Do You Need Victory Conditions in Games…

[Who Asked This Joker]

At the risk of sounding pedantic, all games have victory conditions.  Something as simple as “Destroy the enemy army” or more complex like “Destroy the enemy base without losing half of your own army.”  The latter, BTW is probably what your game lacked.  You needed a stipulation that you could not take excessive casualties expressed in terms of percent lost or percent of points lost if you are so inclined.

So, all games need victory conditions or they are not really games.  😉  However, I think a good scenario would have interesting objectives and, even better, changing objectives based on what you did and when you did it.  An example of changing victory conditions.  “Rescue the hostages by turn 6 and then escape through the north edge of the board.  If you don’t rescue the hostages (secure them really) by turn 6, then sieze the prison and hold until relieved (Turn 12).”  Stuff like that.  After turn 6, the enemy forces maybe start to show up in droves so you have to hold them off until Turn X where it is then assumed that gun ships or whatever come and carry your forces away.

 

 

 

John

"Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man's character, give him power."

--Abraham Lincoln

[Rhoderic]

I think I may just be posting for the sake of keeping an interesting debate going (and in the right direction) at this point, but I’m doing it in the spirit of gentlepersonly mooting. Just want to stress that, lest this post come across as aggressive or hectoring, which is not the attitude I’m writing this with.

Who Asked This Joker wrote:

At the risk of sounding pedantic, all games have victory conditions. Something as simple as “Destroy the enemy army” or more complex like “Destroy the enemy base without losing half of your own army.” The latter, BTW is probably what your game lacked. You needed a stipulation that you could not take excessive casualties expressed in terms of percent lost or percent of points lost if you are so inclined.

Pedantically (), I’d say “Destroy the enemy base without losing half of your own army” is still too imperfect a refinement. You need to define “destroy the enemy base” and “losing half of your own army” for that to be a material, applicable victory condition. But when that’s done, new imperfections are introduced as a consequence. Does it make sense that the defender wins if one guard tower in a far corner is left badly damaged but still standing? Are 49 dead soldiers out of 100 acceptable losses, but does that flip over to unacceptable losses with fatality number 50? If going by points values, are dozens of footslogging grunts acceptable losses as long as that one skunkworks hovertank doesn’t lose its final damage box? In the eyes of some in your side’s military organisation (and the bodies it’s answerable to), that may be acceptable, in the eyes of others of their peers it may not… so, should a definition of victory follow only the reasoning and motivation of one interested party to the exclusion of all others? These are just some examples of problems.

Trying to amend them with yet more complex definitions of victory brings us to the tax law analogy, and as our figurative flowchart becomes increasingly like something that seems favourable for coding in C++, we’ll likely just run into more elaborate versions of situations where the result “on paper” doesn’t match the subtleties and commonsensical outlook of the circumstances on the table. At least, that’s what I believe would happen. My attitude to complex victory conditions may rate as pessimistic, I don’t know.

Note that this isn’t the same as the argument that “kill the enemy” should be the only true objective and everything else will follow from it. I’m a nonparticipant in that dimension of this topic. I’m just saying, objectives (in the sense of not-entirely-measurable goals) are well and good, but victory conditions are superfluous at best and counterproductive at worst, to a fun game.

Who Asked This Joker wrote:

So, all games need victory conditions or they are not really games.

What are the victory conditions in a pen-and-paper roleplaying game, especially one of the many roleplaying games that go beyond the “enter dungeon, kill boss, take treasure” format? There’s goals and motivations, sure, and there’s certainly results, outcomes and consequences, but when do you win at an RPG?

I’m inclined to think, that only if what we may loosely define as the roleplaying and storytelling elements of wargaming are entirely disregarded (which seems to me like an endeavour that would take bloody-minded resolve, and for no benefit) does a wargame genuinely suffer from not having victory conditions in the strict sense.

[Glenn Pearce]

Hello Noel!

Noel wrote:

There is always a higher authority.

In your example yes. Most of the games I play and I am referring to no. The players are the CnC.

Best regards,

Glenn

[Noel]

Glenn Pearce wrote:

Hello Noel!

Noel wrote:

There is always a higher authority.

In your example yes. Most of the games I play and I am referring to no. The players are the CnC. Best regards, Glenn

 

In that case, are your scenarios designed so that the players must take into account wider strategic considerations outside the scope of the battle?

[Glenn Pearce]

Hello Noel!

Noel wrote:

In that case, are your scenarios designed so that the players must take into account wider strategic considerations outside the scope of the battle?

No. There is often an overview that explains what prompted the battle and how it ended and why. The players, however, are under no obligation to follow any of that. They are free to design their battle anyway they want. Sometimes they are locked into a starting position and other times they are free to pick their own ground to some extent. The sole objective is to destroy the enemy or prevent the other side from doing so. Forcing an enemy to withdraw or surrender is considered as meeting the sole objective. Any strategic considerations outside the scope of the battle are also beyond the time allotted for the battle.

Best regards,

Glenn

[Norm S]

Waterloo 1815 – Hougoumont became a significant focus and objective of the battle, drawing in thousands of troops. The death toll was high as a consequence of trying to control the chateau, not as a consequence of simply trying to cause casualties amongst the enemy. It seems reasonable that a scenario designer would want to make control of the Chateau an objective to reflect the subject being modelled.

Although we are just playing games and it doesn’t matter how we go about that. We only really need enjoy and to convince ourselves and perhaps those we actually game with as to the merits of what we do.

[Chris Pringle]

irishserb wrote:

I was recently reading a game scenario that had these elaborate and convaluted victory conditions. Reading them was a little like reading tax law. […] Dude, if I achieve a 10 to 1 kill ratio, destroy your ability to fight, capture the rest of your troops, and do it in less time than given, I won. [In another game] the victory conditions gave me an overwhelming victory, but in my heart, I knew that I was beaten during the game. The other player out-played me, and was just given a nearly unwinable situation. The victory conditions were irrelevent. So, I am curious. Are victory conditions important to you? Or is winning and losing more of an internal issue, or otherwise, often detirmined in a different way?

I’d like to contribute to this fun discussion again but from a different angle.

We all love a post-battle discussion about who did well or badly, and what different plans might have worked better. Clear victory conditions lend structure to that discussion. The discussion may result in agreeing that the victory conditions are poorly designed! But having victory conditions as a measure of success does give you a headstart in that discussion, over just “well I reckon my cavalry threatening your line of communications would have swung it”, or “if we’d played another 2 turns / 2 hours your army would probably have broken” etc.

We playtest lots of scenarios for BBB. Sometimes we feel the victory conditions are pitched just right in the first draft; other times it takes multiple iterations and tweaks before we are happy to share them publicly with the BBB gaming community. But the discussions are always good fun, and victory conditions enhance them.

Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!

https://uk.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/BBB_wargames/info

http://bloodybigbattles.blogspot.co.uk/

 

[irishserb]

That is true of us to some degree after historical scenarios, where the victory conditions are an explanation of actual outcomes, but I find that we tend to ignore quantified victory conditions in those discussions.  But, most of our discussions tend to center around results of tactical events; motivations, expectations, and alternatives, rather than being associated with published victory conditions.

[Prince Rhys]

I think this is a very fascinating and excellent discussion and every single poster has made excellent points and contributed to the discussion, and I am going to try to live up to this trend. However, these are my own personal opinions from my experience as a wargamer, and also an amateur fan of military history.

First of all I think some loose definitions would help.

Objective: In this context a geographic location upon the battlefield table (wargames specific) that would be desirous for one or both sides to capture and/or hold for the remainder of the game and render significant advantage to the side that occupies this point in terms of offering a certain degree of domination of this area of the battlefield. It would also allow for additional leverage to the side who holds it without any contestation whatsoever by the opposing side. Could be considered a firm objective for one or both sides by the scenario designer. However, another objective could be to engage and distract a particular opposing command, or conduct a reconnaissance in force, against the opposing side in the area facing your command. Or, even to conduct an assault against a specified enemy command and clear them out but this would usually be associated with a geographical point. These types of objectives are hard to quantify, and therefore need careful consideration by both sides post game – this where an effective umpire or games master comes into their own. They also need to know how to have fun and should ideally be the scenario creator.

Further personal opinion upon the subject of objectives: Should scenarios and scenario designers include objectives as decisive victory conditions for one side or another? I don’t believe it is necessary. Dominating terrain is obvious to wargamers who will quickly be able to assess its importance and relevance to how they should play the game with the forces available to them. However, an objective, at the end of the game, if dominated by one side or another, should then give leverage to that sides argument for victory. However, the argument for victory should be weighted with a number of factors and not the simplistic term of I hold 4 points worth of objectives. In my opinion objectives should not be assigned points to be counted up and measured (quantified) as victory conditions as this, I believe, does detract from the scenario and its historical importance. Even if it is a fictitious historical encounter. There should always be some sort of narrative behind any historical encounter (i.e. the use of historical opponents) whether based on an actual encounter or a fictional encounter.

Strategic Objective: This can also be a geographic point, but as Chris Pringle points out typically it is the overarching desire for an army or armies on campaign to reach a major, or even, capital city. Usually reaching and entering a capital city after pushing the enemy so far back would result in a total loss of confidence of the command and governement of said forces who would then sue for peace after occupation of a major or capital city. However, in 1812, Napoleon failed to achieve this as Glenn Pearce notes and left a dangerous army in the field that ravaged arguably the finest army Napoleon ever commanded.

