09/09/2015 at 23:55 #30771
It’s 1300 on 2 August 1986, and the Soviets have broken through the entire NATO front in numerous places, pouring armored columns through the giant gaps. This is true maneuver warfare, with Soviet formations seeking out gaps and NATO seeking to find and seal them. Battlefield reconnaissance takes on a role of huge import, with 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11th ACR) at the fore, with attached deep reconnaissance elements of 10th Special Forces Group (10th SFG) providing support.
An SF element of 10th SFG, comprising two SF fireteams, was inserted yesterday evening into the town of Bad Stulz and began reporting, but has missed its last two communications windows (didn’t report in via radio). There’s been a lot of Soviet electronic warfare jamming going on, so Brigade is optimistic the SF teams are still alive, just unable to communicate. From Team Whiskey’s India Company, the sole remaining intact platoon, Lieutenant Teigner’s 3rd Mechanized Platoon, is dispatched to find and recover the SF teams, in order to bring back their intelligence information. Failing that, 3rd Mech Plt must make contact the Soviet 8th Guards Tank Army and provide that information to the Brigade Intelligence Section.
The US force: these are actually two separate forces, the two 10th SFG teams at top left, then Lt Teigner’s 3rd Mech Plt of the command section, four rifle teams, and five Bradleys. The Platoon Commander’s (PC’s) command section has a single Stinger surface to air missile (SAM).
The Soviet force: an infantry platoon of command section, two MGs, an Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM, in this case an AT-5 Spandrel); a mechanized platoon of a command section, four rifle squads, and five BMPs; a tank platoon of four T-72s; a Spetznaz squad of two fireteams; and an Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter, which is also transporting the two Spetznaz teams.
A look at the table, from south to north from behind the US baseline, and you can actually see the Bradleys of 3rd Mech Plt spread across the bottom. The Soviet infantry platoons are scattered across the top of the map. To recap, the US force is charged with going in an finding the two SF teams, and getting at least one of them secured and off the map (back to their own baseline in the south), while the Soviets want to prevent this, and actually are looking to destroy the entire US force.
And here’s the kicker: neither side knows where the two SF teams are! The Soviets aren’t the only ones who have to push into Bad Stulz to find the SF teams, the US does too because of the EW jamming is preventing link-up via VHF/HF comms (I’m guessing Bradleys can go HF? For sure Brigade HQ can).
So, the way I’m handling this peculiar situation is this: there are two SF teams in the center of the table, so I placed four ‘blinds’ (which are purple beads) spread across the center of the map, with both sides having to advance and ‘spot’ the SF teams (admittedly, I’ll be making the spotting easier for the US 3rd Mech Plt as I assume the SF teams want to be found by friendly troops). Despite them being on blinds, I will allow the blinds to move south each turn, albeit very slowly as they are trying to remain unseen. So each turn the blinds are out there, I will move the them four inches towards the southern baseline, and once they are correctly spotted, I will remove the dummies and place the SF teams.
Which brings up activation: I am still using Ivan’s excellent “5Core Company Command,” but I am using cards to determine when each unit activates. So, at the start of the game there is a card for the SF blinds, a card for the US 3rd Mech Plt, a card for the Soviet foot infantry platoon, and a card for the Soviet mech infantry platoon. Once the tanks come on (Turn 2), they will have a card in the deck. once the Hind comes on (also Turn 2), it will have a card in the deck. And once the Spetznaz are off-loaded from the Hind, they will have a card in the deck.
This is looking west to east at the center of town. The red circles show the four ‘blinds’ representing the two SF teams. The southern baseline is to right, where 3rd Mech Plt’s vehicles are off camera.
From the Soviet perspective, they are actively and aggressively engaged in counter-reconnaissance, trying to keep NATO’s prying eyes from locating their armored formations, and the electronic warfare (EW) jamming is actually being conducted in support of this effort. Soviet EW sections conducted signals intercepts and radio direction finding (RDF), which is how they became aware of the two US SF teams nearby. As they were preparing to dispatch forces to deal with the US SF teams, their signals intercept made them aware the US forces in the area had just sent additional forces (3rd Mech Plt) into the area as well. The Soviets don’t know the size or composition of this new force, but absolutely want to keep them from linking up with the two SF teams, and ideally, both US forces would be destroyed entirely. The plan is for the two infantry platoons (one on foot, one in BMPs) to push into Bad Stulz from the north. Once contact with US forces has been made, and/or the infantry have pushed sufficiently into the urban area to help clear it of infantry anti-tank weapons, the tank platoon will dash into the town, straight down main street, as the Hind comes in and deposits the two Spetznaz teams on the southern end of the town to try to bottle the US forces in the center, preventing any escape.
An M3 Bradley looses a TOW at a T-72.
Lt Teigner fires off a Stinger, looking to knock down the Hind.
But the Hind dodges and loops around to deliver a salvo of 57mm rockets.
Even the dismounts get it in on the action, moving to point blank range to engage enemy tanks with LAWs. To see how the fight turned out, please check the blog at:
Another fantastic fight, super intense and decided by a whisker. That’s both games from this past weekend, I’m looking to get two more in this weekend, so stay tuned.
Jack10/09/2015 at 02:40 #30772
Just Jack: a cool scenario and a very hard fought fight. The Soviets had a very strange bag of kit for their job but it made for an interesting engagement. Was this scenario one of your own making or like the first Team Whiskey scenario, one that you are play testing for someone else? Good work Jack and thanks for posting this.
Cheers and good gaming.
10/09/2015 at 02:56 #30774
- This reply was modified 5 years, 5 months ago by Rod Robertson.
Wait wait, I thought Kilo Company was up !!!!! Great fight but damn you should have un assed sooner !!!10/09/2015 at 03:41 #30777
My pleasure man.
This is also a playtest scenario, but I’m not following you on the ‘had a very strange bag of kit’ deal man. What’s strange about a dismounted mech infantry platoon, a mounted mech infantry platoon, a tank platoon, and a Hind with two SOF teams in support?
Are talking about a T/O standpoint, i.e, trying to figure out what the parent element is, a Mech Rifle Battalion or a Tank Battalion, etc…? If that’s it (and forgive me if I’m off base), I’d say you’re probably over-thinking the T/O issue. As I’m getting more and more into Cold War gaming, my discussions with lots of folks are leading me to this conclusion: we (collectively) are giving short shrift to the Soviets. It seems to me lots of guys have some (to me, strange) idea that the Soviets are ridiculously rigid in their handling of troops, which is kind of foreign to me.
