Apologies for the lateness of this reply to our earlier discussion, I seem to have been very busy this week, so I deliberately put off replying until I could give it a proper re-read. Only two points to continue the discussion, from my POV:
1 – the ability of troops to suppress more than a single target. I had this problem with WRG1925-1950, with human wave tactics just a little bit too effective since although the whole platoon could be halted by the effect of fire on a single element, once the rest of the platoon started firing back then generally the initial firer would just be swamped. It felt a much more realistic balance if an element with automatic weapons could target subsequent bases if they were within 25m or so of the first target, and the first target had been destroyed or suppressed. It enables a well-armed section to hold up a platoon, basically.
2 – the initial pin reaction of troops who witness but are not themselves targetted by fire. There is a brilliant description of this happening in the Falklands by the way in Brains & Bullets. I was thinking that this again would again encourage reserves by reducing the (initial) performance of troops that come under fire. BTW, I was only thinking of this in the case of previously unlocated enemies, or in the first round of enemy fire.