Further personal opinion upon the subject of Strategic objectives: The strategic objective, will not typically be on the battlefield of a tabletop wargame – usually. It is a primary objective, of which there may be a singular or multiple primary objectives, of an army on campaign and to consider this strategic objective as relevant you must, in my opinion, be fighting an going historical campaign to consider its relevance to both armies and where they are on the path to victory. A campaign game must consider a major, or capital city as a strategic objective but it must not be exclusive of the destruction of the opposing army. To consider only one or the other will result in a lopsided and unrealistic campaign. Simply rushing to pre-arranged objectives will not on its own bring about victory and you will fall into the traps and mistakes made by German commanders at the Wacht Am Rhein Ardennes offensive. However, this does prove that there are historical instances of armies believing subjectively that this will achieve victory. With the gift of historical hindsight we know this not to be true.

Battlefield Victory Conditions: This is specifically aimed at stand alone wargames that are not played as part of a larger campaign. I imagine this applies to the majority of the games we all play and are talking about. First of all, if you are not assuming the overall command of an army i.e. you are commanding a world war two company, or a Union brigade in 1863, A Prussian division in 1870, or a British brigade in 1809, you are a subordinate commander who will have been to briefings and received written orders for the day of battle ahead. Therefore all commanders have pre-set orders to carry out that are perceived will help the army as a whole to achieve favourable conditions for said army. Therefore, all scenarios where you act as a subordinate commander i.e. not an army commander, will need a set of initial battlefield objectives, they can be geographical points on the battlefield, or, as previously discussed, a tactical manoeuvre against a certain enemy command. However, these often changed quickly in a battle as aid de camps and messengers, as well, as runners, carrier pigeons, telegraphers, heliograph operators, and radio operators, relayed messages across the battlefield to various commanders to do something else that differs slightly or significantly to their original orders as result of fumbles, incompetence, mis-communication, desperation, and exploiting sudden breakthroughs as quickly as possible. Therefore, assessing victory or victory conditions on initial orders alone is dangerous and completely out of context. But neither should it be completely discarded. Once again it should be factored in and measured with all other factors at the end of a battle assuming a battle has been fought to a close. This is where I believe Chris Pringle is correct, as a subordinate, you will have clear objectives to achieve but must be considered along with the whole battle.

If assuming the role of an army commander in a stand alone game, then your over arching goal is to destroy as much of the enemy as possible without your own force becoming too demoralised and routing resulting in defeat. This is where I believe Glenn Pierce is correct. Your only requirement here is destruction. If dominating a particular piece of terrain assists you in this and indeed adds expediency to the destruction of the enemy then it is obviously advantageous and take that particular piece of terrain along with any others across your front that will render your army the same service. So long as dominating it does not cost so great a price as to result in your own forces suffering massive casualties that you have a hole open up in your line and/or your force becomes demoralised and starts to rout.

Further personal opinion upon the subject of Victory Conditions:

Therefore, victory conditions are,m I believe both different to battlefield or tactical objectives, and, also, strategic objectives as part of a campaign as well as battles.

Victory conditions for a stand alone battle must be a very carefully considered subject. In my preference a scenario will have some sort of objectives as well as an outline to what each side should aim to achieve, however, these be purposefully ambiguous to allow mis-interpretations as well as allowing a historical flavour for the period to show through. But don’t forget, all commanders, even army commanders had severe restrictions when commanding in the field. So many thing could and did go wrong. But there was also a significant amount of luck. There are also historical examples of armies subjectively pursuing geographical objectives and the hope this would bring about victory with dire consequences for said armies.

I do believe that utilising an umpire or games master, preferably the scenario designer, can help to determine the victory conditions and direct the post-mortem discussions to ultimately decide which side fulfilled most decisively their original goals along side who inflicted the most casualties, as well as who dominated the battlefield the most consistently as well as at the end of the battle. Therefore, in conclusion, I think victory conditions should not be so, i.e. they should not be pre-conditions. The points to determine victory should be decided as part of a gentlemanly discussion at the end of the battle raising all points with all sides.

As previously discussed though, all scenarios whether fictional historical encounters or historical historical encounters, should have a preconceived narrative, as well as carefully but ambiguous scenario perimeters which frames and subtly directs the battle without dictating exactly how each side should fight.

Victory conditions therefore, should not be dictated prior to the battle being fought and have strict objectives, or points to calculate. Leave that to the tournament players. There is no need for that in a friendly club game or an encounter between friends in their man-cave, shed, basement, bedroom, lounge, dining room, – wherever. It is only tournament play with no narrative or historical context that need strictly defined victory pre-conditions.

I thing Glenn, and Chris both raise excellent points but should not be considered exclusive of each other as both point out in their own unique ways. Also, I consider everyone else has made excellent points that has made me think more about scenario design and ensuring that it is fun, engaging, realistic, and, win, lose, or draw, everyone feels welcomed and listened to.

The one victory condition that no one can argue with is that both sides players should have fun – if everyone enjoys the game then it is a successful battle and scenario!

It is always helpful to run a critique of the scenario itself and feedback to the creator/designer how they felt the scenario played and any changes that may be considered. But this shouldn’t be seen as a failing of a scenario. Evolving rules, house rules, and scenarios, and eventually campaigns with a bunch of like minded people is all part of the fun. And different people bring many different ideas and perspectives to the thing which can only be a good thing like this discussion.

However, I don’t think any of the ideas and points brought to this discussion should be considered exclusive of each other, but as part of a whole for determining how well each side fared.

Anyway, I’ve rambled on too much already.

 

 

[Glenn Pearce]

Chris Pringle wrote:

We all love a post-battle discussion about who did well or badly, and what different plans might have worked better. Clear victory conditions lend structure to that discussion. The discussion may result in agreeing that the victory conditions are poorly designed! But having victory conditions as a measure of success does give you a headstart in that discussion, over just “well I reckon my cavalry threatening your line of communications would have swung it”, or “if we’d played another 2 turns / 2 hours your army would probably have broken” etc.

Am I reading this right? It appears that you are saying that after playing a game with “clear victory conditions”, you can discover that “the victory conditions are poorly designed”? And you still don’t know who really won the game? You then indicate that you use these poorly designed victory conditions, which were previously clear, to leverage your position. Sounds like your using bad ideas to try and justify who actually won or lost, or who should have actually won or lost. So the game is basically a dud?

Chris Pringle wrote:

We playtest lots of scenarios for BBB. Sometimes we feel the victory conditions are pitched just right in the first draft; other times it takes multiple iterations and tweaks before we are happy to share them publicly with the BBB gaming community. But the discussions are always good fun, and victory conditions enhance them.

It appears to me that your system is under constant revision that often falls short of its own objectives……..to clearly show who won and who lost the game in a satisfactory manner to all of the players.

Wouldn’t it make more sense to simply dump the concept as inadequate?

This was one of the many reasons why we walked away from this type of gaming years ago.

[Glenn Pearce]

Pretty much since the beginning of time there has only been one objective in battle and that’s to clobber/destroy/break/kill, the other guy. The period I know best is the Horse & Musket era where armies generally deployed in the open for large battles in an attempt to achieve that objective.

Knowing that they will generally be fighting in the open the armies were designed to support that activity. They were often broken down into battalions/regiments of 500 men with their primary fighting formation being what is called a line. These were subsequently organized into higher formations of Brigades, Divisions, Corps and Armies. Who also often deployed in lines or a series of lines.

Whenever possible an army would hold a “council of war” prior to a battle at which time a “plan of action” would be developed. From there orders would be issued and every unit/command would be assigned to a location for the coming battle and if possible a briefing on what they were expected to do. Sometimes the actual plan of the battle remained in the commanders head and was only executed on his command during the battle.

If an army had decided that it would adopt a defensive position it would generally form up in a line of battle. This is generally just a long line that could cover miles and every unit was expected to be close enough to its neighbour  to protect their flanks and/or rears. The better commanders would often use a town/village/farm etc. to anchor the flanks of the army or act as a strong point in advance of or part of the main line. A strong point can serve two purposes. The simple one is it will just break up the attackers line of battle when he attacks, thus channelling his attacks into a zone that the defender can better defend. The more complicated one is a necessity to potentially launch a local counter attack or to use it as an actual anchor in the main line. As the actual battle unfolds the importance of all “terrain features” can, will and often do change. What happens if a defending commander decides to go on the offensive? All previous “terrain features” are no longer of any value to him.

An offensive army will rarely occupy any “terrain features” beyond the obvious such as a hill, river bank, etc. They will often deploy into a line of battle as well that generally matches the frontage of the defender. Their commander will often place his troops as close to the enemy as possible that he plans to attack. The planned attack could be extremely complex depending on how sophisticated the commander was and what troops he had at his disposal.  It was not uncommon for a commander to maintain control over exactly how, when, and where attacks were made. He had to also be on guard for any unexpected counter or flank attacks that the defender might launch.

Once an attacker has roughly established the defenders line of battle he now has to shore up his attack plan to see if he can be successful in rupturing the enemies line. The normal weak points are the flanks followed by any areas in the main line that look vulnerable. Traditionally these are the exposed areas in the open where artillery, infantry and cavalry attacks can be used to their best advantage. And are of course easiest to maneuver to.

The defender also goes through a similar exercise except he is trying to ensure that all of his vulnerable areas are as secure as possible and can be reinforced if necessary. He also knows that the battle can develop in a number of unlimited ways. Being prepared to move his flanks or pull his army back in part or in full can do a lot to help him defend his position and maintain his line of battle. If possible or as part of his plan counter attacks or a major offensive is also well served when planned in advance.