My understanding is that, just like us, the Soviets were extraordinarily suited (via extensive training for) to task organizing their forces to meet the specific mission requirements and tactical situation. They trained, just like us (Westerners) in cross-attaching units from different battalions (and regimental-support (assets). My understanding of why they ultimately reorganized their T/Os into a strict triangle structure (a division is three regiments of three battalions of three companies of three platoons of three squads/vehicles) was to make them suitably flexible in order to carry out rapid, on the move, task organization.
If they were more limited than Western forces, it was that their ‘playbook’ was smaller. They tried to think of every conceivable tactical problem and come up with a book solution, then exercised it into the ground as battle drill (I thought we rehearsed a lot/too much, before I heard what ‘they’ were doing). We had our battle drill as well, but we played our exercises more free-flow so as to throw as many unexpected situations at small unit leaders as possible, looking to see if they applied the correct concepts and initiative, rather than selected the correct book answer and carried it out in the correct book manner. Kind of the idea of “I’m not going to teach you what to think, I’m going to teach you how to think.”
The Soviets had a real problem with small unit leadership (days could spent on all the various issues), but suffice to say they didn’t trust them to exercise initiative and judgement. The problem with relying solely on battle drill is that is necessarily limits your options, you can only think of and plan for so many things.
So, when the Soviets came across a tactical situation and mission they were familiar with, they could move like greased lightning to rearrange themselves into the ‘book answer’ force, formation, and comm plans. It’s so nailed down that you have ‘execution checklists,’ so that a single word and cardinal direction is spoken into the radio, and instantly one platoon from this company, two from that company, a section from this element, are all moving to where their supposed to be and doing what they’re supposed to do.
The Soviets were very good at that. But we were still better 😉
Let me caveat all this by saying, I DID NOT face off against the Soviets; hell, the Soviet Union was gone before I joined the Corps. All I wrote above comes from: my personal interaction with Russian soldiers that were members of the Soviet military, doctrinal pubs and technical manuals we studied in the Marine Corps, and field grade and general officers, and senior NCOs from the US Army and Marine Corps, as well as foreign militaries (British, Canadian, Dutch, Belgian, Albanian, Croatian, Slovenian, probably forgetting a few. I had the good fortune to work with quite a few other nations’ militaries as well, but with them the subject was not Russia/former Soviet Union.).
I say all that to say this: I know there are quite a few folks here (and on other forums that served in Western Europe during the Cold War, and I fully expect some may show up and post things that run counter to what I just wrote. I welcome one and all, I value their personally experienced insight. I’m not interested in much of a debate, only because all I can say is that I know what I was trained, and they know what they were trained, and the only issue I’ll point out from my point of view (as, thankfully, none of us had to actually go to guns with the Soviets), the Western world got access to a lot more info after the Soviet Union dissolved. Other than that, all I can see is, ‘perhaps you’re right, I only know what I was trained.
If it seems like I’ve gone overboard with this explanation, it’s because you(r question seemed to) asked me to explain my perspective on what happened/why something happened in my batrep, something I’ve stayed away from because I’ve seen how contentious some of these debates have become, and I’m not interested in (more) internet drama (I’m much happier now). Besides, I’m a intellectually a prehistoric form of man and my mind won’t be changed 😉
Jack10/09/2015 at 03:53 #30778
Well said Just Jack. Uncle Carl would be proud of ya !!!10/09/2015 at 04:13 #30779
I was trying to get out of there as fast as I could; unfortunately, the Soviets had something to say about it, and they said it with 30mm rounds, 125mm rounds, RPGs, and 57mm rockets. Once my teams/vehicles started getting pinned down, or aggressive enemy maneuver forced me to spend activations to react fire rather than move, stuff started falling apart.
But that’s what I love about Ivan’s rules, you’ve got to choose between what you think is the best of your bad options; the ability to have the fight dictated to you is actually there (lots of rules talk about it, OODA Loops, etc…), but I have yet to find another set of rules that pulls it off.
And no, Kilo is up this coming weekend, this batrep is from last weekend. But look at it this way: two fights and India Company is no longer an effective fighting force; they can barely mount a squad-sized operation! Kilo is up next on the chopping block, but you’re actually going over to the offensive!
Jack10/09/2015 at 04:37 #30780
I just hope I can get a little arty to at least piss off the Soviets…10/09/2015 at 08:36 #30785SparkerParticipant
Outstanding scenario and batrep work there mate! BRAVO ZULU
'Blessed are the peacekeepers, for they shall need to be well 'ard'
Matthew 5:910/09/2015 at 11:14 #30802
Another cracking game Jack. The speed at which you turn things out is very impressive.10/09/2015 at 12:44 #30808
Jack, again a question as this is a play test. Would the M3 Dismounts be 19D scouts rather than 11B inf and as such are a smaller element without the weaponry of a mech platoon? In the Orbat for both games are you given some latitude on the make up of the elements of the Armored Cavalry sub units or does the scenario bring in Mech platoons as reinforcements. I ask as the structures seem odd from a “historical” basis but still give you a good game or is there a mechanism in “Lariat Advance” to generating the forces that made it out of barracks.10/09/2015 at 15:25 #30816
Thanks guys, I appreciate it, and no Kyote, no arty for you. If you do your job, Team Whiskey may get to have air support in the future though 😉
Si – There’s actually two answers/issues here: first up, to answer your question directly, the scenario book does not get into that kind of detail The scenario book says something like this:
1 x Platoon Commander w/APC or IFV
4 x Rifle Team (with 2 x LAW each)
4 x APC or IFV
It’s written that way to take advantage of whatever it is you have to hand, to be able to play in any era (1950s to the fall of the Wall), and to vaguely ‘fit’ with the roughly 18,000 changes to every nation’s tables of organization during that 40-some odd year period. Furthermore, it’s not strictly built around T/Os; the author and I share a view of ‘paper strength’ vs ‘battlefield strength,’ simply meaning, the forces in the scenario list are what you have. If that means, given your toys, your period of play, and the appropriate T/O&E for that nation and period, that it’s one platoon of five vehicles, or one platoon has sent in three vehicles and another platoon sent in two, that’s what you have. It doesn’t say why this happened, i.e., it doesn’t state “3rd Platoon suffered two mechanical breakdowns on the way from the assembly area, which is why they don’t have ‘x’ amount of vehicles in accordance with the ‘yz’ T/O&E,’ it just says you have (in this case) five vehicles.
