Soviet radios?

[vtsaogames]

I vaguely recall Jim Dunnigan claiming in Panzerblitz (I think) that the Soviets had a radio per infantry company and 1 per 20 tanks or so. This article says a radio per medium or heavy tank company (on good days) and radio trucks at battalion HQ. That’s in 1941 and presumably gets better eventually.

 

Anyone know about radios in Soviet infantry? Thanks in advance.

It's never too late to have a happy childhood

[kyoteblue]

I Googled it but got nothing useful. I do vaguely remember reading that the Russians would love the Lent-lease tanks and aircraft because they came with radios. But don’t quote me on it.

[MartinR]

Zaloga lists radio assets for infantry units. Typically it was one set per battalion and a couple at RHQ. This rose through the war a bit, by 1942 each regiment was authorised 7 sets.

In contrast, the divisional artillery regiment had 24 sets.

Does it matter that much below battalion level? I recall one exasperated British battalion commander stating that the first thing that happened in battle was that all communications immediately broke down. In WW2 runners, flares, O groups and field phones were far more reliable than manpack radios in tactical combat. Vehicle mounted were OK.

 

"Mistakes in the initial deployment cannot be rectified" - Helmuth von Moltke

[vtsaogames]

Agreed they often didn’t work, as 1st Parachute found at Arnhem. But one per battalion? Means that Soviet infantry had less chance of responding rapidly to changing conditions. Also means that their tanks had to operate within visual range of the lead tank, which wagged flags out of the turret hatch.

 

German C&C would vary vary from radios working (faster response) to not working. Below battalion level, Soviets don’t have radios at all, where the Germans are when things go wrong.

Just thinking in terms of C&C rules. Germans had FM radios while Soviets had AM. Means German FOOs were more likely to be in touch with their artillery.

It's never too late to have a happy childhood

[Guy Farrish]

Why do you think  FM  makes it more likely  German FOOs would be in touch with their artillery?

Frequency modulation (FM) means you vary the number of cycles per second (Hertz)  to put information on the carrier wave. Amplitude modulation means you vary the amplitude of the wave, but keep the cps/hertz the same, to put information  on the carrier wave.

You can in theory run FM or AM on any frequency.  The tendency is to run FM on VHF or above and AM on MF.

MF ground wave has a longer distance than VHF, so AM tends generally to have a longer distance than FM signals which are attenuated by trees, sand, etc more than MF.

The Soviet A-7 radio station (man portable) was introduced in 1942 for infantry regiments and worked on VHF FM.

The allies, particularly the USA, sent thousands of radios to the USSR, and home production of different radios increased dramatically. The tendency was however to centralise control from the staff downwards and so tactical comms never got as far down the tree as western allies or the German units, despite the enormous number of signals units in the Red Army.

[John D Salt]

The following snippets are from https://www.connect-wit.ru/svyaz-na-frontah-velikoj-otechestvennoj.html “Communications on the fronts during the Great Patriotic War”, zooshed through google translate with a couple of minor corrections.

The increasing role of radio communications

[…]

Ground forces in the first year and a half of the war mainly used portable radio stations of pre-war development – first 6-PK, then the battalion radio station (RB) and its modernized versions. The RB was widely used during the war for communication at the grassroots (tactical) level in infantry and artillery regimental networks. It worked in three subbands in the frequency band from 1.5 MHz to 6 MHz, providing communication in both telephone and telegraph modes, with an output power of 1.5 watts. A modernized version for cavalry units was produced under the name RBK.

In order to expand the used frequency range, in the interests of the tactical command and control level, the range of ultrashort waves (VHF) is being mastered. In the first war years, VHF radio stations with frequency modulation A7 began to be produced, which became widely used in rifle regiments and battalions, in artillery battalions and batteries. At the same time, the stations were continuously modernized, and at the beginning of 1944, the A-7-A radio station was created, in which the number of valves was reduced, and energy consumption was reduced by a third. At the end of 1944, the VHF radio station A-7-B began to arrive at the front, which had a greater range. In 1943, deliveries to the front of RAT radio stations for communication with the headquarters of large military formations and RB radio stations for communication in regimental networks almost doubled.

[…]

In the armoured forces, the number of command vehicles did not exceed 20% of the total number of tanks. The increased requirements for the command and control system indicated the need to install a radio station on each tank. At the same time, the need for radio stations increased sharply.The production of stations 71-TK-3 and KRSTB in the required quantity was difficult due to the rather high labour intensity of production. The possibility of using RSI-4 aircraft radio stations with minor modifications, the production of which was established in the country, was experimentally shown. Since March 1942, the production of such tank stations 9-R and 9-RM began, in the same year the industry began the production of quartz radio stations 10-R, 10-RK, 10-RM (KRSTB modifications).