So as you can see the actual dynamics of major warfare in this period can be very fluid and is often referred to as the ebb and flow of battle. Once you limit the game to certain “victory conditions” the ebb and flow is generally restricted to those pre defined areas. So it becomes hamstrung.

Once a scenario designer introduces “victory conditions” that are dependent on “terrain features” and generally enhanced  with “victory points” the entire natural development of an army, its thinking and its effectiveness has been severely ruptured. It actually turns things upside down. The attackers focus is no longer on the vulnerable points of the enemies line of battle. The objective has changed from destroying the enemies army at its weakest points to taking his strong points! He is also now obligated to force his army into generally tight positions that are hard to maneuver in and make it extremely difficult for him to utilize his combined forces to their maximum effect. Cavalry are generally useless in most defined “terrain features” and the artillery effect is often greatly reduced as well. Even the classic close order infantry attack is often rendered useless. So the attacker has lost all of his advantages.

Well this is now paradise for the defender as he knows exactly where the attacker will strike. Shore up those strong points even more and ensure that reinforcements are handy and the jobs done! A piece of cake. The defender has now enhanced all of his advantages.

Since a lot of “terrain features” were fought over and are often highlighted in narratives of battles some scenario writers have mistakenly seized on these as critical objectives of a given battle. When in fact they were generally just short term objectives at best that could just as easily have played no part in the battle. To force players into this narrow matrix of “terrain features” defies all military logic.

As previously stated I’ve played a lot of various “victory condition” games and everyone of them has fallen flat. I was unable to find any satisfaction or realisms in these games. They are just too contrived for my taste. Everyone in my group greatly enjoy the games that I put on as everyone is able to test their skills to the maximum without any fabricated scenario objectives and know when the game is over that their victory or defeat was a direct result of their skills and not a matter of an elaborate scavenger hunt.  

Since Norm Smith has brought up Waterloo 1815 and Hougoumont, I’ll use that battle as an example.

The battlefield itself is textbook material and Wellington chose it wisely. It blocks the main road which any attacker must use to push his army forward. It contains a complicated hill/ridge system that gives a number of advantages to a defending army. There are chateaus on both flanks and in the center. The ones on both flanks will serve to help protect his main battle line from easily being disrupted by a flank attack. The ones in the center will break up any attack on the center of his army. Obviously his entire army can’t hide in these chateaus so only an extremely small fraction of his army is allocated to these. Fearing that Napoleon might try to outflank him on his extreme right he places a large force there blocking another road. They are however, not part of his main battle line at Waterloo.

Napoleon deploys his army also in a textbook fashion. One infantry corps is placed on either side of the main road supported by cavalry formations. In the center he places another smaller infantry corps supported by the guard and more cavalry. Napoleon thinks that he will win this battle by executing a “masse de rupture“. That’s “breaking the enemy’s line of battle”. Certainly not by capturing all the chateaus.  He has very little if any concern about any of the chateaus other then where he plans to make his main attack they will restrict the scope of his attack. He also can’t easily launch an effective attack on Wellingtons center as it is protected by a couple of chateaus. He would have to swing his attacking force around the center chateaus exposing the attack to all kinds of counterattacks. The attack will proceed whether or not he controls the chateaus.

Napoleon has selected the “open area” on his right to be the main target of his attack. His entire army has been deployed to either or attack or support that position. They are in no way shape or fashion deployed to take as many “terrain features” as possible.

To weaken the actual “open area” that Napoleon plans to attack he orders a diversionary attack against Hougoumont. The intention is that Wellington will be forced to draw troops away from the “open area” that Napoleon actually plans to attack.  Actually holding Hougoumont is not important to Napoleon.

Napoleon forms a “grand battery” drawing on the resources of his artillery from a number of commands to commence a bombardment of the “open area” he plans to attack. This weakens the striking power of these various commands. Once he thinks the battery has done its job an entire infantry corps attacks across the front of the “open area”. This is critical as some believe that the more units you can cram into a given attack area increases your chances of success. Provided of course that it can maintain order and deliver an assault uniformly.  The down side is the bigger the force the greater the potential for things to go wrong.

Once the infantry assault breaches the main enemy line (masse de rupture) cavalry and reserves are planned to be pushed in where they will spread out and roll up the enemy line in both directions.

If Napoleons plan had succeeded holding every chateau on the battlefield would not have saved Wellingtons army from total destruction.   

We have been playing games without artificial “victory conditions”, “terrain features”, “victory points” for years and players can’t get enough of them.

Norm, we also don’t directly count casualties as a representative of performance. Entire units and their respective Brigades are used as part of an overall evaluation system.

When we finish a game there is never any dispute over who won. The only objective has been obtained. One side has either acknowledged that the other side has won, or they announce that they are withdrawing. Any post game talk centers around why one side won or lost. It’s usually an acknowledgement that one side had a poor plan, poor execution or was simply out manoeuvred. The discussion is never wasted away on who should have had more or better “victory objectives” , “points” or “terrain objectives”.

[Chris Pringle]

Glenn Pearce wrote:

It appears to me that your system is under constant revision that often falls short of its own objectives……..to clearly show who won and who lost the game in a satisfactory manner to all of the players. Wouldn’t it make more sense to simply dump the concept as inadequate?

Like I said … let’s agree to disagree.

[Phil Dutré]

It might help to look at how orders are structured in real military operations. In modern armies, you usually have a variant on the following (apart from defining terrain landmarks, logistics, etc.):

• explain what the bigger context is. E.g. a company commander, giving an order to his platoon commanders, might say: “Our Battalion is going to take the town by tonight”.
• explain the specific order of our own unit: “Our compnay is tasked to attack the suburbs on the north, and take the important railway station by noon”
• Break it down into specific suborder: “To achieve this, platoon A is going to … platoon B is going to … platoon C is going to … “
• On our left, we have company such-and-so, on our right, we have company such-and-so …

The purpose of this scheme is that as a platoon commander receiving orders from the company commander, you have the bigger picture, and you can make impromptu decisions based on that. So, even though your platoon is tasked to occupy a specific terrain feature, but you cannot reach that for whatever reason, you can at least make an informed decision about what to do next or how to make the best of it.

In a wargame, we often lack the bigger context in a game. The scenario objective might be to take the bridge, but often it is not told what the bigger context is, and hence, it is difficult to judge “victory”. Most scenarios are artificial isolated events, and therefore, victory conditions can seem somewhat arbitrary when defined too rigidly.

Hence, I prefer to define scenario objectives AND give an story about the bigger context. Decide after the game how the scenario played out and is the “winner”. Much more fun that way.

[Phil Dutré]

Glenn Pearce wrote:

Pretty much since the beginning of time there has only been one objective in battle and that’s to clobber/destroy/break/kill, the other guy.

I think that’s a gross simplification … if you look at battles that way, you should read more military history 😉 It strongly depends on the echelon at which the battle is fought, and on the specific mission and context.

But I do agree with your overall point. The higher up you go in the hierarchy, terrain features are not an objective. But at some point down the line, some commander is told: “Take Hougomont!”. And commanders below that level are told: “Attack the gate” or “Attack the orchard” … Terrain features are a useful discretization of terrain and help to guide the battle. Although the terrain features might not be a goal by themselves, the orders are often framed using terrain features to reach the goal.

The core of this discussion is that in a game, we want “victory conditions”. In real military operations, “victory conditions” are fluid. There is an objective, an overall plan, and there are orders, but no pre-set definition of what it means to have “won”. An additional complication is that we as wargamers, take up the role of many different commanders at different levels at the same time. Hence, it becoems very difficult to draw strong parallels between how a real military operation is conducted and how we play our games. We can draw inspiration from it, but not much more.

I don’t think there’s a wrong or right in this discussion. Some gamers feel they need precise victory conditions to play the game, others feel scenario objectives and a post-game discussion are a better model.

 

[Victoria Dickson]

Seems to me that in almost every battle at least one side had an objective other than ‘destroy the enemy’, because battles are not fought by equal forces with an equal chance of doing that.  Wellington’s objective at Waterloo wasn’t to destroy the French army, it was to hold on till the Prussians got there and also to ensure that if he didn’t do that that he kept his line of retreat open so his army could get away.  There’s two victory conditions right away, a time based one (survive X amount of turns) and a terrain based one (keep the enemy away from the road to Brussels on his baseline).  That also gives Napoleon a terrain objective, the road to Brussels.

If there is no time pressure or ultimate terrain objective where is the incentive to attack?  Defence is generally stronger than attack, objectives force at least one of the players to go on the offensive, that’s why we have them.  And victory conditions give the player with the weaker army a goal to aim for, even if it’s just to hold out till nightfall.

http://crazywargames.blogspot.co.uk/

[Rhoderic]

Chris Pringle wrote:

irishserb wrote:

I was recently reading a game scenario that had these elaborate and convaluted victory conditions. Reading them was a little like reading tax law. […] Dude, if I achieve a 10 to 1 kill ratio, destroy your ability to fight, capture the rest of your troops, and do it in less time than given, I won. [In another game] the victory conditions gave me an overwhelming victory, but in my heart, I knew that I was beaten during the game. The other player out-played me, and was just given a nearly unwinable situation. The victory conditions were irrelevent. So, I am curious. Are victory conditions important to you? Or is winning and losing more of an internal issue, or otherwise, often detirmined in a different way?