I’m playing with M-1s and M-3 Bradleys, so that’s what my force in the scenario became. I, personally, like to build a force (roster) and follow characters throughout the campaign, but that’s not how the book is written. The book is written to generally be following 11th ACR, but then it moves (as they get worn out) to 3rd Armored Division and even NATO partners. To show what I’m talking about, the fourth scenario has a couple guys left over from 11th ACR, reinforced by 3rd AD, then later being reinforced by Leopard IIs from a West German Panzer Division (forgive me, I’m doing all this off memory).
Ultimately, the book is written with orbats that make conventional sense, provide play balance, and allow you (the player) to do what you want, which is perfect for me.
The second element of the answer is this: one, as I noted above, I’m varying from the scenario book in that I’m trying to follow a single, fictional, US Mech-Heavy battalion task force (“Team Whiskey”). So, in scenario four, it won’t be West German tanks coming to the rescue, it will be a tank platoon from Charlie Company of Team Whiskey. I’m taking a lot of liberties with TO&E to make it fit with my storyline, and I justify that mostly via 1) task organization via cross attachment, for Soviet and US, 2) units being less than full strength due to mechanical, combat losses, and/or other duties (somebody’s gotta pull flank guard, etc…), and 3) pure flim-flam.
What I mean by ‘pure flim-flam’ is this (and has nothing to do with the scenario book, this is all me). The book’s first few scenarios are heavily into 11th ACR, less so by the end of the book, in which case 11th ACR has been ground into dust. But I wanted to a follow a single unit through all ten scenarios, and I needed a parent unit, so I chose 11th ACR, since that is the unit the book starts with. But I didn’t really want to play a cavalry troop, so I made up a fictional ‘4th Troop,’ and I made it a rather conventional Mech-Heavy battalion task force. So, I basically have ‘regular’ mech grunts and ‘regular’ tankers, but I’m still referring to it as a troop, and I’m even still calling the Brads M3s, when, with my task force, they should be M2s. On a side note, I also went with M3s because my understanding is that the ACRs received their M3 Bradleys long before the ‘regular’ mech units received their M2 Bradleys, and I didn’t want my infantry in M-113s.
So, to answer your question about 19Ds vs 11Bs, I don’t really have an answer. The ACR Troops should be stocked full of 19Ds, as well as Air Defense guys, machine gunners, AT gunners, etc… From what I understand, it actually created a lot of problems for unit commanders, having so many different MOSs in the same, small units. Additionally, from friends I have that were Cav Scouts, they always told me that there were never enough of them in training, but that in real live they expected to have their numbers bolstered by all the rear-echelon types, not only from their regiment, but also from higher-echelon HQ and logistics units. Who knows what would have really happened.
In any case, in my scenarios, I’m treating them basically as 11Bs, though the book, and my rules, don’t really get into that level of detail. The book, and the rules I use (5Core Company Command) are extremely flexible, not bothering so much with actual number of troops, but rather their capability in terms of what you as the player assign them regarding staying power and firepower. You’ve probably noted in my batreps that I freely move between squads and fireteams (and sometimes even make mistakes in my nomenclature); in the first fight, each rifle stand was a fireteam. In the second fight, each stand was a squad.
I hope that answers your question; if not, please let me know and I’ll take my best shot.
Jack10/09/2015 at 17:48 #30831
Excellent answer. It is clear on how you have generated forces, I was thinking more that the book went into a lot more detail. I like the idea of Keeping it General and then allowing you to match your own structure/rationale to it.
11/09/2015 at 01:00 #30846
- This reply was modified 5 years, 5 months ago by CAG 19.
Wow, what an answer! Sorry to have provoked you to write such an exhaustive explanation for the “mixed bag” observation I made. The reason I made the comment is that you have Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) assets cooperating with Soviet Army assets at a platoon/company level. Spetznaz teams were GRU or rarely KGB assets attached at the army or military district level which tended to operate on their own, behind enemy lines. The Spetznaz MI-24’s were heavily modified and were quite different internally from the run of the mill Soviet MI-24 or the export version MI-25. Their close cooperation with a company sized combat team threw me for a loop. That’s the genesis for my comment. But it made for a cracking good scenario and a suspense-filled game, so more power to you, Jack!
Cheers and great gaming!
Rod Robertson.11/09/2015 at 01:19 #30847
Mortars…..just a little smoke ??????11/09/2015 at 05:17 #30848
No problem about the explanation, I like talking about this stuff. But your response regarding Spetznaz/GRU supporting Soviet Army assets; now I’m really confused. Brother, this begs the question: what is it you think that military intelligence does? By your response, you seem to think they don’t exist to support the military.
Spetznaz is a general term akin to ‘Special Forces,’ and they are set up much like US Special Operations. That is, they are tiered into different levels of support (theater, strategic, operational, tactical) with varying capabilities. They have their Direct Action shooters, their Unconventional Warfare/Foreign Military Assistance types, Counter-Terrorist operators, they have their own Collection apparatus, they have several levels of reconnaissance and surveillance (just like us). I’m probably forgetting something, but that’s okay.
Then they have what they call ‘counterintelligence,’ but in Western military parlance it would be more appropriately termed ‘counter-reconnaissance.’ You see, during the Cold War, and still in certain aspects, the Soviets put a great amount of stock in battlefield reconnaissance, and because of that mindset they were very wary (and still are) of NATO reconnaissance, particularly our deep reconnaissance capabilities. So the Soviets set up counter-recon elements consisting primarily (but not solely) of SIGINT and Spetznaz types whose job was to find, fix, and destroy NATO deep reconnaissance elements.
So I think you might be confused regarding the ‘close cooperation with a company-sized combat team.’ The Spetznaz (and, in this case, the Hind) are not under the operational control of the local tactical commander, i.e., they are not supporting to the Soviet Captain/Major from the Mech Infantry unit. It’s entirely possible, due to division of labor and professional enmity between GRU and ‘regular’ Army, that the two are operating in the same battlespace against the same target without formal cooperation (such things were noted in Afghanistan and Chechnya).
But my guess is that is backwards; more likely is that GRU and the ‘regular’ Army have gotten past their differences now that they are in the middle of WWIII, and Spetznaz is involved probably at the Division-level (though it could be even higher), and that unit commander ‘chopped’ (a US Marine and Navy term, don’t know if the Army/Air Force use it, but it means you are detached temporarily to support a specific mission) the Mech Infantry unit to support the counter-recon element/mission, and the Mech Infantry unit will return to its parent organization upon completion of the mission.
