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Glenn Pearce
SpectatorHello Mike!
I have had numerous complaints about your conduct on this topic Glenn. Numerous
Obviously you realized that they were unfounded. I’ve never intentionally offended anyone personally unless they have struck the first blow. A lot of people have very strong views on this topic and when someone takes a different stand they have a tendency to take it personally and lose sight of the actual issues at hand. I don’t think it’s fair to single me out simply because I’m able to express myself in a factual manner that others can’t reply to. I gather that you have seen that. So thanks for holding the hand of reason.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorWell, no. Lets be honest here, you started by making general statements and when it was shown you were wrong you cut down the scale of what was being discussed to one where you felt more likely to win the argument.
Well, if I have to be honest I simply explained my position in more detail. However, if you think I just being brilliant, I can go with that!
SpectatorHello Tim!
I apologize unreservedly to Glen and everyone else for being far too aggressive. No excuses. Whatever I thought, he’s quite right, a question is better than expressing irritation.
Thanks very much for proving that you are indeed a fine gentleman.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorThat is not relevant or cool.
Perhaps you should look at the statement that prompted it. It was certainly relevant. I never tried to be cool.
It is clearly a go at someones mental health and not advice born out of compassion and as such is not the sort of thing needed here.
That’s not true at all. If I was not trying to be compassionate the message would have been completely different.
The only thing I was trying to do was defuse a situation that was not created by me. It seems to have worked although it took a little time.
The only thing that is clear here is someone was offended and the individual who committed the offence has now proven that he is indeed a stand up guy and sincerely apologized for his behavior. He should be commended for taking it on. He even acknowledges that my message was right!
So rather then thank me for helping to straighten things out you reopen the wound and insult me again! Perhaps you should read my entire message again with a different perspective. There is a better way to handle things.
SpectatorI just had a look at Glen Pearce’s posts after putting him on ignore. So yeah, there’s a big problem.
Obviously you ignored my advice and are still trying to create problems. So sad.
SpectatorIt’s not just period, it’s scale. Skirmish games are improved greatly by objectives and victory conditions, as is playing out a sector of a battlefield. Arguably these become almost pointless without them.
Absolutely
SpectatorHello Rhys!
However, I think if you play more modern games, the need for geographic locations as leverage for deciding victory become much more important as the weapons of war become much more advanced with rifles and steel rifled breech loading artillery and also the evolution of accurate indirect fire at greater and greater ranges. Especially when tactics completely failed to evolve anywhere near the rate of weaponry.
I can only tell you that I have played more modern games without using geographic locations as leverage for deciding victory and they were a blast. I also don’t see any difference that firepower makes in supporting victory conditions.
During the Russo-Turkish war for example, of 1877 to 1878, the Russians were often found, as an aggressive invader, to be assaulting Turkish field fortifications and prepared positions with a dispersed assault column that, even in the age of the Bolt Action rifle (Turks were using Mausers), had a doctrine of keeping the bayonet fixed at all times on the field of battle so they can always be ready for a close assault. Therefore, an initial Russian assault on day 1 of a battle rarely succeeded. Now, I am sure, you can see the problem of not measuring Russian physical progress across Turkish positions will always result in a terrible loss for the Russians as the initial forces available for day 1 of the battle would take horrendous casualties.
This sounds like a pretty simple game. Either the Russians take the Turkish positions or they don’t. Why would you want to waste time trying to measure their physical progress?
You cannot create a historic battle of the first battle of Plevna (there were three separate battles during what turned into a siege) without giving the Russians credit for achieving some measure of capture of geographic locations compared to their historic counterpart. Otherwise playing the Russians at Plevna would be miserable. And I think this is where Chris Pringle may well have been thinking of. But then again may be not.
What’s wrong with saying if they do they win, if not they lose? Why force them into playing a subjective set of goals that will probably be the source of discord after the game?
I think it may have been a little rash of you to shoot Chris down in advance of understanding his view point and his area of expertise
I don’t think I was rash. I thought my comments were timely and relevant. I’m well aware of Chris’s point of view even before he questioned mine. If you thought I shot him down than he must have had a weak position.
I think it seems to some that you have steered the conversation solely around the horse and musket period and excluded any thoughts of how victories were historically defined in other, typically later periods because you simply have limited or no knowledge or understanding of them
I’ve simply gone where the conversation went. As now and previously it’s my position that is under discussion so why would it include other periods? I think historically victories have pretty much been defined the same way. There is a winner and a loser and sometimes a stalemate. I think that’s a pretty clear understanding of them.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Guy!
I had assumed you didn’t like ‘victory conditions’ or ‘victory points’ because it made for an unrealistic representation of war as a game (within the obvious parameters of unreality inherent in the wargame). I now see your objection is it makes you play a different type of game. My dislike of victory points is they divorce games/battles from historical reality and make them just another badly thought out game of chess.
Actually I’m not fond of them for all three reasons and more.
About context and Generals perhaps a quick overview of what we do might help.
First all of our battles are researched in some detail and every time we play them again a search is conducted to see what else has come up since the last time we played it. So were constantly trying to improve on the facts and the presentation (the table looks better, etc.).
Before the players arrive the table is completely set up to represent what the battle looked like before it started with all of the troops placed in there historical positions. For variety and an added challenge sometimes the troops are not placed on the table and the players decide where to place them.
When the players arrive they are given an historical briefing on what happened before, during and after the battle. From there they are divided up into two sides/teams with a commander who is then responsible for dividing up his army into commands and firming up a plan of action. So they effectively hold a historic council of war.
The game then starts and ends when one side surrenders, withdraws or his army cohesion collapses.
