15/02/2016 at 11:57 #38250
The first of Grand Manoeuvre nineteenth century rules variants will be available as pdf downloads from the GM website at: http://grandmanoeuvre.co.uk/shop/
on Saturday 20th February.
There will be a full version of the rules which the same price as GM Napoleonic rules, (£10) and an update package will consist of the rules introduction booklet and separate files for each war at half price (£5) for people who already have the Napoleonic version of Grand Manoeuvre.
The new rules will in the same format as Grand Manoeuvre Napoleonic rules. The first part, an introduction to basic game terms etc., will have information about unit/army organisation and qualities, the weapons used, tactical systems and doctrine and lists of historical generals` ratings.
The introduction will also contain additional rules and rules amendments.
The second part will be the basic game rules themselves.
Also included for ease of reference, there will be separate files for the rules changes in each of the wars:
- The South American Wars 1811-1824. 2. The November Uprising 1830-1. 3. The Egyptian–Ottoman Wars 1831–3 & 1839-41. 4. The Mexican War of 1846-8. 5. The First Italian War of Independence 1848-9. 6. The Hungarian Uprising 1848-9. 7. The 1st Schleswig-Holstein War 1848-51.
As with GM Napoleonic rules, there’ll be;
15/02/2016 at 20:51 #38281Angel BarracksModerator
- A quick-reference booklet
- An ink-saving black and white version of the main rule book.
- Optional orders and messages sheets
- Optional timetables for umpires to plan/keep track of their scenarios.
Long Time No See!!
How are things, the rules doing well still?17/02/2016 at 16:27 #38349
Hi Michael rules going well – developing nicely… more C19th variants in the pipeline and Ancients too !17/02/2016 at 16:28 #38350
Here are the brief introductions to the rules amendments for each war…
South American Wars of Independence:
After Napoleon had placed his brother Joseph on the throne of Spain, a power vacuum and also therefore opportunities arose to seize power throughout the Spanish provinces of South America. In short time, provisional governments or “Juntas” (a Junta was originally a term for a Spanish legislative council) sprung up in the major cities in the provinces, declaring to rule in the name of the Spanish throne.
But the Juntas had their own, more liberal, political agendas that ran contrary to the interests of Spain who had imposed exclusive trade laws upon their colonies. Added to the pre-existing racial and social divisions within the provinces, the events in distant Europe caused the instability that would lead to conflict between the Spanish Viceroys` Royalist forces and their new Revolutionary, or Patriotic opponents.</em></em>
Sometime between 1808 and 1812 the Spanish (and thereby the South American provinces) adopted versions of French infantry regulations and so therefore the tactics of all armies were essentially linear in nature. The tactical practices of the South American armies too followed French guidelines and we have examples of detachments of grenadiers and of light infantry “flanking brigades”.
The emphasis in all armies would have been upon a deployed order of battle with columns used to hold troops in reserve, or for attacking positions.
But the South American armies seem to have followed the established Spanish tactic of “early fire”, Opening up musketry fire at ranges as far as 500 metres, early fire is a primarily a defensive tactic whose success needs to depend upon steadiness and good discipline of the troops using it, but this was a characteristic which few South American units possessed, and so, in the first 4-5 years of the Wars the use of the tactic probably favoured armies that were on the offensive.
So it was only after several years fighting that the Revolutionary armies were to embrace British tactical methods (for example at the battle of Boyacá, Bolívar’s army advanced in columns screened by skirmishers and then deployed to line) and with this tactic they would have dispensed with the early fire tactics that were used at the start of the wars by both sides.
The November Uprising:
The outcome of this war was perhaps never in doubt. But for one or two moments of opportunity that existed early in the campaign, in which the Poles may have taken more aggressive action, the uprising was bound to fail.
Whereas popular opinion abroad favoured the Poles in their rebellion, most governments supported the Russians and so the Poles failed to receive support from other nations that the radicals hoped for.
The insurrection was sparked by a chance incident in the military cadet school in Warsaw, and so it began without much warning, or chance for the rebels to plan the event and enlist broad popular support for it.
The reactions to the uprising of both Polish generals and the population were mixed; many thought it a mistake to oppose Russia militarily. Some Poles preferred to remain subject to Russian rule. There were then, throughout the conflict, serious political divisions within the Polish high command and there were far too numerous changes in leadership and commanding generals to maintain the confidence and morale of the Polish army.
At first the Poles under their “Dictator”, General Chlopicki, who was neither in favour of armed resistance to Russia, nor of mobilising against her, but attempted to negotiate a settlement with Russia. The Tsar however rejected the advances of the Poles, demanding that the; “Poles should surrender to the grace of their Emperor.” Chlopicki was then forced to resign.
A national government was formed in late January with power held by the “Patriotic Society”, led by Joachim Lelewel, but Chlopicki was still retained as the commander-in-chief of Polish armed forces.
By the first week of February 1831, the Poles had lost the opportunity to open an offensive in Lithuania, when the Russians took the initiative; Field Marshal von Diebitsch crossing the Polish border with an army of 115,000.
Egyptian Ottoman Wars:
The First Egyptian-Ottoman War (1831-33) was caused by the grievance of Muhammad Ali Pasha. Muhammad Ali demanded the control of Syria as a reward for Egypt’s military assistance to the Ottomans against the Greeks and against the combined Russian and British fleets in 1829. But the Ottomans chose not to consent to this demand. Muhammad Ali therefore, sent his son Ibrahim with his army, to invade and take possession of Syria, and with his naval forces he occupied the coastal regions of Lebanon and Palestine.
The armies that were to fight each other in these wars had both gone through recent reforms; both had introduced forms of conscription.