So, to be surprised that Spetznaz is operating in the same battlespace, towards the same goals, as a ‘regular’ Army unit strikes me as very odd. If you say ‘they are a theater asset,’ well, that means they are operating in a military theater that (in this case, at least) has tactical units employed, so if you’re operating there you’re operating in someone’s battlespace, and if you drill down, they’re in the area of operations of 1st Squad of 1st Platoon of A Company of 1st Battalion of 1st Brigade of 1st Division of 1st Corps of 1st Army (using US terminology, but I hope you get the idea).
There are, of course, times when Spetznaz is operating in areas not under the responsibility of a combat element. The example of UCW-types inserted well behind enemy lines to wreak havoc on command and control centers, etc…, or when CT folks are inserted into a country Russia/Soviet Union is not at war with, so no combat elements are present. But that is certainly not Spetznaz’ only mission/capability, and so they end up in direct support to combat elements. That’s what they’re there for. And while it’s not out of the realm of possibility that they get opconn’ed to a local unit commander, that is generally not the case, they have their own chain of command. But again, that’s pretty much how most nation’s run Special Operations.
Bottom line, the Spetznaz aren’t operating under the command of a Mech Infantry Captain or Major, they are carrying out a Division/Corps/Army-level mission with the support of local forces in that same Division/Corps/Army. Because that’s what Military Intelligence does, it supports the military 😉
And Spetznaz may have their own specialized Hinds, but they also fly around in regular old, run-of the mill Hinds, or, more likely, Hips. 😉 The differing means of method of insertion is purely down to mission requirements with regards to capability. If you need a hammer, you use a hammer, not a flying anvil 😉
I hope this is in somehow useful/interesting, and if it sounds like I’m being an @#$%, that’s not my intention, and if you know all this already, I didn’t mean to insult your intelligence, I just must be misunderstanding your comment again.
Looking forward to more games, I can’t wait! I need to get the table set up tomorrow night so I can get right to playing early Saturday morning as my middle kid has a baseball game at 1230.
And Kyote, quite your whining! 😉
Jack11/09/2015 at 09:19 #30855
Presumably it is your job to command the Soviet forces on the board. Therefore you are either a Soviet Army commander in charge of the army assets at your disposal or you’re a GRU commander running the Spetznaz SOF operation. The moment you take over both operations, you have defacto placed both groups under the same command as you are controlling the actions of both during the game. So the argument that they are both operating in parallel but separately in the same battle space is a bit inaccurate given that you, Jack, are making the decisions for both.
I would liken the situation to air strikes and artillery programmes. In games with these assets, the controlling player has little or no control over such assets if the game is set up to accurately reflect the battle space. The air strikes happen where the FAC orders them to happen and this may or may not coincide with the wants and needs of company and battalion commanders whom the air strikes are supporting. The airstrikes could attack any targets of opportunity, including your own forces if mistakes are made, or prearranged terrain/infrastructure targets at prearranged times. Likewise an artillery programme set up before the game begins, according to a schedule and using only a pre-registered target list would be largely out of a commander’s control during the battle/game even though the shells keep falling through out the game. The ground force commander might be able to call for the cancellation of a mission but not otherwise alter the predetermined programme. Only limited control of artillery directly under the command of a company or battalion commander, such as a battery of 120mm mortars, might be able to actively support an attack by allowing the controlling player some latitude in mission choice and then only if that battery was not moving or was not having its fire redirected to other targets by higher echelons of command.
So, like the air strikes or the artillery programme, the Spetznaz operation might be better handled in a pre-programmed sense, with specific goals and timing as part of a predetermined plan made before the game and played out as the army units fight in support under the direct control of the player. The plan could be modified as events on the ground unfold but that modification should not be completely up to the controlling player. It could be controlled by a pre-game contingency plan, or less satisfactorily by random events rolls to see how it progresses. That is to say that the SOF operation should be able to be influenced by the actions of the player but not directly controlled by the player. The other alternative is to reverse the roles and have the player control the Spetznaz operation and have the ground forces in support played out automatically.
The best solution is to have two separate players control these separate but supporting elements so it’s time to abandon the whole solo thing. So, either dragoon the wife into playing along side of you or cancel the kids’ baseball and conscript them into Just Jack’s Pendelton Street Military Academy for very junior officers in order to begin a very rigorous and accelerated training programme in air-land battle operations and special forces training. Or, and I say this with full knowledge of the likelihood of dismal failure, you could take the radical and revolutionary step to make some new ‘friends’ and invite another person or two into Jack’s world! Hee-hee-hee! Gotcha!
Cheers and good gaming.
Rod Robertson.11/09/2015 at 16:42 #30901
6 and a half hours ago??? Don’t you sleep? 😉
First up, I broadly agree with what you’re saying, but let me get specific.
“Presumably it is your job to command the Soviet forces on the board. Therefore you are either a Soviet Army commander in charge of the army assets at your disposal or you’re a GRU commander running the Spetznaz SOF operation. The moment you take over both operations, you have defacto placed both groups under the same command as you are controlling the actions of both during the game. So the argument that they are both operating in parallel but separately in the same battle space is a bit inaccurate given that you, Jack, are making the decisions for both.”
Man, it’s not inaccurate, I’m a solo player, I don’t have a choice but to control the movement/actions of both forces. What I try to do is play it like a multi-player game, except I’m wearing all the hats. Prior to the game starting I come up with a concept of operations for the various elements, and I do my best to stick with it. The two Mech Plts and one Tank Plt were treated as a force, the Hind/Spetznaz were treated as a force, the US SF Recon Teams were treated as a force, and the US Mech Plt was treated as a force, all with their own cards for activation (once the Spetznaz were inserted, I actually put them on their own card to signify the delay in their radio communications to the Hind).
In any case, the Soviet mechanized force was charged with pushing north to south to take out the US SF AND to take out the US Mech force, while the Spetznaz were inserted specifically (on the US baseline) to mark targets for the Hind, and the Hind’s targets were the US SF Teams (that was their only mission). There was one time I gave the Hind the option of attacking the US Bradleys, but that was because Spet 2 failed its radio call and Spet 1 couldn’t see any US SF Teams (at that moment), and Spet 1 failed his radio call anyway.
“I would liken the situation to air strikes and artillery programmes. In games with these assets, the controlling player has little or no control over such assets if the game is set up to accurately reflect the battle space. The air strikes happen where the FAC orders them to happen and this may or may not coincide with the wants and needs of company and battalion commanders whom the air strikes are supporting.”
I disagree with the fact the player(s) has no control. Someone has to control the FAC/FO, even if it’s a different player than the one commanding the armored force. I do agree that the focus of the supporting fires may not be prioritized, or even on the spot, to what the local force (at whatever level) commander wants.