All the players enjoy the games immensely as very often the game is undecided until the last couple of turns. There is never any dispute about who won the game and it’s generally very easy for the defeated side to see that it was short comings in their own plan that caused the loss. It was either the concept or it’s execution that brought them down. Likewise the winners can easily see what they did right that brought them victory.
So the game has context with the overview and table setup and the generals (players) are free to put whatever plan they want in motion without the encumbrance of any artificial stimulants or penalties.
The players can’t play this style of gaming often enough and the friendly banter continues on long after an AAR has been published. None of the members want to change this formula.
I’m sure you would enjoy a game with us as well.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Guy!
Thanks for giving me your own personal views.
You have to know what the strategic national goal is and the strategic and operational situation or you cannot act realistically.
When replaying an historical battle you actually have to divorce yourself from all outside influences and concentrate on the actual situation before you. I’m not aware of any actual battlefield commander who on the day of the battle wrote in his orders to his subordinates what their strategic national goal was along with a detailed account of the strategic and operational situation was. I’m reasonably confident that was the furthest thing from his mind.
Take the Waterloo campaign – was Ligny a win or a loss for the Prussians? They didn’t crush Napoleon (and probably couldn’t have on the day)
Total defeat, they just barely got away in time before their entire army was destroyed. They never had a whisper of a chance of beating Napoleon.
So not being smashed but withdrawing in order to gain time and effect a union with Wellington in the near future was a strategic goal, objective and win for the Prussians despite their battlefield loss.
Our games are focused on the day of the battle, not events that occur afterwards as a result of the battle. Were not playing the future events that have not yet occurred.
Life is more complicated than simply two armies slugging it out to the death.
Absolutely, but our game is only focused on the two armies on that event filled day. Also our games are never a slugfest to the death.
Don’t get me wrong I want to fight the big battles (as well as the small actions) but they must be set in context and often that involves much more than just battering each other.
Our games are completely set in context without any fabricated restrictions and almost always involve a series of complicated situations with the occasional battering. Our games are world class to some in the 6mm community and of course to the members of my club. A long, long way from a simple day of just battering each other.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorI think it depends who you are playing with, whether or not they will play ‘realistically’ without needing incentives. Most armies benefit from concentration, for example, but it’s no fun playing against someone who sets his force up in one corner of the table rather than trying to cover as much of the centre of his line as he reasonably can. For those types of players you need a reason for them to do that, and that’s where objectives and victory conditions are useful.
We never play those kinds of games. Our table is generally bursting with figures (5,000-10,000+)
Going back to Waterloo, given a free deployment the player representing Wellington would be wisest to concentrate as close to where the Prussians will arrive as possible. This was not a historical possibility, and any game where he does so is going to have little claim of realism. Plus the players who turned up wanting to refight Waterloo aren’t going to be happy. Even if you fix initial deployments he can withdraw his right and redeploy it to the left.
Wellington didn’t do that for four good reasons. 1) He was afraid that Napoleon would turn his right flank. 2) He was hoping that he could draw Napoleon into attacking his left flank where the Prussians would crush him from the rear. 3) He needed room for the Prussians in case they weren’t able to crush the French. 4) It would upset his ideal plan for his “line of battle” to function to its best ability. We have played Waterloo many times and the players who have no sense of the importance of a line of battle have always lost the game when they do silly things like withdraw the Allied right flank.
If you can rely on your players to stick to the script that won’t happen, but a published scenario will be played by all types of players, and some will only want to win at any cost or know nothing about the historical situation. Those players need the objectives and victory conditions even if you don’t.
Well I know of at least one published scenario on Waterloo that has no objectives and victory conditions and I’m not aware of any complaints about it. I’ve seen lots of other published scenarios on other battles including a few of my own that are void of conditions and never had anything but positive feedback.
SpectatorHello Grimheart!
I gather you missed my comments about “obvious”. We don’t really say in our games “okay fellows the only way you can win this game is by destroying the other side”. We actually have “no conditions”. So yes I fully agree with you that two major concerns of any army is saving his and crushing the other guy. They kind of go hand and hand.
I also fully agree that at lower levels the forces have objectives. The problem is some scenario designers “cherry pick” those objectives and often assign values to them. Now this is certainly not a problem if you enjoy those types of games. However, if your trying to reflect actual large historical H&M battles the train runs off the track.
If your still not clear on my comments please have a fresh read of my long post that included Waterloo. Still fuzzy just drop off a line or two.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Rhys!
Your welcome. Yes although I was concerned over your tone I never thought that we were too far apart.
Yes, I’ve tried to keep my point as simple as possible so we don’t lose sight of the actual discussion. A battle is a very complex situation with a huge number of factors in play. Withdrawing from a battle as you mention clearly establishes a winner and a loser and both armies can still be in reasonable condition. That’s how a number of our games do in fact end. One side realizes that he has no hope in destroying the other side and or to continue the battle the other side will destroy their army.
No question as well that a series of battles effect the outcome of a campaign. For our games we have realized that although outside events are of concern to the commanders the day at hand moves into top priority and all other issues fall by the wayside.
quote quote=74703]In summary, your extreme over-simplification of victory conditions irked me a little. I hope my somewhat direct tone didn’t seem rude or irk you.[/quote]
Sorry for that, but I can’t figure out everybody. It did seem a little rude.
I only played a small WWI fictional scenario many, many years ago.
My WWII experience is also limited to a fictional game every now again at various friends houses. Some use VPs/objectives/goals/etc. and others don’t.
As for your scenario I think you definitely need to set the stage and explain the situation. You also need to give each side their own briefing and if possible their actual orders. Oddly enough I don’t see the need for any “victory conditions”, etc. One side or the other will gradually be worn down and have to withdraw/surrender/give up/etc. (regardless of orders) and if so that’s the loser and the remaining side is the winner. Am I missing something or do you see some shortcomings in my approach?