I’d like to contribute to this fun discussion again but from a different angle. We all love a post-battle discussion about who did well or badly, and what different plans might have worked better. Clear victory conditions lend structure to that discussion. The discussion may result in agreeing that the victory conditions are poorly designed! But having victory conditions as a measure of success does give you a headstart in that discussion, over just “well I reckon my cavalry threatening your line of communications would have swung it”, or “if we’d played another 2 turns / 2 hours your army would probably have broken” etc. We playtest lots of scenarios for BBB. Sometimes we feel the victory conditions are pitched just right in the first draft; other times it takes multiple iterations and tweaks before we are happy to share them publicly with the BBB gaming community. But the discussions are always good fun, and victory conditions enhance them.

Weeelll… I think the opposite can just as easily be argued. One person’s head start is another person’s railroading in the “wrong” direction, where VPs and binary on/off-mode victory conditions with unrealistically specific “watersheds” might not reflect the commonsensical interpretation of the outcome of a game.

Player 1: “Your objective was to hold the farmstead uncontested. You have a small number of shaken light cavalry from an originally much larger, now devastated unit left in the farmstead, and they only got there because they fled to it and regrouped there after I wrecked them in combat. The closest relief is your bogged-down infantry half the length of the table away, and they would have to fight their way through my intervening troops. Meanwhile, I have two fairly intact, strong units close to the farmstead, able to assault it from opposite sides, and I have artillery in a very favourable location to support them. Do you really insist you’re holding the farmstead uncontested?”

Player 2: “Yes, because the victory conditions state your units would have to be 4 inches from the farmstead to contest it, but they’re 5-6 inches away. All other factors you name are immaterial because the victory conditions don’t take them into consideration, nor could they feasibly given all the complexities, subtleties and sliding scales. Hence I get 3 VPs, you get 0.”

I agree that this is a fun discussion, though, at least along this dimension of it. There’s certainly no right or wrong, it’s as subjective as our favourite ice cream flavours. I see the argued-for benefits of playing with victory conditions to accompany objectives, it’s just that I subjectively believe they’re outweighed by the benefits of playing with objectives alone without quantified/watershed victory conditions.

[Prince Rhys]

Pretty much since the beginning of time there has only been one objective in battle and that’s to clobber/destroy/break/kill, the other guy.

This is simply not true – the destruction of an enemy army in the field is one of the primary goals of a campaign and not a battle and this needs to be carefully defined. In 1870, Prussia and its German allied states defeated every army in the field of the Imperial French army and still did not win the war!

The period I know best is the Horse & Musket era where armies generally deployed in the open for large battles in an attempt to achieve that objective.

Again this is simply not true – ever heard of a delaying action or a reconnaissance in force battle?

Knowing that they will generally be fighting in the open the armies were designed to support that activity. They were often broken down into battalions/regiments of 500 men with their primary fighting formation being what is called a line. These were subsequently organized into higher formations of Brigades, Divisions, Corps and Armies. Who also often deployed in lines or a series of lines. Whenever possible an army would hold a “council of war” prior to a battle at which time a “plan of action” would be developed. From there orders would be issued and every unit/command would be assigned to a location for the coming battle and if possible a briefing on what they were expected to do.

So basically you agree that a large command, that may well be represented on the table battlefield as an action on its own will have a geographic location and objectives to achieve according to its command briefings and written orders to be carried out in that geographic location by said command?

Sometimes the actual plan of the battle remained in the commanders head and was only executed on his command during the battle. If an army had decided that it would adopt a defensive position it would generally form up in a line of battle. This is generally just a long line that could cover miles and every unit was expected to be close enough to its neighbour to protect their flanks and/or rears. The better commanders would often use a town/village/farm etc. to anchor the flanks of the army or act as a strong point in advance of or part of the main line. A strong point can serve two purposes. The simple one is it will just break up the attackers line of battle when he attacks, thus channelling his attacks into a zone that the defender can better defend. The more complicated one is a necessity to potentially launch a local counter attack or to use it as an actual anchor in the main line.

So you agree physical/geographic locations become important to local commands which are often the ones being represented as an isolated battle on the tabletop?

As the actual battle unfolds the importance of all “terrain features” can, will and often do change. What happens if a defending commander decides to go on the offensive? All previous “terrain features” are no longer of any value to him.

Yes, a counter-attack was usually launched either to re-take a physical location after losing to an enemy force assaulting the physical location. Or, the enemy have been so cut up by trying to assault said location that a counter-attack will hopefully act as the final nail in the coffin and destroy the enemy after they tired to take their objective!

An offensive army will rarely occupy any “terrain features” beyond the obvious such as a hill, river bank, etc. They will often deploy into a line of battle as well that generally matches the frontage of the defender. Their commander will often place his troops as close to the enemy as possible that he plans to attack. The planned attack could be extremely complex depending on how sophisticated the commander was and what troops he had at his disposal. It was not uncommon for a commander to maintain control over exactly how, when, and where attacks were made. He had to also be on guard for any unexpected counter or flank attacks that the defender might launch. Once an attacker has roughly established the defenders line of battle he now has to shore up his attack plan to see if he can be successful in rupturing the enemies line. The normal weak points are the flanks followed by any areas in the main line that look vulnerable. Traditionally these are the exposed areas in the open where artillery, infantry and cavalry attacks can be used to their best advantage. And are of course easiest to maneuver to. The defender also goes through a similar exercise except he is trying to ensure that all of his vulnerable areas are as secure as possible and can be reinforced if necessary. He also knows that the battle can develop in a number of unlimited ways. Being prepared to move his flanks or pull his army back in part or in full can do a lot to help him defend his position and maintain his line of battle. If possible or as part of his plan counter attacks or a major offensive is also well served when planned in advance. So as you can see the actual dynamics of major warfare in this period can be very fluid and is often referred to as the ebb and flow of battle.

You have just described any major battle ever in history… we are all aware that there is an ebb and flow to a battle that does nothing to prove your narrow and singular point.

Once you limit the game to certain “victory conditions” the ebb and flow is generally restricted to those pre defined areas. So it becomes hamstrung. Once a scenario designer introduces “victory conditions” that are dependent on “terrain features” and generally enhanced with “victory points” the entire natural development of an army, its thinking and its effectiveness has been severely ruptured. It actually turns things upside down.

You have missed the point entirely here and have got it backwards. Victory conditions do not in any way limit the potential of a game and certainly doesn’t hamstring it. Objectives and victory conditions give you a goal – something to generally aim for. How to achieve these is entirely down to the player and how they interpret or in deed misinterpret these is all part of the fun and very historically accurate – and unless you can give me an example of a major set-piece battle where the chain of command did not get something wrong at some point then this just goes to show that fumbles and misinterpretations are all part of re-creating historical battles – the human element is in the player. If a player tries to achieve their victory conditions simply moving straight up the battlefield and trying to assault them with no manoeuvring then they will, 99% of the time come a cropper, but in all battles there is also an element of luck also and sometimes a player will get lucky just as commanders did! 

Are you trying to tell us that it is much more satisfying to just watch to armies pointlessly slugging out on the tabletop for hours taking vast un-realistic casualties without any regard for historical narrative or imperative?

The attackers focus is no longer on the vulnerable points of the enemies line of battle. The objective has changed from destroying the enemies army at its weakest points to taking his strong points! He is also now obligated to force his army into generally tight positions that are hard to maneuver in and make it extremely difficult for him to utilize his combined forces to their maximum effect. Cavalry are generally useless in most defined “terrain features” and the artillery effect is often greatly reduced as well. Even the classic close order infantry attack is often rendered useless.

Battle of the Wilderness whereby the confederates chose to attack in difficult terrain as a deliberate command decision ring any bells? Again your view seems to be extremely narrow and singular as to exclude most of history’s military campaigns and battles.

So the attacker has lost all of his advantages. Well this is now paradise for the defender as he knows exactly where the attacker will strike. Shore up those strong points even more and ensure that reinforcements are handy and the jobs done! A piece of cake. The defender has now enhanced all of his advantages. Since a lot of “terrain features” were fought over and are often highlighted in narratives of battles some scenario writers have mistakenly seized on these as critical objectives of a given battle. When in fact they were generally just short term objectives at best that could just as easily have played no part in the battle.

But they did play a part in the battle so therefore they did matter and it was an historical objective that was aimed for, for a part of the battle by that command which may well be represented on the table top as part of an historical re-fight. You seem to be constantly tripping over your own points in terms of wargaming historical actions. 

To force players into this narrow matrix of “terrain features” defies all military logic. As previously stated I’ve played a lot of various “victory condition” games and everyone of them has fallen flat. I was unable to find any satisfaction or realisms in these games. They are just too contrived for my taste. Everyone in my group greatly enjoy the games that I put on as everyone is able to test their skills to the maximum without any fabricated scenario objectives and know when the game is over that their victory or defeat was a direct result of their skills and not a matter of an elaborate scavenger hunt. Since Norm Smith has brought up Waterloo 1815 and Hougoumont, I’ll use that battle as an example. The battlefield itself is textbook material and Wellington chose it wisely. It blocks the main road which any attacker must use to push his army forward.

So you are saying Wellington chose a favourable defensive position to block the road, therefore the terrain in this area was a favourable geographic location to prevent Napoleon from achieving his objective!?

It contains a complicated hill/ridge system that gives a number of advantages to a defending army. There are chateaus on both flanks and in the center. The ones on both flanks will serve to help protect his main battle line from easily being disrupted by a flank attack. The ones in the center will break up any attack on the center of his army. Obviously his entire army can’t hide in these chateaus so only an extremely small fraction of his army is allocated to these.

So wellington used these terrain features to his advantage by deploying troops in these terrain features that became indirectly an objective for French forces – I am sure Napoleon did not see these at strategic objectives in terms of the overall battle but the local commanders in that area did as part of achieving their objectives.