“The airstrikes could attack any targets of opportunity, including your own forces if mistakes are made, or prearranged terrain/infrastructure targets at prearranged times.”
“Likewise an artillery programme set up before the game begins, according to a schedule and using only a pre-registered target list would be largely out of a commander’s control during the battle/game even though the shells keep falling through out the game. The ground force commander might be able to call for the cancellation of a mission but not otherwise alter the predetermined programme.”
See, this is where I disagree, I think you’re seriously underestimating the Soviet capability. First, I would say local commander competency/clout would affect his relationship with the FO/FAC, and please understand that there is a relationship with the FO/FAC. The FO/FAC is not a subordinate, but the relationship is developed due to extreme amounts of rehearsal, which is part of the point of rehearsal/exercises. So that affects the ability of the local force commander to get supporting fires on where HE needs supporting fires.
Second, I don’t get why so many people believe the Soviet artillery to be so rigid and constrained. True, they were not set up to be as flexible as Western forces with regards to putting arty onto previously un-surveyed targets, but their arty battalions and regiments had huge survey parties that pre-registered everything for on-call targets. From talking with former Soviet soldiers, their survey parties would pre-register every damn hill, defilade, village, clump of trees. Of course, doing that calls for physical (eyes-on) survey, and they couldn’t do that for areas they couldn’t see. A weak area, from my discussions, was that, rather than try to come up a system to do comms relay for previously un-surveyed targets, they would do pre-registering via map exercise. The issue there was 1) the map doesn’t always match up with what you’re now looking at (particularly back during the Cold War), and 2) they were not good at zeroing the guns on map pre-registered targets, which was further compounded by a relatively difficult adjust fire process.
But from a tactical perspective, I see a Soviet battalion commander (and higher) keeping his FO right next to him, and having the ability to say ‘I want rounds over there, right now’ in the middle of a fight. And if the target was pre-registered, rounds would start falling pretty quickly. If not, he’s probably out of luck.
“Only limited control of artillery directly under the command of a company or battalion commander, such as a battery of 120mm mortars, might be able to actively support an attack by allowing the controlling player some latitude in mission choice and then only if that battery was not moving or was not having its fire redirected to other targets by higher echelons of command.”
Sure, a commander always has more control over organic assets because he’s their boss. But I still think you’re shorting the arty. By the end of WWII, the Soviets came about a doctrine of maximum firepower to the front via task organized battle groups (at all echelons), and they got very good at it, making maximum use of tanks, guns, and supporting fires (particularly arty). What you’re describing sounds like a NATO commander’s dream, that the Soviets would be so incompetent as to not be able to effectively use their overwhelming advantage in artillery. I suppose I naturally just look at the worst-case scenario, which is to assume the enemy is good at what they do 😉
“So, like the air strikes or the artillery programme, the Spetznaz operation might be better handled in a pre-programmed sense, with specific goals and timing as part of a predetermined plan made before the game and played out as the army units fight in support under the direct control of the player. The plan could be modified as events on the ground unfold but that modification should not be completely up to the controlling player. It could be controlled by a pre-game contingency plan, or less satisfactorily by random events rolls to see how it progresses. That is to say that the SOF operation should be able to be influenced by the actions of the player but not directly controlled by the player. The other alternative is to reverse the roles and have the player control the Spetznaz operation and have the ground forces in support played out automatically.”
Like I said, I do that to the best of my ability via having a set plan from the outset of the game.
I don’t know if I put it in the write-up, but here’s what I did for the first scenario (to try to overcome solo-player knowledge): I placed the NATO units in their defensive positions, placed their minefields, then assigned them each sectors and missions (i.e., you’re here. If the Soviets come at you, you stand fast until ‘x’ happens. If they by-pass you over here, you do ‘y’, if they by-pass you over there, you do ‘z.’ This unit, you engage these types of targets from here, and if the main thrust is here you fall back to ‘x’, if the main thrust is there, you fall back to ‘y’.
Then I took the Soviet forces, organized them into simple battlegroups (three tank, three mech inf, for my simple, solo mind), and came up with six different battle plans You probably saw the overlay I did with the US positions and the Soviet attack plan marked; that was number 5 of 6. I did six separate and distinctly different Soviet attack plans up, which laid out their routes of advance, their tactical responsibilities and priority targets, and the preparatory barrage (changed six times to match the various enemy schemes of maneuver). Then I rolled a D6 to decide which one to go with, and I stuck with that plan throughout the fight.
My point is, as a I solo player I do as much as I can to come up with a plan and make the opposing forces to stick to it, as that is my mechanism for having fun playing solo games.
“The best solution is to have two separate players control these separate but supporting elements so it’s time to abandon the whole solo thing.”
Yeah, well, that’s probably not going to happen. First, if you can’t tell, I’m not a big fan of people 😉 Second, I have too much fun playing solo; I always get to do exactly what I want, the exact way I want. And I always win! 😉
Having said that, I do have a batrep from about a month ago I need to post, a 15mm skirmish fight between me and the young baseball player.
Got me, eh? Okay, how about this: please keep your questions coming, Doctor Robertson, and I will continue to educate you on how the military works! 😉 Relax everybody, it’s just a joke.
Jack12/09/2015 at 00:00 #30933
The price of eternal vigilance is very little sleep, and I’m watching you very closely!
Dr. Robertson was my father! I’m just Robertson, or Rod or Evil-Roddy or as my father used to call me, ” you fat-faced bastard!”. And he was the nice parent! My mum was ex-US Army and served as a nurse in WWII. You did not cross that lady and live without deep regrets ever-after! So, Jack, feel free to call me whatever you think you can get away with without breaking forum rules as I know you’re just joking and there is no way you could offend me even with your acutely honed Marine vocabulary and intensity. I’ve been shot and stabbed by relatives so friends and acquaintances have a high bar to reach to get under my skin.
Now, to the Cold War! Yikes, I wrote a note saying my apologies for triggering a lengthy response and I get an Opus Magnus on the scale of the Gettysburg Address back! What you wrote was eloquent and elegant and I largely agree with your rational for how your games are designed, planned and executed. However the Soviet Army was a giant kinetic bludgeon, not a surgeon’s finessed blade. Soviet Doctrine in the 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s changed in flavour but not in substance really.