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorWhat I’m finding incredibly aggravating is your clear turning your nose down at Chris. If you want that kind of thing there’s another site for folks who insist only their way is the right way.
If you don’t understand something that I’ve said, I think a simple question would be a better way to approach it. If your suffering from some other issues than perhaps you should seek professional help. If your trying to insult me then perhaps an apology is in order and you should follow your own advice and go elsewhere. Although I’m not aware of any site that would encourage your behaviour.
SpectatorBecause if you don’t have objectives Napoleons best strategy is to go on the defensive. He has artillery superiority and can pound away with his guns all day.
Both Napoleon and Wellington do have an objective. Even without it Napoleons best strategy could never have been defensive. He was doomed to lose if he did. Short term the Prussians were moving on his flank and rear. Long term the massive allied armies would overwhelm him, just like they did previously.
SpectatorPretty much since the beginning of time there has only been one objective in battle and that’s to clobber/destroy/break/kill, the other guy.
This is simply not true – the destruction of an enemy army in the field is one of the primary goals of a campaign and not a battle and this needs to be carefully defined. In 1870, Prussia and its German allied states defeated every army in the field of the Imperial French army and still did not win the war!
GP: That sounds like a contradiction. It’s a primary goal of a campaign and not a battle? Who won a war is outside of my point about a single battle. So your statement is simply not true.
The period I know best is the Horse & Musket era where armies generally deployed in the open for large battles in an attempt to achieve that objective.
Again this is simply not true – ever heard of a delaying action or a reconnaissance in force battle?
GP: Again, this is simply not true. Why are you continuing to use these false comments? I do know this period extremely well. I would rarely define a delaying action or a reconnaissance as a “large battle”.
Knowing that they will generally be fighting in the open the armies were designed to support that activity. They were often broken down into battalions/regiments of 500 men with their primary fighting formation being what is called a line. These were subsequently organized into higher formations of Brigades, Divisions, Corps and Armies. Who also often deployed in lines or a series of lines. Whenever possible an army would hold a “council of war” prior to a battle at which time a “plan of action” would be developed. From there orders would be issued and every unit/command would be assigned to a location for the coming battle and if possible a briefing on what they were expected to do.
So basically you agree that a large command, that may well be represented on the table battlefield as an action on its own will have a geographic location and objectives to achieve according to its command briefings and written orders to be carried out in that geographic location by said command?
GP: Absolutely.
Sometimes the actual plan of the battle remained in the commanders head and was only executed on his command during the battle. If an army had decided that it would adopt a defensive position it would generally form up in a line of battle. This is generally just a long line that could cover miles and every unit was expected to be close enough to its neighbour to protect their flanks and/or rears. The better commanders would often use a town/village/farm etc. to anchor the flanks of the army or act as a strong point in advance of or part of the main line. A strong point can serve two purposes. The simple one is it will just break up the attackers line of battle when he attacks, thus channelling his attacks into a zone that the defender can better defend. The more complicated one is a necessity to potentially launch a local counter attack or to use it as an actual anchor in the main line.
So you agree physical/geographic locations become important to local commands which are often the ones being represented as an isolated battle on the tabletop?
GP: Absolutely.
As the actual battle unfolds the importance of all “terrain features” can, will and often do change. What happens if a defending commander decides to go on the offensive? All previous “terrain features” are no longer of any value to him.
Yes, a counter-attack was usually launched either to re-take a physical location after losing to an enemy force assaulting the physical location. Or, the enemy have been so cut up by trying to assault said location that a counter-attack will hopefully act as the final nail in the coffin and destroy the enemy after they tired to take their objective!
GP: So your counterpoint is?
An offensive army will rarely occupy any “terrain features” beyond the obvious such as a hill, river bank, etc. They will often deploy into a line of battle as well that generally matches the frontage of the defender. Their commander will often place his troops as close to the enemy as possible that he plans to attack. The planned attack could be extremely complex depending on how sophisticated the commander was and what troops he had at his disposal. It was not uncommon for a commander to maintain control over exactly how, when, and where attacks were made. He had to also be on guard for any unexpected counter or flank attacks that the defender might launch. Once an attacker has roughly established the defenders line of battle he now has to shore up his attack plan to see if he can be successful in rupturing the enemies line. The normal weak points are the flanks followed by any areas in the main line that look vulnerable. Traditionally these are the exposed areas in the open where artillery, infantry and cavalry attacks can be used to their best advantage. And are of course easiest to maneuver to. The defender also goes through a similar exercise except he is trying to ensure that all of his vulnerable areas are as secure as possible and can be reinforced if necessary. He also knows that the battle can develop in a number of unlimited ways. Being prepared to move his flanks or pull his army back in part or in full can do a lot to help him defend his position and maintain his line of battle. If possible or as part of his plan counter attacks or a major offensive is also well served when planned in advance. So as you can see the actual dynamics of major warfare in this period can be very fluid and is often referred to as the ebb and flow of battle.
You have just described any major battle ever in history… we are all aware that there is an ebb and flow to a battle that does nothing to prove your narrow and singular point.
GP: I think it adds value, if you don’t that’s okay.
Once you limit the game to certain “victory conditions” the ebb and flow is generally restricted to those pre defined areas. So it becomes hamstrung. Once a scenario designer introduces “victory conditions” that are dependent on “terrain features” and generally enhanced with “victory points” the entire natural development of an army, its thinking and its effectiveness has been severely ruptured. It actually turns things upside down.
You have missed the point entirely here and have got it backwards. Victory conditions do not in any way limit the potential of a game
GP: No, you have missed my point entirely. Even Chris has admitted that they restrict a game.
and certainly doesn’t hamstring it.
GP: Well if you can’t see it then I understand your position.