Fearing that Napoleon might try to outflank him on his extreme right he places a large force there blocking another road. They are however, not part of his main battle line at Waterloo. Napoleon deploys his army also in a textbook fashion. One infantry corps is placed on either side of the main road supported by cavalry formations. In the center he places another smaller infantry corps supported by the guard and more cavalry. Napoleon thinks that he will win this battle by executing a “masse de rupture“. That’s “breaking the enemy’s line of battle”. Certainly not by capturing all the chateaus.

Right, so Napoleon is trying to do what all attacking army commanders have ever tried to do…

He has very little if any concern about any of the chateaus other then where he plans to make his main attack they will restrict the scope of his attack. He also can’t easily launch an effective attack on Wellingtons center as it is protected by a couple of chateaus.

They have no strategic value but they do have local tactical value, two very different things that you seem to be getting confused with.

He would have to swing his attacking force around the center chateaus exposing the attack to all kinds of counterattacks. The attack will proceed whether or not he controls the chateaus. Napoleon has selected the “open area” on his right to be the main target of his attack. His entire army has been deployed to either or attack or support that position. They are in no way shape or fashion deployed to take as many “terrain features” as possible. To weaken the actual “open area” that Napoleon plans to attack he orders a diversionary attack against Hougoumont. The intention is that Wellington will be forced to draw troops away from the “open area” that Napoleon actually plans to attack. Actually holding Hougoumont is not important to Napoleon.

You are absolutely right – it has no strategic value to Napoleon, but commanders in the area need to take it into account as part of their plans to achieve Napoleons vision.

Napoleon forms a “grand battery” drawing on the resources of his artillery from a number of commands to commence a bombardment of the “open area” he plans to attack. This weakens the striking power of these various commands. Once he thinks the battery has done its job an entire infantry corps attacks across the front of the “open area”. This is critical as some believe that the more units you can cram into a given attack area increases your chances of success. Provided of course that it can maintain order and deliver an assault uniformly. The down side is the bigger the force the greater the potential for things to go wrong. Once the infantry assault breaches the main enemy line (masse de rupture) cavalry and reserves are planned to be pushed in where they will spread out and roll up the enemy line in both directions.

If Napoleons plan had succeeded holding every chateau on the battlefield would not have saved Wellingtons army from total destruction.

This sentence doesn’t make any sense to me? Please could you elaborate this point so that I may understand it better?

We have been playing games without artificial “victory conditions”, “terrain features”, “victory points” for years and players can’t get enough of them.

So you have been pointlessly slugging it out regardless of casualties, objectives or victory conditions until one side has absolutely no forces left on the table after hours and hours of wargaming?

Norm, we also don’t directly count casualties as a representative of performance. Entire units and their respective Brigades are used as part of an overall evaluation system. When we finish a game there is never any dispute over who won. The only objective has been obtained. One side has either acknowledged that the other side has won, or they announce that they are withdrawing. Any post game talk centers around why one side won or lost. It’s usually an acknowledgement that one side had a poor plan, poor execution or was simply out manoeuvred. The discussion is never wasted away on who should have had more or better “victory objectives” , “points” or “terrain objectives”.

Again: So you have been pointlessly slugging it out regardless of casualties, objectives or victory conditions until one side has absolutely no forces left on the table after hours and hours of wargaming?

[irishserb]

As I’ve read through this, I’ve realized that the “problem” is mine.  In my own case, the value of victory conditions are often overshadowed by the perceived context of the game on the table.

I often play low level battles; skirmishes, or a little above.  Thus, the game on the table is little piece of a much bigger picture, and I usually try to present the game as such.  In cases where this sort of context is not presented, I look for that context.  Once I have that context, I develop expectations of myself given the objective, composition of my forces, roll of my forces, what I face, etc.  This context/perception/ expectation tends to supersede the value of the victory conditions for me, particularly if they are quantitative.

In thinking back, I recognize that others don’t necessarily do this.  The game is a more isolated event, and the victory conditions give the context, that I find elsewhere.

Regarding Glenn’s comment about a singular objective, in the big picture, I guess he is generally correct.  But the scope of the game can vary tremendously depending on the presentation.  I can readily think of games that I’ve played, where the objective is far different from destroying the enemy.  Evacuating Firebase Ripcord was about minimizing casualties and getting out as quickly as possible.  Inflicting casualties on the enemy was a function of damage control, not the objective.  In some games focused on recovery and extraction of friendly/wounded troops, the games involved not making contact with the enemy, or at least controlling/minimizing that contact.  In my experience, the objection can vary, and is largely dependent on context and/or scope.

 

[Rhoderic]

irishserb wrote:

As I’ve read through this, I’ve realized that the “problem” is mine. In my own case, the value of victory conditions are often overshadowed by the perceived context of the game on the table. I often play low level battles; skirmishes, or a little above. Thus, the game on the table is little piece of a much bigger picture, and I usually try to present the game as such. In cases where this sort of context is not presented, I look for that context. Once I have that context, I develop expectations of myself given the objective, composition of my forces, roll of my forces, what I face, etc. This context/perception/ expectation tends to supersede the value of the victory conditions for me, particularly if they are quantitative. In thinking back, I recognize that others don’t necessarily do this. The game is a more isolated event, and the victory conditions give the context, that I find elsewhere.

FWIW, I also recognise myself in your way of looking at context.

Maybe the differences from one wargamer to another in how we perceive victory in context correlates with our respective positions on a spectrum where on one extreme end is wargaming as a roleplaying & storytelling exercise, and on the other is wargaming as an intellectual, analytical, tactical exercise? Mind, I don’t think any of us are at either extreme end of the spectrum, we’re all probably fairly close to the middle, just moderately offset to one side or the other at most.

[Glenn Pearce]

? I expect that must have changed some time before my own (peacetime) service. At least before WWI. Failure to take an objective by one unit, regardless of size often means the whole operation fails.

I think were possibly talking about two different things here. My comments only pertain to large historical H&M battles not small actions in any period.

Well in other posts, you’ve said you’ve played thousands of games, and it sounds as if you’ve never come across such a thing? I’ve seen see many, many posts on various fora, including this one, where folks like to talk exactly about what Chris Pringle is mentioning. I’m not sure you are understanding that what is perfect for you is not necessarily so for others. Some people loves points, for example, while others, including myself, eschew them. I know an awful lot of folks like to play their game and then retire to a bar or stand around the table for almost as long as the game took place to talk about the game and figure out what was what. In my case, my friends and I like to rip into each other and make fun of dumb moves or bad dice rolling or point out how someone duped the other into moving his forces over there. For us, these exchanges get us riled up for a fun rematch for next time, maybe with some agreement on what the objectives should be. Some people don’t do that.

Sorry but I thought I mentioned that I have played in games like Chris plays. That’s why I know I don’t enjoy them. The after game banter from a game that was not satisfactory, to at least some players is simply a waste of time and is rarely enjoyable because of that. Especially when they know the design was the main culprit. Some people ignore the design or could care less. While others due actually enjoy trying to fix all the problems for the next time. Some just really enjoy the banter regardless. Small groups of friends who often play together develop their own style of fun and nothing else matters. I’m well aware of all of the types involved in wargaming. I can only tell you that our conversations are never about unsatisfactory victory conditions. They are always about critical decisions make by the players (without outside direction) and their skills. My wife thinks we don’t game at all. Just tell jokes as the laughter is constant all day long.

Our day is pretty much all gaming and many players have a long way to travel when it’s over. So any after game banter is generally cut short. The banter continues on line once the AAR is issued and pretty much all of the players and members who couldn’t make the game just love it.

 

[Glenn Pearce]

Phil Dutré wrote:

I think that’s a gross simplification … if you look at battles that way, you should read more military history It strongly depends on the echelon at which the battle is fought, and on the specific mission and context.

Yes it is. If I read anymore I’m afraid I would fall asleep. The mission and context become secondary when two large H&M armies face off against each other.

[Glenn Pearce]

Victoria Dickson wrote:

Seems to me that in almost every battle at least one side had an objective other than ‘destroy the enemy’, because battles are not fought by equal forces with an equal chance of doing that.

Yes, my point has been simplified to make it easier to discuss. Somehow I think that might not have worked. There are other objectives in play that are generally outside of the single battles that I’m talking about. However, when the two armies face off against each other that is pretty much out the window and self preservation and or victory move to the forefront.

Victoria Dickson wrote:

Wellington’s objective at Waterloo wasn’t to destroy the French army, it was to hold on till the Prussians got there and also to ensure that if he didn’t do that that he kept his line of retreat open so his army could get away. There’s two victory conditions right away, a time based one (survive X amount of turns) and a terrain based one (keep the enemy away from the road to Brussels on his baseline). That also gives Napoleon a terrain objective, the road to Brussels.

Wellingtons objective was certainly intended to destroy the French army, and they did to some extent! Their junction with the Prussians was in part the means to that end. It was never to accumulate victory points over time. It was also his objective for the campaign. His very presence on the main road to Brussels helps to ensure his base line is secure as well as his avenue of retreat. Why do you need to create obvious victory conditions? The battle was won in part when his forces advanced. What value do these victory conditions have in that situation?

During the actual battle the road to Brussels was not a direct objective of Napoleons. It was to the left of his main attack. If he wins the battle he automatically gets the road. Why try and confuse players into obtaining secondary objectives over the primary objective that are meaningless if the battle is lost?

