I’m not sure when the fashion for bagging the Canucks started, but I don’t recall so many authors making uncomplimentary remarks about them, and 21 AG in general, when I first started learning about this stuff as a kid. I tend to think that there was a wave of Germanophilia in military history in the 1980s. This was kicked off by Dupuy’s observation in “Numbers, Predictions and War” (1979) that, according to his Quantified Judgement Method, the Germans had higher combat effectiveness than anyone else; then reinforced by van Creveld’s “Fighting Power” (1982) on differences between Wehrmacht and US Army command style; and culminated in the rather silly proposition, in John Ellis’ “Brute Force” (1990), that the Allies were not as good as the Germans because they could not win without applying overwhelming force. I believe that books like Ben Kite’s “Stout Hearts” show that the pendulum has swung back the other way, and wonder of Caravaggio’s book is following the trend.
But until the more pro-Allied authors start to engage with Dupuy’s stuff in a rigorous way, then he will still hold sway, perhaps?
Based on some actual Canadian generals, contemporary at the time, the order of “…operational and tactical effectiveness… [placed] the Germans first, followed in order by the Americans [!], the British and finally the Canadians.” goddam. 🙂 The author is a Canadian and vet with long service. The gist of the book is to put 4th Cdn Armd in a better light than it earned for itself by not closing the Falaise Gap in time to prevent the Germans that did escape to escape.
I have never seen anything very convincing to show that any of the Allied nations was very much better or worse than another. I don’t find much of the inter-Allied squabbling very edifying or convincing, for that matter.