Objectives and victory conditions give you a goal – something to generally aim for. How to achieve these is entirely down to the player and how they interpret or in deed misinterpret these is all part of the fun and very historically accurate – and unless you can give me an example of a major set-piece battle where the chain of command did not get something wrong at some point then this just goes to show that fumbles and misinterpretations are all part of re-creating historical battles – the human element is in the player.
GP: No problem, but why do you need more than one objective or condition?
If a player tries to achieve their victory conditions simply moving straight up the battlefield and trying to assault them with no manoeuvring then they will, 99% of the time come a cropper, but in all battles there is also an element of luck also and sometimes a player will get lucky just as commanders did!
GP: So your saying that in all the historical battles where they did that they were not historical!
Are you trying to tell us that it is much more satisfying to just watch to armies pointlessly slugging out on the tabletop for hours taking vast un-realistic casualties without any regard for historical narrative or imperative?
GP: Don’t think I said that anywhere.
The attackers focus is no longer on the vulnerable points of the enemies line of battle. The objective has changed from destroying the enemies army at its weakest points to taking his strong points! He is also now obligated to force his army into generally tight positions that are hard to maneuver in and make it extremely difficult for him to utilize his combined forces to their maximum effect. Cavalry are generally useless in most defined “terrain features” and the artillery effect is often greatly reduced as well. Even the classic close order infantry attack is often rendered useless.
Battle of the Wilderness whereby the confederates chose to attack in difficult terrain as a deliberate command decision ring any bells? Again your view seems to be extremely narrow and singular as to exclude most of history’s military campaigns and battles.
GP: So your saying that the “Battle of the Wilderness” that is widely acclaimed as an unusual battle is in fact a reflection of most of history’s military campaigns and battles! And you think I got things backwards!
So the attacker has lost all of his advantages. Well this is now paradise for the defender as he knows exactly where the attacker will strike. Shore up those strong points even more and ensure that reinforcements are handy and the jobs done! A piece of cake. The defender has now enhanced all of his advantages. Since a lot of “terrain features” were fought over and are often highlighted in narratives of battles some scenario writers have mistakenly seized on these as critical objectives of a given battle. When in fact they were generally just short term objectives at best that could just as easily have played no part in the battle.
But they did play a part in the battle so therefore they did matter and it was an historical objective that was aimed for, for a part of the battle by that command which may well be represented on the table top as part of an historical re-fight. You seem to be constantly tripping over your own points in terms of wargaming historical actions.
GP: I think you need some time to digest my entire message. I’ve explained why they didn’t matter. If you missed it, that’s okay.
To force players into this narrow matrix of “terrain features” defies all military logic. As previously stated I’ve played a lot of various “victory condition” games and everyone of them has fallen flat. I was unable to find any satisfaction or realisms in these games. They are just too contrived for my taste. Everyone in my group greatly enjoy the games that I put on as everyone is able to test their skills to the maximum without any fabricated scenario objectives and know when the game is over that their victory or defeat was a direct result of their skills and not a matter of an elaborate scavenger hunt. Since Norm Smith has brought up Waterloo 1815 and Hougoumont, I’ll use that battle as an example. The battlefield itself is textbook material and Wellington chose it wisely. It blocks the main road which any attacker must use to push his army forward.
So you are saying Wellington chose a favourable defensive position to block the road, therefore the terrain in this area was a favourable geographic location to prevent Napoleon from achieving his objective!?
GP: Absolutely.
It contains a complicated hill/ridge system that gives a number of advantages to a defending army. There are chateaus on both flanks and in the center. The ones on both flanks will serve to help protect his main battle line from easily being disrupted by a flank attack. The ones in the center will break up any attack on the center of his army. Obviously his entire army can’t hide in these chateaus so only an extremely small fraction of his army is allocated to these.
So wellington used these terrain features to his advantage by deploying troops in these terrain features that became indirectly an objective for French forces – I am sure Napoleon did not see these at strategic objectives in terms of the overall battle but the local commanders in that area did as part of achieving their objectives.
GP: Absolutely.
Fearing that Napoleon might try to outflank him on his extreme right he places a large force there blocking another road. They are however, not part of his main battle line at Waterloo. Napoleon deploys his army also in a textbook fashion. One infantry corps is placed on either side of the main road supported by cavalry formations. In the center he places another smaller infantry corps supported by the guard and more cavalry. Napoleon thinks that he will win this battle by executing a “masse de rupture“. That’s “breaking the enemy’s line of battle”. Certainly not by capturing all the chateaus.
Right, so Napoleon is trying to do what all attacking army commanders have ever tried to do…
GP: Why not?
He has very little if any concern about any of the chateaus other then where he plans to make his main attack they will restrict the scope of his attack. He also can’t easily launch an effective attack on Wellingtons center as it is protected by a couple of chateaus.
They have no strategic value but they do have local tactical value, two very different things that you seem to be getting confused with.
GP: Why do you think I’m confused? I’m simply trying to explain the difference to the VP camp. Obviously it hasn’t worked as your confused.
He would have to swing his attacking force around the center chateaus exposing the attack to all kinds of counterattacks. The attack will proceed whether or not he controls the chateaus. Napoleon has selected the “open area” on his right to be the main target of his attack. His entire army has been deployed to either or attack or support that position. They are in no way shape or fashion deployed to take as many “terrain features” as possible. To weaken the actual “open area” that Napoleon plans to attack he orders a diversionary attack against Hougoumont. The intention is that Wellington will be forced to draw troops away from the “open area” that Napoleon actually plans to attack. Actually holding Hougoumont is not important to Napoleon.
You are absolutely right – it has no strategic value to Napoleon, but commanders in the area need to take it into account as part of their plans to achieve Napoleons vision.