[Victoria Dickson]

Because if you don’t have objectives Napoleons best strategy is to go on the defensive.  He has artillery superiority and can pound away with his guns all day.

http://crazywargames.blogspot.co.uk/

[Chris Pringle]

Rhoderic wrote:

Weeelll… I think the opposite can just as easily be argued. One person’s head start is another person’s railroading in the “wrong” direction, where VPs and binary on/off-mode victory conditions with unrealistically specific “watersheds” might not reflect the commonsensical interpretation of the outcome of a game.

Hi Rhoderic,

The victory conditions approach is just a tool. It can be used badly, or it can be used well. You’ve given a good example of it being used badly. I’ve written a few bad ones along the way myself too, but that’s how we learn to get better, and after the best part of 100 published BBB scenarios I think I know what I’m doing. (To paraphrase Marshal Foch’s “15,000 casualties to train a major general”, how many fed-up wargamers does it take to train a scenario designer?) It’s a way for a scenario designer to express what he believes a given battle was about.

As witnesses to this approach being capable of aiding understanding of a battle and giving historical insight, I could invoke Dr Mark Smith of the University of Oxford, Professor Konstantinos Travlos of Ozyegin University, or Professor Nicholas Murray of the US Naval War College and formerly US Army Command & General Staff College: professional historians all, authors of many BBB scenarios, and in the latter cases using BBB to teach history students or professional military officers. Eg:

http://bloodybigbattles.blogspot.co.uk/2017/01/wargaming-at-us-naval-war-college.html

 

Rhoderic wrote:

Maybe the differences from one wargamer to another in how we perceive victory in context correlates with our respective positions on a spectrum where on one extreme end is wargaming as a roleplaying & storytelling exercise, and on the other is wargaming as an intellectual, analytical, tactical exercise? Mind, I don’t think any of us are at either extreme end of the spectrum, we’re all probably fairly close to the middle, just moderately offset to one side or the other at most.

Interestingly, I’d say the group at OWS reflects many different points along that spectrum. We have competitive-minded tournament-style players, ex-40K players, guys who are deeply into the history, others who don’t care so long as they get to do a glorious charge at some point in the evening. The scenario format we use for BBB seems to provide a common framework that enables us all to join in the same game but all get out of it the very different things we want.

Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!

https://uk.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/BBB_wargames/info

 

 

[Rhoderic]

Chris Pringle wrote:

Rhoderic wrote:

Maybe the differences from one wargamer to another in how we perceive victory in context correlates with our respective positions on a spectrum where on one extreme end is wargaming as a roleplaying & storytelling exercise, and on the other is wargaming as an intellectual, analytical, tactical exercise? Mind, I don’t think any of us are at either extreme end of the spectrum, we’re all probably fairly close to the middle, just moderately offset to one side or the other at most.

Interestingly, I’d say the group at OWS reflects many different points along that spectrum. We have competitive-minded tournament-style players, ex-40K players, guys who are deeply into the history, others who don’t care so long as they get to do a glorious charge at some point in the evening. The scenario format we use for BBB seems to provide a common framework that enables us all to join in the same game but all get out of it the very different things we want.

That doesn’t sound entirely unfamiliar. I regularly go along with mechanical victory conditions because some (not all) of the people I play against want them. They’ll just have to put up with the fact that I don’t fret that stuff quite as much as they do, and I try more to roleplay my side as if their understanding of the conditions is “That farmstead is valuable to us if it’s firmly in our grasp”, not “That farmstead is worth X VPs if we occupy it and keep the enemy no nearer than Y paces away from it on turn Z”.

If that causes a disjunction in my opponent’s and my own respective conceptions of how the game went… well, that’s less than ideal of course, but I can live with it, knowing in my heart that it’s the mechanical victory conditions, not I, that failed to grasp the reality, and I think my opponent will know that deep down as well. This, by the way, is regardless of who won and lost in our divergent conceptions, often my interpretation favours my opponent. When the mechanical victory conditions do reflect the reality, there’s usually no disjunction between us – but that’s at the best of times, and even then the mechanical victory conditions just feel surplus to requirements to me, like an extraneous filter that’s been needlessly overlaid on the story.

The only thing that gets to me sometimes, is that a few of my opponents don’t seem to want to even imagine playing without mechanical victory conditions. Rather than alternating between games, it always has to be played their way for the game to even make sense to them. It’s alright, though – I have my ways of “guerilla reinterpreting” the game 

[Glenn Pearce]

Pretty much since the beginning of time there has only been one objective in battle and that’s to clobber/destroy/break/kill, the other guy.

This is simply not true – the destruction of an enemy army in the field is one of the primary goals of a campaign and not a battle and this needs to be carefully defined. In 1870, Prussia and its German allied states defeated every army in the field of the Imperial French army and still did not win the war!

GP: That sounds like a contradiction. It’s a primary goal of a campaign and not a battle? Who won a war is outside of my point about a single battle. So your statement is simply not true.

The period I know best is the Horse & Musket era where armies generally deployed in the open for large battles in an attempt to achieve that objective.

Again this is simply not true – ever heard of a delaying action or a reconnaissance in force battle?

GP: Again, this is simply not true. Why are you continuing to use these false comments? I do know this period extremely well. I would rarely define a delaying action or a reconnaissance as a “large battle”.

Knowing that they will generally be fighting in the open the armies were designed to support that activity. They were often broken down into battalions/regiments of 500 men with their primary fighting formation being what is called a line. These were subsequently organized into higher formations of Brigades, Divisions, Corps and Armies. Who also often deployed in lines or a series of lines. Whenever possible an army would hold a “council of war” prior to a battle at which time a “plan of action” would be developed. From there orders would be issued and every unit/command would be assigned to a location for the coming battle and if possible a briefing on what they were expected to do.

So basically you agree that a large command, that may well be represented on the table battlefield as an action on its own will have a geographic location and objectives to achieve according to its command briefings and written orders to be carried out in that geographic location by said command?

GP: Absolutely.

Sometimes the actual plan of the battle remained in the commanders head and was only executed on his command during the battle. If an army had decided that it would adopt a defensive position it would generally form up in a line of battle. This is generally just a long line that could cover miles and every unit was expected to be close enough to its neighbour to protect their flanks and/or rears. The better commanders would often use a town/village/farm etc. to anchor the flanks of the army or act as a strong point in advance of or part of the main line. A strong point can serve two purposes. The simple one is it will just break up the attackers line of battle when he attacks, thus channelling his attacks into a zone that the defender can better defend. The more complicated one is a necessity to potentially launch a local counter attack or to use it as an actual anchor in the main line.

So you agree physical/geographic locations become important to local commands which are often the ones being represented as an isolated battle on the tabletop?

GP: Absolutely.

As the actual battle unfolds the importance of all “terrain features” can, will and often do change. What happens if a defending commander decides to go on the offensive? All previous “terrain features” are no longer of any value to him.

Yes, a counter-attack was usually launched either to re-take a physical location after losing to an enemy force assaulting the physical location. Or, the enemy have been so cut up by trying to assault said location that a counter-attack will hopefully act as the final nail in the coffin and destroy the enemy after they tired to take their objective!

GP: So your counterpoint is?

An offensive army will rarely occupy any “terrain features” beyond the obvious such as a hill, river bank, etc. They will often deploy into a line of battle as well that generally matches the frontage of the defender. Their commander will often place his troops as close to the enemy as possible that he plans to attack. The planned attack could be extremely complex depending on how sophisticated the commander was and what troops he had at his disposal. It was not uncommon for a commander to maintain control over exactly how, when, and where attacks were made. He had to also be on guard for any unexpected counter or flank attacks that the defender might launch. Once an attacker has roughly established the defenders line of battle he now has to shore up his attack plan to see if he can be successful in rupturing the enemies line. The normal weak points are the flanks followed by any areas in the main line that look vulnerable. Traditionally these are the exposed areas in the open where artillery, infantry and cavalry attacks can be used to their best advantage. And are of course easiest to maneuver to. The defender also goes through a similar exercise except he is trying to ensure that all of his vulnerable areas are as secure as possible and can be reinforced if necessary. He also knows that the battle can develop in a number of unlimited ways. Being prepared to move his flanks or pull his army back in part or in full can do a lot to help him defend his position and maintain his line of battle. If possible or as part of his plan counter attacks or a major offensive is also well served when planned in advance. So as you can see the actual dynamics of major warfare in this period can be very fluid and is often referred to as the ebb and flow of battle.

You have just described any major battle ever in history… we are all aware that there is an ebb and flow to a battle that does nothing to prove your narrow and singular point.

GP: I think it adds value, if you don’t that’s okay.

Once you limit the game to certain “victory conditions” the ebb and flow is generally restricted to those pre defined areas. So it becomes hamstrung. Once a scenario designer introduces “victory conditions” that are dependent on “terrain features” and generally enhanced with “victory points” the entire natural development of an army, its thinking and its effectiveness has been severely ruptured. It actually turns things upside down.

You have missed the point entirely here and have got it backwards. Victory conditions do not in any way limit the potential of a game

GP: No, you have missed my point entirely. Even Chris has admitted that they restrict a game.

and certainly doesn’t hamstring it.

GP: Well if you can’t see it then I understand your position.

Objectives and victory conditions give you a goal – something to generally aim for. How to achieve these is entirely down to the player and how they interpret or in deed misinterpret these is all part of the fun and very historically accurate – and unless you can give me an example of a major set-piece battle where the chain of command did not get something wrong at some point then this just goes to show that fumbles and misinterpretations are all part of re-creating historical battles – the human element is in the player.

