Reply To: WW2 Wargame Development

[Pieter Roos]

I’d like to be clear that I really like your mechanic of limiting one side to activating either one arm or another, I think it is a great idea and captures the doctrinal or training limitations of one side (or both sides if need be) and is a big step beyond rules that either ignore such factors totally in favor of sometimes spurious technical detail (“at this range I can penetrate your tank’s armor by ONE MM, so you are destroyed!”) or simply giving one side fewer activations to show poorer command and control. One of the few rules I can think of with a similar aim is Spearhead with it’s target limitations. I think the rule should be applied selectively, and possibly to most combatants before 1942 – certainly Soviet and American forces before late war had similar issues. The point of the last few posts being that I would NOT apply it British I tanks in a planned attack – positional warfare, as you say.

I do take exception to your characterization of Gott and Auchinleck as incompetent. Historian Correlli Barnett wrote a whole book, The Desert Generals, pushing back on Montgomery’s self aggrandizement as the only British general able to win. My thought is that he was lucky in three areas; as newly appointed commanders he and Alexander had more ability to push-back Churchill’s demands (as did Auckinleck before Crusader, which was a British victory even if it didn’t ‘stick’), he arrived just as the logistical and equipment quality equation tipped strongly in the favor of the Allies, and he took command just at the point where the desert war became positional rather than maneuver in nature. I suspect, based on his performance during the German retreat from Alamein, Goodwood and Market Garden, that a Monty in charge at Gazala and after would be viewed very differently, as another commander out of his depth in maneuver warfare against Rommel and the Germans. It is interesting to speculate on how the desert war would have unfolded if O’Conner and Coombe had not been captured in early 1941!

Gott was probably competent, although when he was tapped to assume the role Montgomery took he said he was very tired and thought some new blood and new ideas were called for (the question as to Montgomery’s ideas being “new” is open).  Neame and Ritchie were probably out of their depth, and both were delt poor hands in many respects either from troop and organizational dysfunction for Neame and command difficulties (being junior and not having commanded at that level before) for Ritchie.