‘Blundering To Glory’ : Napoleon’s Military Campaigns

[OotKust]

BLUNDERING TO GLORY : NAPOLEON’S MILITARY CAMPAIGNS
By: Connelly, Owen [Revised Edition 1999].

A 30 year old tome I’d never seen reference too before. And now I’ve found a copy online, I can see why.
It seems the author, a Professor, revered as a veteran of Korea, like many other ‘academic’ authors, knows little about his subject.I wonder what his compatriots truly thought about the demolition of Napoleon.

Not worth paying for is my summation.

From technical errors- like I have never seen anyone before annotate the Chasseur A Cheval de la garde imperialé as the ‘First Chasseurs’. ! WTF #1

To semantic errors- not knowing how and why Divisions and Corps were ‘formed’ etc. WTF #2

Historical errors of fact- citing anomalous reasons for various events, such as the surrounding of Macks force at Ulm; citing as ‘reserves’ and in support the two Heavy Cavalry Divisions at Austerlitz; the assertion that Kutuzov only wanted to ‘delay’ Mortier on the Danube and not destroy him etc. WTF #…. xxx

Obviously an admirer of Marshal Davout, he beknights him with ‘being given command’ over half of Soults Corps (the defensive Southern portion of the Goldbach).

“Davout, in the predawn hours, had taken over the French south (right) flank with 3000 infantry and 4000 cavalry from Soult.”

While in practice he (Davout) did so, by virtue of his own ‘status’ no actual order or document has ever been found that so states the fact. Nor did Davout himself state any such thing, not even a hint, in his family memoires. You would logically expect such a matter to be confirmed, in writing.

Of course we know (factually and documented) that Davout didn’t ‘arrive’ at the Goldbach, just West of Tellnitz, until after 0800- when day had dawned, albeit in a foggy stew. Nor did he have 3000 men with him. Heudelets Brigade had been designated his avant-garde, and had barely 1600 or so across several units.

As for 4000 ‘cavalry’- well Soult had no such thing! His own ‘legere division’ had been stripped of two of the four regiments to other purposes; and the 3rd Dragoon Division that ‘had’ been attached to him all campaign, had been withdraw to the actual command of Murat as commander of the Cavalry Reserve by at least the day before.

This ignores the fact that command was ‘nominal’- Napoleon issued orders directly as he saw fit.

This is as gross a falsehood as Segurs’ memoires claims that Davout was present at the midnight ‘conference’ on December 1 and again (or some other claimed) at ‘breakfast’ with the Emperor, what between 0400 and 0600 on December 2.

Davout was of course riding hard after Friants Division, with his delay being he was with the outposts toward Pressburg, well East of Vienna when the march orders were received.

Friants Division the only one in distance capable of reaching the battlefield. So he could neither attend those meetings as he WAS NOT PRESENT at Brunn or anywhere close.

The book is so full of false claims, I repeat- did he ever read anything about them? He has-

“driving such Russians as had forded the brook back across, and establishing a stable line. … There were lightly frozen marshes on the enemy side of the Goldbach, and the masses of Russian infantry crashed through and found themselves bogged down in mud and freezing water.”

Never, in any book or report have I read that any Russians attempted, or did, traverse the Goldbach by any means other than the well established bridges and roading network. Nor the French. The Goldbach may have been a narrow tributary in Winter, but its’ edges were swampy swathes of water covered, like the larger ponds, with ice. Despite the Allied armies having sappers and engineers present, including a nominal bridge-train somewhere, again nothing is written that they were used or even attempted.

Another failed fact is written as-

“At about 9:30 AM, Napoleon had ordered Soult to retake the Pratzen, and his corps, which had been waiting for the order, sprang into action. (The marshal cockily promised to deliver in fifteen minutes.)”

The French, and certainly not St.Hilaire, ever ‘sprang’ into action. They marched precisely and in step uphill to the plateau they had vacated several days earlier (the same fog covered their positions as well). In fact they had march exactly down this same slope, but in battalion squares!

I doubt Soult was ever cocky. He was a scientific and calculating individual little given to mirth. And the question posed directly by N. was “how long will it take to get there?”

Thus I see in the book a lot of ‘mansplaining’ going on- injections of modernism and transliteration making modern allusions to events that never happened.

On a scale of probability, there may be 30-40% of accurate information, but one needs to know it to identify the rest.

And so it goes- just as that fantasy movie of battle by Ridley, he goes on and on- by 2000 we all knew that the ‘lie’ about 20,000 Russians was N. imperial propaganda, but apparently not this author.

“The Russians were pressed into a more and more constricted space and finally broken and thrown into flight across the marshes and ponds, where the ice broke and hundreds of men were drowned. The firm ground between the larger ponds was enfiladed by the French artillery, including that of the Guard, and became a hideous killing ground in itself.”

Those Russians hardly ever fought anyway- they were the barricaded remnants, and yes about 20,000 of them, of Büxhowdens ineptitude and drunkenness (?) that kept them out of the battle entirely all day.

Strange that the Austrians barely get a mention. In this same place, at the same time, but organised better a lot earlier, Kienmayers forces that had fought and taken Tellnitz by 0900, marched successfully South via the Menitz road and around the Southern edge of the Sachen Ponds, including ALL his 12 horse artillery pieces, two cavalry regiments AND the remnants of 5 battalions of Grenze.

And by my reading, the only artillery mobile on the battlefield enough were the Guard Artillery*- though I doubt all companies could span the position on the edge of the Augezd escarpment. Thus they flayed the stationary Russian batteries below on the roadway and any infantry units passing Eastward to escape the entrapment they found themselves in.

*Like other elements, Napoleon requisitioned resources ad-hoc and sourced extra train horses to do so. He wanted to give his Garde, in particular, experience, and so shooting ducks in the pond was one such example.

And more-

“By 4:00 PM, when the sun of Austerlitz began to set and the snow began to fall, the Russian army was in totally disorganized retreat. Murat found pursuit impossible.”

Snow? Did I overlook something? Actually, those components that had avoided battle, especially some of the Russian LeibGarde, marched away in good order. So had those early engagements (Miloradovic, Kienmayer etc.)
Others were trapped in the encirclement, mostly captured and yes, some escaped by stealth throughout the night.

Murat didn’t find “pursuit impossible”. But his cavalry corps had all been engaged in the main battles-  few had more than minor losses but the temperature and conditions were such that horses were worn out as were the men being mounted since 0800 or earlier.

I’ll finish no further in the train than with-

“There is one curious fact about Austerlitz, however, which is often overlooked. Napoleon did not use all his available troops to combat the czar”.

Strangely, I’ve found every resource has cited the fact. Again, I wonder, despite the plethora of biblio references, did he actually read and use them?

Seems we have another version of the ‘kind of true’ that has been used against Mr Bowden and his erstwhile foreign language ‘sources’ (ie citations of others biblios).

regards,
davew

Swinging from left to right no matter where the hobby goes!

[Aethelflaeda was framed]

Yeah, it’s pretty bad. Written by a guy who clearly thought he would have better than Napoleon in the same situation.

Mick Hayman
Margate and New Orleans

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