GP: No problem, but why do you need more than one objective or condition?

If a player tries to achieve their victory conditions simply moving straight up the battlefield and trying to assault them with no manoeuvring then they will, 99% of the time come a cropper, but in all battles there is also an element of luck also and sometimes a player will get lucky just as commanders did!

GP: So your saying that in all the historical battles where they did that they were not historical!

Are you trying to tell us that it is much more satisfying to just watch to armies pointlessly slugging out on the tabletop for hours taking vast un-realistic casualties without any regard for historical narrative or imperative?

GP: Don’t think I said that anywhere.

The attackers focus is no longer on the vulnerable points of the enemies line of battle. The objective has changed from destroying the enemies army at its weakest points to taking his strong points! He is also now obligated to force his army into generally tight positions that are hard to maneuver in and make it extremely difficult for him to utilize his combined forces to their maximum effect. Cavalry are generally useless in most defined “terrain features” and the artillery effect is often greatly reduced as well. Even the classic close order infantry attack is often rendered useless.

Battle of the Wilderness whereby the confederates chose to attack in difficult terrain as a deliberate command decision ring any bells? Again your view seems to be extremely narrow and singular as to exclude most of history’s military campaigns and battles.

GP: So your saying that the “Battle of the Wilderness” that is widely acclaimed as an unusual battle is in fact a reflection of most of history’s military campaigns and battles! And you think I got things backwards!

So the attacker has lost all of his advantages. Well this is now paradise for the defender as he knows exactly where the attacker will strike. Shore up those strong points even more and ensure that reinforcements are handy and the jobs done! A piece of cake. The defender has now enhanced all of his advantages. Since a lot of “terrain features” were fought over and are often highlighted in narratives of battles some scenario writers have mistakenly seized on these as critical objectives of a given battle. When in fact they were generally just short term objectives at best that could just as easily have played no part in the battle.

But they did play a part in the battle so therefore they did matter and it was an historical objective that was aimed for, for a part of the battle by that command which may well be represented on the table top as part of an historical re-fight. You seem to be constantly tripping over your own points in terms of wargaming historical actions.

GP: I think you need some time to digest my entire message. I’ve explained why they didn’t matter. If you missed it, that’s okay.

To force players into this narrow matrix of “terrain features” defies all military logic. As previously stated I’ve played a lot of various “victory condition” games and everyone of them has fallen flat. I was unable to find any satisfaction or realisms in these games. They are just too contrived for my taste. Everyone in my group greatly enjoy the games that I put on as everyone is able to test their skills to the maximum without any fabricated scenario objectives and know when the game is over that their victory or defeat was a direct result of their skills and not a matter of an elaborate scavenger hunt. Since Norm Smith has brought up Waterloo 1815 and Hougoumont, I’ll use that battle as an example. The battlefield itself is textbook material and Wellington chose it wisely. It blocks the main road which any attacker must use to push his army forward.

So you are saying Wellington chose a favourable defensive position to block the road, therefore the terrain in this area was a favourable geographic location to prevent Napoleon from achieving his objective!?

GP: Absolutely.

It contains a complicated hill/ridge system that gives a number of advantages to a defending army. There are chateaus on both flanks and in the center. The ones on both flanks will serve to help protect his main battle line from easily being disrupted by a flank attack. The ones in the center will break up any attack on the center of his army. Obviously his entire army can’t hide in these chateaus so only an extremely small fraction of his army is allocated to these.

So wellington used these terrain features to his advantage by deploying troops in these terrain features that became indirectly an objective for French forces – I am sure Napoleon did not see these at strategic objectives in terms of the overall battle but the local commanders in that area did as part of achieving their objectives.

GP: Absolutely.

Fearing that Napoleon might try to outflank him on his extreme right he places a large force there blocking another road. They are however, not part of his main battle line at Waterloo. Napoleon deploys his army also in a textbook fashion. One infantry corps is placed on either side of the main road supported by cavalry formations. In the center he places another smaller infantry corps supported by the guard and more cavalry. Napoleon thinks that he will win this battle by executing a “masse de rupture“. That’s “breaking the enemy’s line of battle”. Certainly not by capturing all the chateaus.

Right, so Napoleon is trying to do what all attacking army commanders have ever tried to do…

GP: Why not?

He has very little if any concern about any of the chateaus other then where he plans to make his main attack they will restrict the scope of his attack. He also can’t easily launch an effective attack on Wellingtons center as it is protected by a couple of chateaus.

They have no strategic value but they do have local tactical value, two very different things that you seem to be getting confused with.

GP: Why do you think I’m confused? I’m simply trying to explain the difference to the VP camp. Obviously it hasn’t worked as your confused.

He would have to swing his attacking force around the center chateaus exposing the attack to all kinds of counterattacks. The attack will proceed whether or not he controls the chateaus. Napoleon has selected the “open area” on his right to be the main target of his attack. His entire army has been deployed to either or attack or support that position. They are in no way shape or fashion deployed to take as many “terrain features” as possible. To weaken the actual “open area” that Napoleon plans to attack he orders a diversionary attack against Hougoumont. The intention is that Wellington will be forced to draw troops away from the “open area” that Napoleon actually plans to attack. Actually holding Hougoumont is not important to Napoleon.

You are absolutely right – it has no strategic value to Napoleon, but commanders in the area need to take it into account as part of their plans to achieve Napoleons vision.

GP: Absolutely. I never said they didn’t.

Napoleon forms a “grand battery” drawing on the resources of his artillery from a number of commands to commence a bombardment of the “open area” he plans to attack. This weakens the striking power of these various commands. Once he thinks the battery has done its job an entire infantry corps attacks across the front of the “open area”. This is critical as some believe that the more units you can cram into a given attack area increases your chances of success. Provided of course that it can maintain order and deliver an assault uniformly. The down side is the bigger the force the greater the potential for things to go wrong. Once the infantry assault breaches the main enemy line (masse de rupture) cavalry and reserves are planned to be pushed in where they will spread out and roll up the enemy line in both directions.

If Napoleons plan had succeeded holding every chateau on the battlefield would not have saved Wellingtons army from total destruction.

This sentence doesn’t make any sense to me? Please could you elaborate this point so that I may understand it better?

GP: In most “victory condition” games on Waterloo pretty much every chateau is given a value. If Napoleon destroys/pushes back/routs  all of Wellingtons troops in the open but he still holds all of the chateaus he might very well win the game, but he certainly lost the battle.

We have been playing games without artificial “victory conditions”, “terrain features”, “victory points” for years and players can’t get enough of them.

So you have been pointlessly slugging it out regardless of casualties, objectives or victory conditions until one side has absolutely no forces left on the table after hours and hours of wargaming?

GP: Absolutely not! We certainly don’t waste our time counting casualties or chasing useless objectives. Generally both sides have plenty of troops on the table when the game is over. Some of the smaller games are over in an hour and we get to play it again and sometimes again.

Norm, we also don’t directly count casualties as a representative of performance. Entire units and their respective Brigades are used as part of an overall evaluation system. When we finish a game there is never any dispute over who won. The only objective has been obtained. One side has either acknowledged that the other side has won, or they announce that they are withdrawing. Any post game talk centers around why one side won or lost. It’s usually an acknowledgement that one side had a poor plan, poor execution or was simply out manoeuvred. The discussion is never wasted away on who should have had more or better “victory objectives” , “points” or “terrain objectives”.

Again: So you have been pointlessly slugging it out regardless of casualties, objectives or victory conditions until one side has absolutely no forces left on the table after hours and hours of wargaming?

GP: Not sure why you feel the need to repeat yourself, but no, see the above.

[Glenn Pearce]

Victoria Dickson wrote:

Because if you don’t have objectives Napoleons best strategy is to go on the defensive. He has artillery superiority and can pound away with his guns all day.

Both Napoleon and Wellington do have an objective. Even without it Napoleons best strategy could never have been defensive. He was doomed to lose if he did. Short term the Prussians were moving on his flank and rear. Long term the massive allied armies would overwhelm him, just like they did previously.

[Prince Rhys]

To GP

thanks very much for taking the time to reply to my riposte and elaborating. I now have a much better understanding of your view point and I don’t think we are too far away.

I do agree that intelligent scenario design shouldn’t need strict victory conditions that may include points being attributed to terrain pieces. I think it is very subjective and unhelpful as well as  being un-realistic.

However, the sole objective of a stand along battle, in my opinion, does not work as simply being the destruction of the opposing army. Perhaps causing the demoralisation army is a better term. In a campaign, even after a major set piece battle where won side is considered to have lost and the other side considered to have won, quite often, it was the case that both sides still had capable armies in the field on campaign and the loser would with draw to re-organise, re-in force, re-supply etc and the winning side would do the same in place at the site of victory before probably conducting a pursuit.

Regardless of whether or not an army could still be considered effective in the field, a lost battle or a series of lost battles and manoeuvrings in a campaign could result in the high command and or the government at home becoming so demoralised regardless of the actual real condition of its armed forces, that it may sue for peace and accept the campaign as being lost. All without their effective field forces being destroyed. The object of a battle therefore as seen as part of a larger campaign is to gain the advantage in the on-going campaign, to demoralise, out-manoeuvre, and seriously threaten the opposing sides forces/government/country.

In summary, your extreme over-simplification of victory conditions irked me a little.

I hope my somewhat direct tone didn’t seem rude or irk you.

I am also assuming that if you game World War One, you don’t game the whole of the western front in 1917 in one go in one evening with painted and based miniatures all on the same table.