GP: Absolutely. I never said they didn’t.
Napoleon forms a “grand battery” drawing on the resources of his artillery from a number of commands to commence a bombardment of the “open area” he plans to attack. This weakens the striking power of these various commands. Once he thinks the battery has done its job an entire infantry corps attacks across the front of the “open area”. This is critical as some believe that the more units you can cram into a given attack area increases your chances of success. Provided of course that it can maintain order and deliver an assault uniformly. The down side is the bigger the force the greater the potential for things to go wrong. Once the infantry assault breaches the main enemy line (masse de rupture) cavalry and reserves are planned to be pushed in where they will spread out and roll up the enemy line in both directions.
If Napoleons plan had succeeded holding every chateau on the battlefield would not have saved Wellingtons army from total destruction.
This sentence doesn’t make any sense to me? Please could you elaborate this point so that I may understand it better?
GP: In most “victory condition” games on Waterloo pretty much every chateau is given a value. If Napoleon destroys/pushes back/routs all of Wellingtons troops in the open but he still holds all of the chateaus he might very well win the game, but he certainly lost the battle.
We have been playing games without artificial “victory conditions”, “terrain features”, “victory points” for years and players can’t get enough of them.
So you have been pointlessly slugging it out regardless of casualties, objectives or victory conditions until one side has absolutely no forces left on the table after hours and hours of wargaming?
GP: Absolutely not! We certainly don’t waste our time counting casualties or chasing useless objectives. Generally both sides have plenty of troops on the table when the game is over. Some of the smaller games are over in an hour and we get to play it again and sometimes again.
Norm, we also don’t directly count casualties as a representative of performance. Entire units and their respective Brigades are used as part of an overall evaluation system. When we finish a game there is never any dispute over who won. The only objective has been obtained. One side has either acknowledged that the other side has won, or they announce that they are withdrawing. Any post game talk centers around why one side won or lost. It’s usually an acknowledgement that one side had a poor plan, poor execution or was simply out manoeuvred. The discussion is never wasted away on who should have had more or better “victory objectives” , “points” or “terrain objectives”.
Again: So you have been pointlessly slugging it out regardless of casualties, objectives or victory conditions until one side has absolutely no forces left on the table after hours and hours of wargaming?
GP: Not sure why you feel the need to repeat yourself, but no, see the above.
SpectatorSeems to me that in almost every battle at least one side had an objective other than ‘destroy the enemy’, because battles are not fought by equal forces with an equal chance of doing that.
Yes, my point has been simplified to make it easier to discuss. Somehow I think that might not have worked. There are other objectives in play that are generally outside of the single battles that I’m talking about. However, when the two armies face off against each other that is pretty much out the window and self preservation and or victory move to the forefront.
Wellington’s objective at Waterloo wasn’t to destroy the French army, it was to hold on till the Prussians got there and also to ensure that if he didn’t do that that he kept his line of retreat open so his army could get away. There’s two victory conditions right away, a time based one (survive X amount of turns) and a terrain based one (keep the enemy away from the road to Brussels on his baseline). That also gives Napoleon a terrain objective, the road to Brussels.
Wellingtons objective was certainly intended to destroy the French army, and they did to some extent! Their junction with the Prussians was in part the means to that end. It was never to accumulate victory points over time. It was also his objective for the campaign. His very presence on the main road to Brussels helps to ensure his base line is secure as well as his avenue of retreat. Why do you need to create obvious victory conditions? The battle was won in part when his forces advanced. What value do these victory conditions have in that situation?
During the actual battle the road to Brussels was not a direct objective of Napoleons. It was to the left of his main attack. If he wins the battle he automatically gets the road. Why try and confuse players into obtaining secondary objectives over the primary objective that are meaningless if the battle is lost?
SpectatorI think that’s a gross simplification … if you look at battles that way, you should read more military history It strongly depends on the echelon at which the battle is fought, and on the specific mission and context.
Yes it is. If I read anymore I’m afraid I would fall asleep. The mission and context become secondary when two large H&M armies face off against each other.
Spectator? I expect that must have changed some time before my own (peacetime) service. At least before WWI. Failure to take an objective by one unit, regardless of size often means the whole operation fails.
I think were possibly talking about two different things here. My comments only pertain to large historical H&M battles not small actions in any period.
Well in other posts, you’ve said you’ve played thousands of games, and it sounds as if you’ve never come across such a thing? I’ve seen see many, many posts on various fora, including this one, where folks like to talk exactly about what Chris Pringle is mentioning. I’m not sure you are understanding that what is perfect for you is not necessarily so for others. Some people loves points, for example, while others, including myself, eschew them. I know an awful lot of folks like to play their game and then retire to a bar or stand around the table for almost as long as the game took place to talk about the game and figure out what was what. In my case, my friends and I like to rip into each other and make fun of dumb moves or bad dice rolling or point out how someone duped the other into moving his forces over there. For us, these exchanges get us riled up for a fun rematch for next time, maybe with some agreement on what the objectives should be. Some people don’t do that.
Sorry but I thought I mentioned that I have played in games like Chris plays. That’s why I know I don’t enjoy them. The after game banter from a game that was not satisfactory, to at least some players is simply a waste of time and is rarely enjoyable because of that. Especially when they know the design was the main culprit. Some people ignore the design or could care less. While others due actually enjoy trying to fix all the problems for the next time. Some just really enjoy the banter regardless. Small groups of friends who often play together develop their own style of fun and nothing else matters. I’m well aware of all of the types involved in wargaming. I can only tell you that our conversations are never about unsatisfactory victory conditions. They are always about critical decisions make by the players (without outside direction) and their skills. My wife thinks we don’t game at all. Just tell jokes as the laughter is constant all day long.