[…]

During the war, the radio communication organization system made it possible to use communication not only with the directly subordinate headquarters, but also one step (command level) lower. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had direct radio communications with all active armies. In addition to communication through the headquarters of the fronts, the front commander, in turn, could directly contact the commanders of corps and divisions. The division commander had direct communication not only with the headquarters of the regiments, but also with the commanders of the battalions. Such a system of organization of radio communication justified itself not only during the period of temporary withdrawal of our troops, but also during offensive battles.

General strategic leadership of the partisan movement was also carried out from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, while at first the lack of established radio communications was acutely felt: in the summer of 1942, only about 30% of the partisan detachments had radio communication with the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement in Moscow. However, by November 1943, almost 94% of the detachments maintained radio contact with the organs of the partisan movement through the radio stations of the partisan brigades.

[…]

The number of radio stations in a rifle division increased during the war years from 22 to 130.

[…]

In the conditions of an acute shortage of military communications in the Red Army in the first years of the war, much attention was paid to the use of captured equipment. For the operation of captured means, special memos were issued for the troops.

[…]

The total volume of Lend-Lease deliveries did not exceed 4% of the volume of production at domestic enterprises, and by means of communications – no more than 5%.

[…]

Insufficient quantities were supplied with means intended for radio communications at the forefront, that is, at the level of companies and platoons.

[…]

The main American deliveries of communications equipment included: SCG-299, SCR-399 quartz-stabilized vehicle radios on the chassis of Chevrolet and Studebaker trucks, EE-8A telephone sets, chargers based on the Wisconsin engine, field communication workshops on a vehicle chassis and others. Under Lend-Lease, scarce field cable was also supplied (about 1 million km per year).

All the best,

John.

[vtsaogames]

Most excellent, thank you!

It's never too late to have a happy childhood

[MartinR]

The OP specifically asked about infantry radios, so I didn’t look up Soviet vehicle allocations, although John touched on it above.

Before pointing out all the shortcomings of the Russians, in the first half of the war, radios were a vanishing rarity in German infantry formations below company level and many German tanks only had receivers, and some didn’t have a radio at all (typically Panzer Is in mixed panzer platoons).

The proportion of transmitter/receivers increased as the war progressed although initially they were reserved for commanders vehicles.

 

"Mistakes in the initial deployment cannot be rectified" - Helmuth von Moltke

[John D Salt]

MartinR wrote:

Does it matter that much below battalion level? I recall one exasperated British battalion commander stating that the first thing that happened in battle was that all communications immediately broke down. In WW2 runners, flares, O groups and field phones were far more reliable than manpack radios in tactical combat. Vehicle mounted were OK.

NA piece number WO 232/77 “Communications within the Infantry Battalion” quotes 21 Army Group/2064/2/OPS/(B) of 16 August 1944, “Lessons from Battle” by the Staffordshire Yeomanry:

“2. Bad Infantry Communications. These are without exception deplorable. There is the general defeatist attitude amongst infantry that their communications are bound to fail once the battle starts. The attitude is justified as they always do. The result is that the plan has to be too rigid, and once troops are committed it is impossible for them to adjust themselves to the enemy’s reactions. The whole system of infantry communications seems to require a complete overhaul.”

One of the benefits to the infantry of having accompanying tanks and artillery observers is that tank and gunner radios are much more likely to work, and I understand the artillery net was often used to pass messages for the infantry. It’s an aspect of combined arms that isn’t shown in any wargame I can think of.

Having used a Larkspur manpack radio on one memorable night exercise — I could hear Radio Luxembourg and a navigationally-confused Chieftain troop somewhere near us, but never the people I wanted to talk to — I imagine it must have required enormous skill and patience to get WW2-era radios to work adequately.

MartinR wrote:

Before pointing out all the shortcomings of the Russians, in the first half of the war, radios were a vanishing rarity in German infantry formations below company level and many German tanks only had receivers, and some didn’t have a radio at all (typically Panzer Is in mixed panzer platoons).

From my recollection of the KStNs available from https://www.wwiidaybyday.com/kstn/kstnmain.htm I think a good hand-waving rule for German infantry is four sets for an infantry company from mid-war on — not enough for one per platoon and a rear link without using a flick frequency — and prior to that a similar number of K-Blinks, another thing I never see represented in wargames https://www.kriegsfunker.com/accessories/light_signals/k_blink.html

AIUI even the mighty US of A started their particiaption in the war without a transceiver in every tank, some vehicles having receivers only.

All the best,

John.

[vtsaogames]

Guy Farrish wrote:

Why do you think FM makes it more likely German FOOs would be in touch with their artillery?

 

Because Dunnigan thought so back in the day. What can I say, I’m no expert on radios, beyond listening to some good stations over the internet; WWOZ roots music from New Orleans, Hatteras Radio from the Outer Banks.

It's never too late to have a happy childhood

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