15/10/2017 at 20:50 #73988
Just found this old After Action Review from a Dirtside game we played last year, done in the manner of a defeated general explaining his folly. Thought it might be fun. I was playing Microworld Foundationists (which I interpreted to be a race of religious zealouts) and got beat.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Captain General I.M. Sumbich of His Holiness’ Righteous Foundationist Host
SUBJECT: AAR for the recent defeat suffered in the Megalopolis Campaign
The recent defeat suffered at the hands of the infidel forces, led by the Father/Son mercenary scum of of The House of Dodge can be attributed to the following causes:
1) Lack of preparedness for aerial threats. For budgetary reasons, the air defense component has been allowed to languish in both numbers and quality. We were indeed fortunate that the infidel airstrikes were conducted in a haphazard manner or our losses could have been catastrophic. Intelligence suggests that our fortune was due to electronic malfunctions of the attacking aerospace forces. Perhaps Divine Intervention played a part as well. In any case, this defect must be rectified.
2) Poor understanding of the force structure and use of infantry. This was demonstrated in several ways. The incorrect manifesting of Teams vs Squads in drop pods led to a lack of concentration of forces, wastage of transport assets and unnecessary scattering of forces in the drop zone. The failure of elite power armor troops to close with and assault enemy “terminator” armor, even with numerical superiority, was cause for concern (the surviving non-performing officers have been sent to re-education camps in the hope that they will rediscover their religious dedication). The use of mechanized infantry was a complete non-factor during this operation and must be regarded as a failure to adequately utilize the assets invested in this effort. Finally, the brave but ultimately tragic charge into the teeth of a platoon of Main Battle tanks by the green but religiously committed Power Armor “white platoon” of Moore’s Volunteers demonstrated a poor grasp of infantry tactics in general.
3) Poor use of artillery. While artillery ammunition was plentiful, the number of batteries was insufficient to deliver the kind of righteous blows that artillery should be capable of. There was one significant success that resulted in the enemy artillery park being purified by fire. Other than that however, there was generally poor coordination of artillery assets in general. There was no use of screening, and poor concentrations called in upon a moving and elusive enemy. In future operations, artillery must not be attached to headquarters elements, but must be independent. They can still take the benefit of HQ air defense and command and control assets, but must be activated in a logical sequence. The batteries must NEVER be silent, but performing a task on every phase of an operation. The use of “shoot and scoot” tactics must be reinforced in training. Reconnaissance support needs to improve as well.
4) Lack of drop zone coordination. The disaster at “Martyr Hill” was a direct result of not understanding the proper sequencing and spacing of drop pod deliveries and coordination with other forces to support the landing. The enemy was able to pin our forces in place with huge Mechs (the first time these imposing threats have been encountered by our forces) and annihilate them with concentrated artillery. Once again, divine intervention caused the Mechs to quit firing for some reason and enable our troops to incinerate one of the abominations with Fusion gun fire. Future drop zone operations must feature instant activation and maneuver to preclude this kind of outcome.
5) Lack of air support. Our forces faith in the use of heavily armed, fast moving grav vehicles has been vindicated (most notably in the smiting of the enemy VTOLs), but they cannot accomplish their tasks alone. The enemies’ growing skill in the use of airpower assets have awakened us to the possibilities of this arm.
6) Failure to focus upon mission objectives. The command intent was to focus on the annihilation of enemy forces and follow up with the taking of objectives. Unfortunately, this understandable preoccupation with scourging the enemy did not lead to mission accomplishment in the manner intended. The lack of time and the effects of enemy action rendered the strategy impotent.
CONCLUSION: Future operations will take these factors into account so that we may advance our glorious cause with renewed fervor and success.
Lt. General, COMMANDING
His Holiness’ Foundationist Host
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