The Egyptians had unsuccessfully tried enlisting Albanians and Sudanese slaves as soldiers, before they opted to raise forces by conscription from the peasants of Upper Egypt (The Fellaheen).
After the Janissaries power had been destroyed, the Ottoman army was reformed by Mehmed Husrev Pasha. “The Mansure” (or Victorious) Army was formed in 1826 and was based upon the regulations and organisation of the French Napoleonic army.
In addition they also formed provincial militias to supplement their regular forces. Raising local irregular forces had been the practice before, but this new structure was more regulated.
In both conflicts Great Britain and France intervened to support the Ottomans out of a fear that a further weakened Ottoman Empire would give the Russians an opportunity to extend their territory, power and influence.
The US-Mexican War of 1846-48:
Prior to the war the small, regular American army of less than 10,000 had been scattered amongst garrisons along the western borders of the United States and its eastern seaboard.
The Mexican army which numbered more than 30,000 (which included just over 10,000 militia) had largely been used to keep order within Mexico itself and under its generals, or it was used politically to support local governors against the central government.
In many ways both armies were unprepared for war in training and in grand manoeuvres, but yet both sides displayed a Napoleonic tactical flexibility in use of unit formations, skirmishing and different “orders” (e.g. open order) and both armies used conventional, Napoleonic battlefield linear tactics.
At the start of the war in the battles of Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma and Buena Vista both armies used columns for manoeuvre covered by light infantry deploying to line formation. The Americans used infantry squares to cover their flanks and supported their infantry lines with horse artillery batteries.
<em>As with the South Americans over 30 years before, the Mexicans employed out-dated early fire tactics, which in open, defensive battles was to disadvantage them against the American infantry.
The Americans had a great advantage of very effective artillery; in particular their “flying artillery” (horse artillery batteries) were used to good effect as mobile reserve and to break down the Mexican lines.
By contrast the Mexican artillery was poorly supported, equipped and served. It also contracted civilian drivers, which meant that once it was positioned those positions were fixed.
The Hungarian Uprising:
Even once the Russians had entered the war and the balance of forces had swung towards the Austrians, the Hungarian Uprising still presents us with some interesting battles and campaigning possibilities.</em>
Up until that point in the war the Hungarians had proved themselves able to match the invading Austrians and the Austrian-allied armies like the Jellacic`s Croatian army.
The Austrians and Hungarians both had all-arms brigades and divisions, the battalions had same structure as they did in 1815; a battalion, comprised of three divisions, and these of two companies each. Each of the companies had two “zugs”. Zugs were also termed “half-companies”.
The Austrian’s and the Hungarian’s standard infantry formation for manoeuvre was the division-masse. Tactically nothing much had changed from the Napoleonic wars, apart from Hungarian troops being able adopt loose order tactics, which may have had advantages in the right tactical circumstances, but this was not in itself a battle-winning tactic.
The introduction of Augustine percussion caps to existing smoothbore muskets led to an improvement in loading, rate of fire, and a reduction in misfires, but both sides were similarly equipped and so there was no significant advantage by either side.
Preferring linear tactics, Russian tactical doctrine was unchanged since the “November Uprising” of 1830-31.
Added to this mix, both Austrians and Hungarians had rocket artillery.
The Schleswig-Holstein War:
The First Schleswig-Holstein War of 1848–51 was a result of the conflict between the Duke of Augustenborg and the Danish King; it was a war that was sparked by the political turmoil, revolutions and rebellions in the rest of Europe.
Attempts to make government in Denmark more democratic, by introducing regional assemblies was not enough to hold the Kingdom together with German liberals in Schleswig Holstein being attracted to membership of the German Confederation.
A political compromise could not be reached in negotiations between the Danish liberals, the King, and a delegation from the Schleswig Holsteiners from Kiel; on the 24th of March, 1848 a Schleswig Holstein provisional government was formed in Kiel. Also on that day the Prince of Nor, marched with a few troops and persuaded the garrison of Rendsburg to join the government.
The War had begun, when at the end of March, the Danish army marched into the Duchy of Schleswig.
The major innovation in this war was that company columns with deployed skirmishers were used by all sides – the Danes had introduced these into their regulations in 1842, five years earlier than the Prussians.
A response to the lessons learned in the Napoleonic Wars, the company column tactic was centred on the need for more flexible supports to the main firing line of skirmishing troops in loose, or extended orders; and behind the company columns, the reserve companies were always held in line formation.
Later in the 1850`s Prussian generals called the use of battalion column formations: “parade tactics” but praised the new company column as the new “shooting war tactic”.</em></em>
And the 1st Italian War of Independence:
The movement for Italian independence in this war was led by Charles Albert, King of Piedmont, but the insurgent allies were not a completely unified force.
Italian liberals objected to what they perceived as Charles Albert`s expansionist ambitions and the support of the Papal States was withdrawn on religious grounds, with Ferdinand of Naples being persuaded to following suit.
This disunity and the Austrian’s greater resources made the end result fairly predictable. But for the political pressure after the war from Great Britain and France, who wanted to preserve Piedmont as a buffer state, the kingdom may have been absorbed, or severely treated by the Austrians.
Prior to 1848, militarily, the Piedmontese fearing an attack by Napoleon III, had prepared for a possible defensive campaign against France.
In their Infantry regulations of 1833, they followed French methods and practices and the Piedmontese cavalry regulations of 1817 were also based upon French ones.
The Austrians will be using the same methods (and so the same rules apply) as in the Hungarian Uprising.
The use of artillery is probably the most notable facet in the war the Piedmontese with their heavy 16 pounders could be well-handled and effective. The Austrians also had some rockets that were used to good effect but this was generally employed in sieges.20/02/2016 at 20:54 #38562
The rules are now loaded at the Grand Manoeuvre website shop:
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