Our day is pretty much all gaming and many players have a long way to travel when it’s over. So any after game banter is generally cut short. The banter continues on line once the AAR is issued and pretty much all of the players and members who couldn’t make the game just love it.
SpectatorPretty much since the beginning of time there has only been one objective in battle and that’s to clobber/destroy/break/kill, the other guy. The period I know best is the Horse & Musket era where armies generally deployed in the open for large battles in an attempt to achieve that objective.
Knowing that they will generally be fighting in the open the armies were designed to support that activity. They were often broken down into battalions/regiments of 500 men with their primary fighting formation being what is called a line. These were subsequently organized into higher formations of Brigades, Divisions, Corps and Armies. Who also often deployed in lines or a series of lines.
Whenever possible an army would hold a “council of war” prior to a battle at which time a “plan of action” would be developed. From there orders would be issued and every unit/command would be assigned to a location for the coming battle and if possible a briefing on what they were expected to do. Sometimes the actual plan of the battle remained in the commanders head and was only executed on his command during the battle.
If an army had decided that it would adopt a defensive position it would generally form up in a line of battle. This is generally just a long line that could cover miles and every unit was expected to be close enough to its neighbour to protect their flanks and/or rears. The better commanders would often use a town/village/farm etc. to anchor the flanks of the army or act as a strong point in advance of or part of the main line. A strong point can serve two purposes. The simple one is it will just break up the attackers line of battle when he attacks, thus channelling his attacks into a zone that the defender can better defend. The more complicated one is a necessity to potentially launch a local counter attack or to use it as an actual anchor in the main line. As the actual battle unfolds the importance of all “terrain features” can, will and often do change. What happens if a defending commander decides to go on the offensive? All previous “terrain features” are no longer of any value to him.
An offensive army will rarely occupy any “terrain features” beyond the obvious such as a hill, river bank, etc. They will often deploy into a line of battle as well that generally matches the frontage of the defender. Their commander will often place his troops as close to the enemy as possible that he plans to attack. The planned attack could be extremely complex depending on how sophisticated the commander was and what troops he had at his disposal. It was not uncommon for a commander to maintain control over exactly how, when, and where attacks were made. He had to also be on guard for any unexpected counter or flank attacks that the defender might launch.
Once an attacker has roughly established the defenders line of battle he now has to shore up his attack plan to see if he can be successful in rupturing the enemies line. The normal weak points are the flanks followed by any areas in the main line that look vulnerable. Traditionally these are the exposed areas in the open where artillery, infantry and cavalry attacks can be used to their best advantage. And are of course easiest to maneuver to.
The defender also goes through a similar exercise except he is trying to ensure that all of his vulnerable areas are as secure as possible and can be reinforced if necessary. He also knows that the battle can develop in a number of unlimited ways. Being prepared to move his flanks or pull his army back in part or in full can do a lot to help him defend his position and maintain his line of battle. If possible or as part of his plan counter attacks or a major offensive is also well served when planned in advance.
So as you can see the actual dynamics of major warfare in this period can be very fluid and is often referred to as the ebb and flow of battle. Once you limit the game to certain “victory conditions” the ebb and flow is generally restricted to those pre defined areas. So it becomes hamstrung.
Once a scenario designer introduces “victory conditions” that are dependent on “terrain features” and generally enhanced with “victory points” the entire natural development of an army, its thinking and its effectiveness has been severely ruptured. It actually turns things upside down. The attackers focus is no longer on the vulnerable points of the enemies line of battle. The objective has changed from destroying the enemies army at its weakest points to taking his strong points! He is also now obligated to force his army into generally tight positions that are hard to maneuver in and make it extremely difficult for him to utilize his combined forces to their maximum effect. Cavalry are generally useless in most defined “terrain features” and the artillery effect is often greatly reduced as well. Even the classic close order infantry attack is often rendered useless. So the attacker has lost all of his advantages.
Well this is now paradise for the defender as he knows exactly where the attacker will strike. Shore up those strong points even more and ensure that reinforcements are handy and the jobs done! A piece of cake. The defender has now enhanced all of his advantages.
Since a lot of “terrain features” were fought over and are often highlighted in narratives of battles some scenario writers have mistakenly seized on these as critical objectives of a given battle. When in fact they were generally just short term objectives at best that could just as easily have played no part in the battle. To force players into this narrow matrix of “terrain features” defies all military logic.
As previously stated I’ve played a lot of various “victory condition” games and everyone of them has fallen flat. I was unable to find any satisfaction or realisms in these games. They are just too contrived for my taste. Everyone in my group greatly enjoy the games that I put on as everyone is able to test their skills to the maximum without any fabricated scenario objectives and know when the game is over that their victory or defeat was a direct result of their skills and not a matter of an elaborate scavenger hunt.
Since Norm Smith has brought up Waterloo 1815 and Hougoumont, I’ll use that battle as an example.
The battlefield itself is textbook material and Wellington chose it wisely. It blocks the main road which any attacker must use to push his army forward. It contains a complicated hill/ridge system that gives a number of advantages to a defending army. There are chateaus on both flanks and in the center. The ones on both flanks will serve to help protect his main battle line from easily being disrupted by a flank attack. The ones in the center will break up any attack on the center of his army. Obviously his entire army can’t hide in these chateaus so only an extremely small fraction of his army is allocated to these. Fearing that Napoleon might try to outflank him on his extreme right he places a large force there blocking another road. They are however, not part of his main battle line at Waterloo.