Soviet artillery was primarily a break-through tool and was thus massed to reinforce success and withheld to starve failure. Where NATO might task a battery or a battalion, the Soviets would task battalions, Regimental Artillery Groups (RAG’s), Divisional Artillery Groups (DAG’s), Army Artillery Groups (AAG’s) and larger level AG’s to support both breakthroughs and mobile warfare. There was a constant tension in the Soviet Army from the early 1960’s to the late 1980’s between centralization and responsiveness. But the Soviets never adopted a system where a FOO could call in anything from his own battery to a divisional or a corp level stonk. This was because NATO’s system was based on secure radio communications and the Soviets did not believe that NATO’s communications would survive EW jamming, nuclear generated EMP and inefficient use in an NBC environment. They also believed that they could not count on reliable and secure communications and so kept artillery control centralized at the expense of responsiveness and flexibility.
The Soviets centralized much of their artillery into these artillery groups to allow for effective command and control in an environment which was hostile to communication and thus decentralization. So a motor Rifle Regiment Commander or battalion commander would find some or all of the artillery needed to support his operation was not under his command but rather under the RAG or higher level Artillery Commander’s command and control. Soviet FOO’s and fire control teams would report requests to the RAG HQ which would then decide who got the fire support. After breakthroughs had been made and a more fluid maneuver warfare was occurring the command structure did not change. For supporting a meeting engagement during a march attack Soviet forces could expect little artillery support. They would have available their own organic artillery like 120mm mortars and perhaps some SP Arty directly off the march, often firing directly at the enemy rather than in an indirect role. The chief task of this artillery was the destruction, suppression or the blinding of enemy antitank defenses to allow a successful march attack to succeed or to allow the Soviet formation to bypass the strong points in the enemy’s defenses. If a march attack failed or a hasty attack was chosen instead then rapid deployment of some or all of the RAG/DAG would occur and there would be more arty for support and likely less use of direct fire over open sights by the SP arty. If a deliberate attack was called for more complete deployment and more thorough fire support would occur. This is how the Soviets reconciled centralization with responsiveness but you will notice that, platoon, company, battalion and often even regimental commanders had limited if any control over their artillery support and FOO’s could only request/suggest fire missions and not call them in from all levels like NATO FOO’s could. In the Soviet Army the decisions were made by the artillery group commanders and not by the maneuver formation commanders or the FOO’s attached to those maneuver elements. La!
Cheers and good gaming.
Rod Robertson.12/09/2015 at 03:32 #30940
I am still puzzled that 5 CC does not have arty represented in the way I think it should. But I’ve only read the rules a couple of times and read Just Jacks reports.12/09/2015 at 05:09 #30941
No reason to watch me, man, I’m boring. And Dr Robertson’s your father, eh? Well, I’ll be Gilligan if you’ll be The Professor 😉 We do need to hear more about this being shot and stabbed by relatives, though.
Once again, I largely agree with what you’re saying, but not 100%, so I’ll only address those issues. Though first, I’m with you on the ‘breakthrough’ aspect; our joke was that they don’t take out targets, they take out grid squares. But surely you must agree with me that playing a game where the NATO player puts all his stuff on the board, sits back, and has the Soviet player roll 10,000 D6s to eliminate all but one of your tanks and a the cook’s truck, then follow it with a regiment of tanks and another of mechanized rifles, isn’t the most stimulating experience. So my concept has been that the massively overwhelming barrage has already occurred. That’s partly why we’re seeing orders of battle that don’t match T/Os, we’re dealing with what’s left. And because I build a roster and follow characters, I can’t be truly realistic; realistic would have been (for the first battle): what’s on the board (a mech inf company, two tanks, and some TOWs) is all that’s left of Team Whiskey, the rest (a mech inf company and three and a half platoons of tanks) was destroyed in the initial barrage.
That’s real, but I’m not willing to do that. And I admit that I don’t sit down before each battle and work out what happened to everyone on each side that’s not there, i.e., two tanks dropped due to mechanical problems, one mech inf plt was detached to guard the Brigade CP, three were destroyed by Su-25s on the road march here, and all these others were destroyed by the opening arty barrage, and that’s why I have these forces on the battelefield. Because of the non-standard T/Os, my whole assumption is that the rest of the platoon/company/whatever is not here because of stuff like that. But, I digress.
“However the Soviet Army was a giant kinetic bludgeon, not a surgeon’s finessed blade. Soviet Doctrine in the 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s changed in flavour but not in substance really.”
Well, I disagree with that, and it’s exactly what I mean by my comment “we’re seriously underestimating them.”
“Soviet artillery was primarily a break-through tool and was thus massed to reinforce success and withheld to starve failure.”
The Soviet artillery was a break-through tool for the first day (and other, large offensives/counteroffensives that might have taken place should NATO have been able to keep them from reaching the sea in a very short amount of time). After that, they were mechanized and towed-artillery that was meant to keep up with the armored elements to support them in pursuit operations. Maybe I’m not getting your point, but the arty wasn’t going to be left behind after the initial decimation of the West German border (and others).
Not sure why you put the second part in there; reinforce success is a basic tenet of everyone’s idea of maneuver warfare. So, I agree, but what for?
“Where NATO might task a battery or a battalion, the Soviets would task battalions, Regimental Artillery Groups (RAG’s), Divisional Artillery Groups (DAG’s), Army Artillery Groups (AAG’s) and larger level AG’s to support both breakthroughs and mobile warfare.”
Got it, and agreed, and you’ve got mobile warfare in there so disregard my comment above. But then that begs the question, what were they doing if not supporting the maneuver elements?
“There was a constant tension in the Soviet Army from the early 1960’s to the late 1980’s between centralization and responsiveness.”
My understanding is there was not tension, there was a lack of capability (to put rounds onto un-surveyed targets). I mean, are you saying they had the ability to be as flexible and accurate with arty as NATO, but decided not to? I suppose I can see your point if what you’re saying is that they believed in mass fires rather than battery-level fires. But serving up massed fires isn’t the issue, we’ll get to that in a second.
“But the Soviets never adopted a system where a FOO could call in anything from his own battery to a divisional or a corp level stonk.”
I’m not sure I follow (never had a system where an FO could call in a fire mission?); you can’t be saying they didn’t use FOs, I know you know they did because I’ve seen you discuss it in other posts. Are just trying to say they couldn’t call in a battery/battalion level fire mission? The Soviets did train for battalion-level fire missions, whether they would have used them is another matter as they quite liked massing fires rather than divvying them out (which I think we both agree on).
So, do we agree that the Soviets had FOs? More on that in a minute.
“This was because NATO’s system was based on secure radio communications and the Soviets did not believe that NATO’s communications would survive EW jamming, nuclear generated EMP and inefficient use in an NBC environment.”
