Reply To: Rules that offer historically accurate movement rates – are there any?

[McLaddie]

It only makes sense that the outcome is that the unengaged rgt can move further than the engaged one. So that blows the “standard movement rate” out of the water…. as was the initial question… there are so many factors that can affect movement rate…. they must be taken into account somewhere…. random movement does not work as it gives too much to chance… a uniform rate is not accurate as it doesn’t reflect the reality of the situation and to say the turn is an hour and this is what that “hour” encompasses doesn’t work with me….

Poniatowski:

Well, I guess I’d ask:  What constitute ‘engaged’ ?  I gave the example of the Confederates and Pickett’s Charge. Were they ‘engaged’ crossing that 1600 yards of ground under fire?  Certainly Soult wasn’t engaged.  Leith’s division at Salamanca was under fire as it advanced, and even stopped to dress lines because of the casualties. However, they all made at least 75 yards a minute… that isn’t a ‘standard’ but an average under many of the factors you mention.  So, what does that say about the ‘reality’ of the situation?  I have to admit that is not what I expected to find, but it is remaining remarkably consistent and when it isn’t, in most cases the reasons are pretty obvious from the accounts.

If the troops are within 300 yards of the enemy or less, the speed and consistency of average movement won’t be there because of command decisions, as well as the troops don’t have as far to go and the troops stop to fire and/or charge which will impact that average.  From what I have read, infantry moving behind the battle line can be expected to cover 2.5 miles an hour.  Once under artillery fire, about 1000 to 1200 yards from the enemy troops, they average about 75 yards per minute.  Once within musket range, which is about 250 yards on the outside [There are occasions when the French actually started firing from that range, such as Talavera] you have a lot going on and movement will vary for a whole lot of reasons.

that is why I go to many commanders micromanaging… not one, making broad assumptions…. as is pointed out over and over again in this discussion… unengaged troops that spend their whole turn moving should absolutely be able to move further in a turn than engaged troops doing other stuff.. you cannot just white wash it and average it all out…. that alone to me is the difference between grand tactical and tactical level games.

I think I may not have been clear. I wasn’t “white washing” anything.  I was averaging what troops accomplished with all the dirty laundry present.  As I said, Pickett’s charge was under heavy artillery fire, crossing fences, losing officers, dressing lines, maneuvering by wheels and yet  managed to cross 1400 to 1600 yards in twenty minutes.  It isn’t whether troops spend their whole turn moving or not, but at what rate they can be expected to move on average rate with all those factors when they do move.   Obviously, when troops do other stuff than move, they aren’t going to move as far.

When they don’t it is going to be for one of four reasons:  Command decisions, Terrain obstacles,  enemy actions, or cohesion issues, all of which are now included in most game mechanics.   Variable movement is certainly a possibility. My questions would be how ‘variable’ was movement on the battlefield and why?   So far, whenever I find writers mentioning time and movement, regardless of the conditions and those factors you mention, troops are still averaging @75 yards per minute…  and when they don’t there are specific reasons for that.  That’s all we have to go on when putting together a historical game.

If the game is going to have players at a grand tactical level, then all those factors you mentioned are going to be included in any unit movement.  It is below the players purview.   So, what can that corps commander expect troops to do when they move?  Will the units always achieve those rates?  No, but there is an average that it is reasonable to expect based on their experience… and our study of that experience.

McLaddie