Napoleon deploys his army also in a textbook fashion. One infantry corps is placed on either side of the main road supported by cavalry formations. In the center he places another smaller infantry corps supported by the guard and more cavalry. Napoleon thinks that he will win this battle by executing a “masse de rupture“. That’s “breaking the enemy’s line of battle”. Certainly not by capturing all the chateaus. He has very little if any concern about any of the chateaus other then where he plans to make his main attack they will restrict the scope of his attack. He also can’t easily launch an effective attack on Wellingtons center as it is protected by a couple of chateaus. He would have to swing his attacking force around the center chateaus exposing the attack to all kinds of counterattacks. The attack will proceed whether or not he controls the chateaus.
Napoleon has selected the “open area” on his right to be the main target of his attack. His entire army has been deployed to either or attack or support that position. They are in no way shape or fashion deployed to take as many “terrain features” as possible.
To weaken the actual “open area” that Napoleon plans to attack he orders a diversionary attack against Hougoumont. The intention is that Wellington will be forced to draw troops away from the “open area” that Napoleon actually plans to attack. Actually holding Hougoumont is not important to Napoleon.
Napoleon forms a “grand battery” drawing on the resources of his artillery from a number of commands to commence a bombardment of the “open area” he plans to attack. This weakens the striking power of these various commands. Once he thinks the battery has done its job an entire infantry corps attacks across the front of the “open area”. This is critical as some believe that the more units you can cram into a given attack area increases your chances of success. Provided of course that it can maintain order and deliver an assault uniformly. The down side is the bigger the force the greater the potential for things to go wrong.
Once the infantry assault breaches the main enemy line (masse de rupture) cavalry and reserves are planned to be pushed in where they will spread out and roll up the enemy line in both directions.
If Napoleons plan had succeeded holding every chateau on the battlefield would not have saved Wellingtons army from total destruction.
We have been playing games without artificial “victory conditions”, “terrain features”, “victory points” for years and players can’t get enough of them.
Norm, we also don’t directly count casualties as a representative of performance. Entire units and their respective Brigades are used as part of an overall evaluation system.
When we finish a game there is never any dispute over who won. The only objective has been obtained. One side has either acknowledged that the other side has won, or they announce that they are withdrawing. Any post game talk centers around why one side won or lost. It’s usually an acknowledgement that one side had a poor plan, poor execution or was simply out manoeuvred. The discussion is never wasted away on who should have had more or better “victory objectives” , “points” or “terrain objectives”.
SpectatorWe all love a post-battle discussion about who did well or badly, and what different plans might have worked better. Clear victory conditions lend structure to that discussion. The discussion may result in agreeing that the victory conditions are poorly designed! But having victory conditions as a measure of success does give you a headstart in that discussion, over just “well I reckon my cavalry threatening your line of communications would have swung it”, or “if we’d played another 2 turns / 2 hours your army would probably have broken” etc.
Am I reading this right? It appears that you are saying that after playing a game with “clear victory conditions”, you can discover that “the victory conditions are poorly designed”? And you still don’t know who really won the game? You then indicate that you use these poorly designed victory conditions, which were previously clear, to leverage your position. Sounds like your using bad ideas to try and justify who actually won or lost, or who should have actually won or lost. So the game is basically a dud?
We playtest lots of scenarios for BBB. Sometimes we feel the victory conditions are pitched just right in the first draft; other times it takes multiple iterations and tweaks before we are happy to share them publicly with the BBB gaming community. But the discussions are always good fun, and victory conditions enhance them.
It appears to me that your system is under constant revision that often falls short of its own objectives……..to clearly show who won and who lost the game in a satisfactory manner to all of the players.
Wouldn’t it make more sense to simply dump the concept as inadequate?
This was one of the many reasons why we walked away from this type of gaming years ago.
SpectatorHello Noel!
In that case, are your scenarios designed so that the players must take into account wider strategic considerations outside the scope of the battle?
No. There is often an overview that explains what prompted the battle and how it ended and why. The players, however, are under no obligation to follow any of that. They are free to design their battle anyway they want. Sometimes they are locked into a starting position and other times they are free to pick their own ground to some extent. The sole objective is to destroy the enemy or prevent the other side from doing so. Forcing an enemy to withdraw or surrender is considered as meeting the sole objective. Any strategic considerations outside the scope of the battle are also beyond the time allotted for the battle.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Noel!
There is always a higher authority.
In your example yes. Most of the games I play and I am referring to no. The players are the CnC.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Noel!
Controlling locations have certainly been objectives in battles for both strategic and tactical considerations. No general is going to tell his troops “go fight and see how it goes,” terrain objectives are a critical part of waging war. I think there is confusion as to a junior officer’s assessment of the situation and how to use that, versus actually being told to “take the heights” or “hold the road”, “destroy the communications”, etc. as their battlefield objectives. Location objectives are realistic and fun.
I fully agree, except in war the objectives come from the commander, not a scenario designer. They also are never quantified with “because their worth 2 points”. They can, will and do change during an actual battle. Very rarely if ever in a victory condition game, until afterwards when the scenario designer admits he could have done better.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Chris!
“I’ll happily agree with you to an extent, that victory locations do focus or channel players’ actions, and therefore can distort things – but only if the scenario is poorly designed.”
I’ve pulled this sentence out of your message again to raise a couple of points that I don’t think should get lost in the overall discussion.
You clearly admit that my position has merit “victory locations do focus or channel players’ actions, and therefore can distort things”. The use of the word “can” seems like your trying to protect a known faulty position (yours). Which is further enhanced by your qualifier “but only if the scenario is poorly designed.” Surely just the fact that victory locations do focus or channel players actions in itself must result in a scenario that is poorly designed. It can’t be any good if the players actions are artificially focused and channeled. Players are now totally at the mercy of the scenario designer. Most designers that I have ever met who design games like this generally have limited knowledge of actual historical battles beyond a few references. Almost none of them have ever actually spent much if any time studying in detail battlefield behaviour. To top it off after every game I’ve ever played in (and it’s a lot) the designer admits that if he did it again he would change the victory conditions. So I repeat my statement above, “they are all poorly designed”.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Chris!