Therefore, you will be acting as a subordinate commander with objectives that could be considered subjective, irrelevant, and even plain foolish. But that is a war in which success became measured in metres out of desperation of a horrendous stalemate.

I assume you play games outside of your horse and musket comfort zone? Have you ever played a World War Two Eastern Front scenario? Were you in charge of the entire forces for the Germans or Russians along the whole of the eastern front? I assume that you weren’t.

I assume if you’ve ever played a World War Two game you were in charge of a company maybe? A battalion or regiment perhaps  as the biggest individual player command.

So if you were designing for example a scenario whereby a company of Russians have been charged with crossing a river and establishing a bridge head in front of  weakened enemy lines like an under strength German platoon.

So the Russian victory conditions/objectives are to establish a river crossing and create a bridgehead from which further Soviet assaults may be launched.

The German victory conditions/ objectives are to prevent the establishment of a major soviet bridgehead in the area by whatever means possible. A withdrawal is not an option.

(base it around the Soviet crossings of the Dnepr in 1944).

So Glenn, how would you feel about the scenario roughly outlined above? What would you do differently to frame the same scenario? How would you decide on the winner and loser? What criteria would you use to define a winner and a loser in this scenario?

[Victoria Dickson]

Glenn Pearce wrote:

Victoria Dickson wrote:

Because if you don’t have objectives Napoleons best strategy is to go on the defensive. He has artillery superiority and can pound away with his guns all day.

Both Napoleon and Wellington do have an objective. Even without it Napoleons best strategy could never have been defensive. He was doomed to lose if he did. Short term the Prussians were moving on his flank and rear. Long term the massive allied armies would overwhelm him, just like they did previously.

Neither of those effect the game unless you have victory conditions.

 

http://crazywargames.blogspot.co.uk/

[Prince Rhys]

Also another example of armed forces conducting an offensive through difficult terrain – the German Ardennes offensive 1944.

[Norm S]

+1. This thread is getting tired and getting hard work to read through lengthy posts of justification. We all seem to enjoy the games that we are playing and not surprisingly we do that in different ways.

[Grimheart]

An interesting discussion with some good points made across a variety of opinions……

Now for mine!

@Glenn,

Like others I must politely disagree with your basic premise – that in large H&M battles the only aim is to destroy the enemy forces.

I would argue that in virtually every battle the commanders first aim was to preserve their own forces. Destroying the enemy comes second.

Waterloo and many other H&M battles illustrate this point perfectly with lines of retreat generally a priority as a condition of battle.

I would call these two aims “victory conditions” as of course any reasonable commander was out to destroy the enemy whilst suffering as few casualties to their own forces as possible.

 

However when you look at a typical battle in more detail then you can see that each is made up of various “objectives” within that battle.

Both sides will move forces around, institute local attacks, try to obtain an advantage by taking terrain features and so on.

Very few battles, at least since ancient times, was a simple face one another and charge until one side gives up.

So within a battle there are usually clearly different smaller aims the overall commander or his subordinates are trying to achieve.

These are the basis for a wargames “objectives”. ie a reflection of any real battle, wether it be a skirmish or a mass battle.

 

In conclusion it seems to me that a wargame, at any level, will have “objectives” wether these are defined before the game by the players / scenario/umpire or made up by the players themselves as the game progresses.

Wether those objectives also include “destroy all enemy forces” is entirely optional and certainly not necessary.

Interest include 6mm WW2, 6mm SciFi, 30mm Old West, DropFleet, Warlords Exterminate and others!

[Glenn Pearce]

What I’m finding incredibly aggravating is your clear turning your nose down at Chris. If you want that kind of thing there’s another site for folks who insist only their way is the right way.

If you don’t understand something that I’ve said, I think a simple question would be a better way to approach it. If your suffering from some other issues than perhaps you should seek professional help. If your trying to insult me then perhaps an apology is in order and you should follow your own advice and go elsewhere. Although I’m not aware of any site that would encourage your behaviour.

[Noel]

Taking it to 11.

[Glenn Pearce]

Hello Rhys!

Your welcome. Yes although I was concerned over your tone I never thought that we were too far apart.

Yes, I’ve tried to keep my point as simple as possible so we don’t lose sight of the actual discussion. A battle is a very complex situation with a huge number of factors in play. Withdrawing from a battle as you mention clearly establishes a winner and a loser and both armies can still be in reasonable condition. That’s how a number of our games do in fact end. One side realizes that he has no hope in destroying the other side and or to continue the battle the other side will destroy their army.

No question as well that a series of battles effect the outcome of a campaign. For our games we have realized that although outside events are of concern to the commanders the day at hand moves into top priority and all other issues fall by the wayside.

quote quote=74703]In summary, your extreme over-simplification of victory conditions irked me a little. I hope my somewhat direct tone didn’t seem rude or irk you.[/quote]

Sorry for that, but I can’t figure out everybody. It did seem a little rude.

I only played a small WWI fictional scenario many, many years ago.

My WWII experience is also limited to a fictional game every now again at various friends houses. Some use VPs/objectives/goals/etc. and others don’t.

As for your scenario I think you definitely need to set the stage and explain the situation. You also need to give each side their own briefing and if possible their actual orders. Oddly enough I don’t see the need for any “victory conditions”, etc. One side or the other will gradually be worn down and have to withdraw/surrender/give up/etc. (regardless of orders) and if so that’s the loser and the remaining side is the winner. Am I missing something or do you see some shortcomings in my approach?

Best regards,

Glenn

[irishserb]

Dear TWW members,

When I posed the original question, I really didn’t intend for anyone to get insulted, and ask that we all step back for a moment, and treat each other with consideration in any future posts in this thread.

I am sorry if I offended anyone, and for creating an environment where anyone might have been offended otherwise.

Brian/irishserb

[Victoria Dickson]

Glenn Pearce wrote:

Oddly enough I don’t see the need for any “victory conditions”, etc. One side or the other will gradually be worn down and have to withdraw/surrender/give up/etc. (regardless of orders) and if so that’s the loser and the remaining side is the winner. Am I missing something or do you see some shortcomings in my approach?

I think it depends who you are playing with, whether or not they will play ‘realistically’ without needing incentives.  Most armies benefit from concentration, for example, but it’s no fun playing against someone who sets his force up in one corner of the table rather than trying to cover as much of the centre of his line as he reasonably can.  For those types of players you need a reason for them to do that, and that’s where objectives and victory conditions are useful.

Going back to Waterloo, given a free deployment the player representing Wellington would be wisest to concentrate as close to where the Prussians will arrive as possible.  This was not a historical possibility, and any game where he does so is going to have little claim of realism.  Plus the players who turned up wanting to refight Waterloo aren’t going to be happy.  Even if you fix initial deployments he can withdraw his right and redeploy it to the left.

If you can rely on your players to stick to the script that won’t happen, but a published scenario will be played by all types of players, and some will only want to win at any cost or know nothing about the historical situation.  Those players need the objectives and victory conditions even if you don’t.

Well, that’s how I see it anyway. 🙂

 

http://crazywargames.blogspot.co.uk/

[Glenn Pearce]

Hello Grimheart!

I gather you missed my comments about “obvious”. We don’t really say in our games “okay fellows the only way you can win this game is by destroying the other side”. We actually have “no conditions”. So yes I fully agree with you that two major concerns of any army is saving his and crushing the other guy. They kind of go hand and hand.

I also fully agree that at lower levels the forces have objectives. The problem is some scenario designers “cherry pick” those objectives and often assign values to them. Now this is certainly not a problem if you enjoy those types of games. However, if your trying to reflect actual large historical H&M battles the train runs off the track.

If your still not clear on my comments please have a fresh read of my long post that included Waterloo. Still fuzzy just drop off a line or two.

Best regards,

Glenn

[Mike]

Is everyone ok?

[Glenn Pearce]

Victoria Dickson wrote:

I think it depends who you are playing with, whether or not they will play ‘realistically’ without needing incentives. Most armies benefit from concentration, for example, but it’s no fun playing against someone who sets his force up in one corner of the table rather than trying to cover as much of the centre of his line as he reasonably can. For those types of players you need a reason for them to do that, and that’s where objectives and victory conditions are useful.

We never play those kinds of games. Our table is generally bursting with figures (5,000-10,000+)

Victoria Dickson wrote:

Going back to Waterloo, given a free deployment the player representing Wellington would be wisest to concentrate as close to where the Prussians will arrive as possible. This was not a historical possibility, and any game where he does so is going to have little claim of realism. Plus the players who turned up wanting to refight Waterloo aren’t going to be happy. Even if you fix initial deployments he can withdraw his right and redeploy it to the left.

Wellington didn’t do that for four good reasons. 1) He was afraid that Napoleon would turn his right flank. 2) He was hoping that he could draw Napoleon into attacking his left flank where the Prussians would crush him from the rear. 3) He needed room for the Prussians in case they weren’t able to crush the French. 4) It would upset his ideal plan for his “line of battle” to function to its best ability. We have played Waterloo many times and the players who have no sense of the importance of a line of battle have always lost the game when they do silly things like withdraw the Allied right flank.

Victoria Dickson wrote:

If you can rely on your players to stick to the script that won’t happen, but a published scenario will be played by all types of players, and some will only want to win at any cost or know nothing about the historical situation. Those players need the objectives and victory conditions even if you don’t.

Well I know of at least one published scenario on Waterloo that has no objectives and victory conditions and I’m not aware of any complaints about it. I’ve seen lots of other published scenarios on other battles including a few of my own that are void of conditions and never had anything but positive feedback.

 

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