I have real problems with your statement that the Soviets remained rigid with their doctrine because they believed comms would fail. They did have pretty unreliable VHF/HF radios, that’s true, but they had whole battalions of wire dogs to run slash wire out to everyone for field phones, and they did it constantly. Hell, they even made extensive use of motorized couriers. So radios were an issue, but comms in general was not.
“They also believed that they could not count on reliable and secure communications and so kept artillery control centralized at the expense of responsiveness and flexibility.”
My understanding of things is that comms issues has nothing to do with centralizing artillery control. My understanding is that they centralized 1) it in order to be able to meet the shifting priorities of mobile warfare, and 2) because they believed in applying overwhelming firepower to whatever objective they were after. They did not believe in Economy of Force operations, they were told to ignore their flanks (how successful they would have been at that no one will ever know; it’s easy to say that over a map, quite different when you’re out in the field and don’t know what’s left or right of you, or worse, you know there’s enemy units out there and you’re being told to ignore them), and if the enemy had a single squad and they had ten battalions, they were going to send ten battalions. That line of thinking, from what I understand, was pounded into them, in every aspect of their military.
“So a motor Rifle Regiment Commander or battalion commander would find some or all of the artillery needed to support his operation was not under his command but rather under the RAG or higher level Artillery Commander’s command and control. Soviet FOO’s and fire control teams would report requests to the RAG HQ which would then decide who got the fire support.”
“…then rapid deployment of some or all of the RAG/DAG would occur and there would be more arty for support and likely less use of direct fire over open sights by the SP arty. If a deliberate attack was called for more complete deployment and more thorough fire support would occur. This is how the Soviets reconciled centralization with responsiveness but you will notice that, platoon, company, battalion and often even regimental commanders had limited if any control over their artillery support and FOO’s could only request/suggest fire missions and not call them in from all levels like NATO FOO’s could. In the Soviet Army the decisions were made by the artillery group commanders and not by the maneuver formation commanders or the FOO’s attached to those maneuver elements.”
This is where we are so close, but seem so far away. People say things like, you can’t have a motor rifle company requesting that stuff, those are Army-level assets! What those people are somehow not realizing is that there are no magical Army/Corps/Division/Task Force troops, i.e., they are not some ‘other’ guys, they are simply the guys in that Army, and ultimately that Army breaks down into Corps, Divisions, Regiments, Battalions, to eventually arrive at a rifle, or mech, or tank company that is actually at the point of contact for the entire Army. And where do you think the Army CG had his Arty commander put his FOs, and what do you think the Army CG had his Arty commander make as priority targets?
Do people really think that the FO is riding around, all by his lonesome, without a care regarding what’s happening to the infantry units to his left and right? Do you think that those infantry unit commanders are not asking for arty support, and do you think he doesn’t want to do it, even though the Army CG, via his chain of command, said ‘you will go out there and support this attack by directing the fires of ‘x’ artillery regiment???
There is no denying that there is friction in the planning process when you have a centralized arty chain of command separate from the maneuver chain of command, and there is no denying there is a lack of capability when you don’t train your troops to call in arty fire missions because your doctrine says we mass fires and thus limit ourselves only to accepting calls for fire from the designated FO. But you can’t act like the Arty command has a separate mission than the maneuver command; you are not going to fire arty on a target that doesn’t affect your maneuver elements, and so, even in the Soviet military, the maneuver element commander has a say on where and when arty gets used, it is just run up a separate chain of command, via what is basically a single point of failure, thus delaying the arty fire missions, or, in some cases jeopardizing them altogether.
And regarding your comparing it to NATO, you’re kind of off-base there too. Much has been made in modern times (Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc…) of a squad-leader being able to call in a fire mission, and get it! What’s missing from the equation is an enemy that has tanks, IFVs, air support, and arty of their own. The issue is not in capability; in the Army and Marine Corps, grunts (well, all Marines, grunts and arty guys in the Army) are taught ‘call for fire’ in Boot Camp. The issue is, in the Cold War Gone Hot environment, one of availability, the fact there would never be enough arty to go around. And so conceptually, we did (still do, we just have arty and the enemy doesn’t) it the same way as the Soviets: calls for fire went to a central location (a Fire Direction Center, or Fire Control Center) where your request was matched up against assets and priorities and then approved or disapproved.
The difference there, as you pointed out, is that in NATO the maneuver unit commander had the arty under his control (organic or chopped to him), while the Soviets placed it under an arty group commander. So both sides had calls for fire going to a centralized location, and had someone other than they guy calling for fire deciding on whether that mission would be supported or not. If the Soviet Arty Group Commander didn’t support the Army CGs scheme of maneuver he’d probably be shot on the spot, so the the Soviets didn’t lack flexibility in calls for fire because the Arty Group Commander decided whether to shoot the mission or not (he’s looking at the chart tacked to the wall of the tent to see what priority the mission has); just like in NATO, the decision was made based on priorities set by the senior commander. Think of it this way: NATO simply pushed the title of ‘senior command’ downward in echelon in order to be faster in making the decision and responding. If you think about it, NATO was forced to do that because we never had as much arty as the Soviets (I don’t want to get into a doctrinal ‘what came first, chicken or egg’ debate as to why NATO had so much less arty).
Now what the hell does that mean??? My wife is Thai, so I hear that a lot, but I don’t think it means the same thing 😉
In summary, my belief is that Soviet response to on-call fire missions, particularly if they had been able to pre-register the targets, is not as quick as NATO, but not as slow (or unlikely to happen) as you have stated. I know you’re a fan of pubs; I need to find it! There’s a pub that has the FO riding with the lead battalion in hasty attack (mounted mech rifle) whose sole purpose in life is to call in battalion-level arty fire missions to suppress NATO ATGMs, and he had to do it the hard way (calling in 8-digit grids) as the targets were not pre-registered. It had diagrams and everything; it was going to be slower than us because the call for fire was still going all the way up the chain of command, then all they way back down to the supporting arty battalion, but it was going to happen!
So, I see your complaining about the length of my posts, and I raise you! ;0
I rambled so much that I’m not sure I made any points; eh, with that much writing, there has to be at least one point in there. Take care man, talk to you soon.
Jack12/09/2015 at 05:13 #30942
Kyote, you’re always confused 😉
What’s the problem? Spend an activation to call (with a 66% chance you’re good, 16.5% chance you’re not but it’s there next turn, and a 16.5% chance you’re not and it’s gone for good); if good, pick out the target(s) and roll the dice. You get to do that ‘x’ amount of times (as designated in whatever scenario you’re playing). EEEEEEEaaaasssssyyyyy.
Sure, it doesn’t have spotting rounds and adjust. I used to play rules that did all that, but it quickly made me very tired… Of life. So now I play more streamlined rules 😉
Jack12/09/2015 at 05:19 #30943
Ack….I am old and kinda blind now. So do any of team Whiskey scenarios have arty ????12/09/2015 at 12:27 #30951
That last post was too long by half! Your “throw everything at the wall and something will stick” approach to writing and discussion is like being hit with a literary shotgun – messy and jarring! But your points are well taken and will be addressed momentarily.
“La!”, means, “There!” in French and connotes,”There, It is done!”. It can be used in everything from regular day to day conversation to dueling with fists or swords.
When I was 6 and 1/2 years old a younger American cousin accidentally shot me in the arm with his older brother’s 22 rifle. When I was a teenager a Canadian cousin of mine and myself used to fight all the time, half the time for fun and half the time out of anger. During one spirited duel he was gripped by blind rage and he stabbed me in the upper left thigh with a knife while I was trying to beat him senseless with a bicycle! He won that fight, but I won the war. Alas, he passed away about fifteen years ago as a result of a motorcycle accident, I miss him.
Soviet on-call fire missions could go in two directions during a maneuver/march engagement. 1) To the organic artillery under the maneuver commander’s control, like the battalion of 120mm mortars integral to each MRR or a battery of 122mm SP How. attached to an advanced guard party. Such arty would be very responsive to the needs of Btn. or the Regt. Commander. Company and Ptn commanders could ask for and hope for access to arty but the decision would be up to their superiors. 2) To the RAG, DAG or AAG under the arty group commander’s control. Such arty would be far more volumous and effective potentially but would not be as responsive or flexible as organic arty assets.
The key to understanding this dichotomy is initiative. The Soviet offensive was so structured and so finely tuned that initiative could screw things up very badly. Everything was planned and timetabled down to small local details. If a commander diverted from the plan he could seriously imperil the greater operation so control was centralized and initiative was viewed with suspicion as it could be a source of fatal friction to the plan. The Soviets realized that no plan survives contact with the enemy and that contingencies would have to be made, but they also believed that no enemy could survive contact with their plans and that if they could hold the plan intact for as long as possible they could breakthrough and flood the NATO middle and rear areas with Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG’s) and win the war quickly. All this depended upon being able to move huge volumes of troops, vehicles and war material over limited numbers of routes at the fastest possible speed in a hostile EW and possibly NBC environment which would hamper or stop electronic communication, command and control badly (field phones notwithstanding). The only way to do this was to follow the plan. If the initiative of one Regt. commander blocks a route even temporarily, the knock-on effect causes frictional ripples which magnify themselves more and more and interfer with plans and timetables until the collateral friction brings the advance to a halt that is short of strategic and operational objectives. So while initiative is valued at the very local and tactical level, it is also feared and discouraged at the operational and strategic level. Centralization of command was seen as the cure for the disruptive interference which could be caused by initiative.
It is important to remember that this system was developed for the high intensity and potentially NBC environment in Europe. Different doctrines were used in say Afghanistan from 1979-1989 where the flexibility of arty was greater and more responsive to the needs of smaller combat formations.
I know I probably missed some of your many points but you shot gunned so many that this is all I can manage in one post. I’ll respond more completely when I have more time.
Cheers and this is a cracking good discussion.
Rod Robertson.12/09/2015 at 17:55 #30956
I found the arty rules under unusual circumstances…..12/09/2015 at 19:04 #30957
How cryptic and vague! OK, I’ll bite. What arty rules under what circumstances? Get back to those M2/M3 Bradley’s, and get’em done!
Cheers and keep painting.
Rod Robertson.12/09/2015 at 19:34 #30961
The Arty rules for 5CCC .12/09/2015 at 20:41 #30962
Well then stop throwing unusual circumstances around your game-cave and start reading your new-found rules whilst painting Bradley’s and mowing the damn lawn! It’s the age of multitasking man, so get on with it!
Cheers and good reading/painting/mowing.
Rod Robertson.12/09/2015 at 20:50 #30963
I don’t have any NATO dark green paint !!!! Grand Kids are over so I can’t mow or work on my hobby stuff !!!!!12/09/2015 at 20:51 #30964
Oh and my new computer doesn’t like my printer or my camera !!!!!13/09/2015 at 04:11 #30969
Rod – That was pretty clever with the ‘throw stuff against the wall.’ If you don’t want to read it just say so 😉 All that’s left to be said is this: the beauty of it all is that we don’t have to agree. You’re going to do your thing, and I’m going to do mine, and we’re both going to have a great time!
Kyote – I just finished up Scenario 3. The good news is, you’re still alive. The bad news is, none of your guys are 😉
Jack13/09/2015 at 06:31 #30972
Damn !!! So where is the AAR ??????14/09/2015 at 00:54 #31022
Got another other computer….now to see if it likes my camera.14/09/2015 at 02:40 #31023
Jack, don’t get me wrong. I like this discussion and I was not complaining. I was only kidding you about your gift for typed gab! This morning I typed out a long post to you on Soviet Artillery and as I was getting about 75%-80% finished when the wireless misbehaved and I lost it all. Argh! I’ll try again soon but I have been busy today.
Cheers and good gaming.
Rod Robertson.14/09/2015 at 03:41 #31024
Kyote – I actually just answered you on TMP. I only got one game in, and it’s huge (145 pics), and I’m working on the batrep, but it takes awhile man. I’m thinking about doing it in three parts, I think I can have the first part posted tomorrow night.
What do you guys think about that? Should I post the batrep in three parts.
Rod – No sweat man. But don’t worry about another arty post man, time marches forward, and I’m busy as hell this coming week (writing up the batrep, baseball practice, work, family, and getting ready for the next fight). I don’t think I’ll have time to read and respond.
I know this is off topic, but where’s Jozi’s Tin Man? I miss his 5Core Brigade Commander batreps (in 3mm).
Jack14/09/2015 at 03:57 #31025
Got another computer as the last one was window 10 (which sucks) this is a Chrome book…OOps Yes Just Jack post it in 3 parts if that means we get to read it sooner !!!!
15/09/2015 at 19:20 #31129
- This reply was modified 5 years, 5 months ago by kyoteblue.
Got a monkey on my back…I be jones for Team Whiskey 3 !!!15/09/2015 at 19:32 #31131
I’m trying man, hopefully have the first part up tonight after baseball practice.
Jack15/09/2015 at 19:44 #31133
Yes, please !!!! Oh and I’m rereading Team Yankee.
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