“So how close you get to important cities could be a measure of success and … victory?”
No, the subject is “victory conditions in a game”. Campaign objectives are normally outside of that and would be an entirely separate and different conversation.
“You’re right, of course, Glenn.”
Then what’s your problem?
“Making an Arnhem game revolve around how many bridges the Allies hold at the end would be an utter distortion. I can’t imagine the bridges figured in Urquhart’s briefing at all, no historical commander operated like that. If the paras managed just to hole up on a moor 10 miles away having beaten up more Germans than they lost, they’d have won by the casualties measure, obviously. Or have I misunderstood?”
Yes, you missed the boat completely. My position only involves major historical land battles (mainly 1700 – 1815), not raids, skirmishes or obvious objectives.
“Glenn, your position is so extreme and absolute that I find it absurd.”
Oh my, that sounds a little harsh. I have studied my position (1700 – 1815) for years and if it’s different from yours wouldn’t a few questions suffice?
” I’ll happily agree with you to an extent, that victory locations do focus or channel players’ actions, and therefore can distort things – but only if the scenario is poorly designed.”
They are all poorly designed. Unless of course if the objective is just a game and not an attempt to replicate a “large historical battle”.
” There are plenty of situations where ignoring the geography would be a bigger distortion.”
So the lesser of two evils? Certainly not a game that I would enjoy.
Was there a particular reason that you seem to have ignored my example?
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Chris!
Sorry if my comments confused the issue. Cities are strategic points in a campaign.
Playing a game that reflects a historical battle of some size completely distorts it if you use predetermined geographical objectives. I’m not aware of any historical commanders who operated under those conditions. A historical battle is almost a living thing (as living things make it happen). That means its subject to change as conditions change. As an example an actual commander could be ordered to move his command to given point during a battle. As he moves towards his destination he encounters a building occupied by the enemy. Now he’s probably into an area where he has to evaluate his orders and decide for himself what to do or send a runner back to his commander. If your playing a “victory condition” game an entirely different process is used by the player and it has nothing to do with history.
VC games force players into a “box” that dictates the best way to play a game to win. History had no such “box’, all the options were on the table.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Chris!
Obstacles are not objectives. Results are not objectives. Casualties are not objectives.
Napoleon took Moscow and lost the war and his army. Why, because he failed to destroy the other army. Geographical objectives mean nothing if you fail to destroy the other army.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello irishserb!
I think Roger Calderbank is pretty close to my thoughts.
I’ve played a lot of games over my 50 years of gaming easily 1,000 plus. I’ve seen victory points/objectives used in all kinds of ways and never liked one of them. Their either so bloody obvious there pointless, or they destroy the game by forcing players into the victory box (the points force the players to do things). Once players get into the victory box all other rational plans fall to the wayside. Now if your just “playing a game” or a “fictional exercise” then it can be fun. On the other hand if your trying to reflect real life or historical gaming then you have sunk the boat before it even leaves the dock.
Most historical battles had one objective only, to destroy the other side or at least stop the other side from doing that. To accomplish this their armies were deployed in a formation that would best achieve this goal. They would subsequently commence activities to support this. Once you put players into the victory box the entire dynamic of the game changes. The goals have changed so must the style of play. Even the language of the game changes “got to take it for victory points” vs “if we destroy their center their army will collapse”. Players become oblivious to the real point of actual tactics and maneuvers. Victory points/objectives become the only thing that matters.
In the early periods armies were designed from the ground up to destroy their enemies in the open where the only objective was clearly the enemy in front of them. Break that down into 2 points for that tree and 2 points for that rock and the entire army (player) is forced operate in a totally different manner then what it was trained for.
So these types of games are certainly enjoyable for those who merely seek to play a game. If your trying to reflect any sense of historical realities it’s a major failure for those players.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello JJ!
Thanks very much for the detailed explanation.
Yes, I’ve managed to get more of the battlefield on my table. I have all of Talavera and the entire Spanish army. If anything to me it indicates that the French have no chance of winning this battle. Disregarding of course the silly things that wargamers do. If the Spanish could maneuver they could even launch an attack on the French left wing. Something that may have been too difficult for them historically, but in a wargame anything can happen.
I see the British in a great defensive position and the French with a slight edge in numbers (excluding Spanish) having an impossible task before them. As you say Joseph is clearly thinking about withdrawing even before the battle starts. I would have pulled back and encouraged the Allies to follow up, but that would probably have played against the French morale and increased Spanish resolve.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello JJ!
Excellent stuff as always. What a body of work you have on that table! It looks like you were using a 5′ x 9′ table, is that correct? Oddly enough if so that’s the size of my table for my 6mm Baccus figures, and guess what battle were about to play in a few weeks…………………….Talavera! It’s all set and ready to go and then I noticed your post. Did you have to squeeze the scale a little bit to fit the battle and or leave a little bit off as it was too big? I just managed to fit it on my table with all units present and battalion frontages of 60mm in line.
Did you find that 9 turns was long enough or would you have liked to do more? How long were the other games?
Thanks!
Glenn
SpectatorHello Mr. Average!
I only played a couple of Kriegsspiel games many, many years ago. Very interesting and enjoyable at the time, but required too much work and little action for my tastes.
Most games/rules neutralize the senior officer effect, as the players are intended to take on those roles as much as possible. The command system below them is generally built into the mechanics of the game and is generally arbitrary with minimum player involvement. Those systems that ignore this tend to drag out and become pretty boring.
Hope this helps you in some way.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Victoria!
I thought we were in the same boat. Thanks for confirming that.
Excellent point, I’m sure a lot of allies were very nervous about having to face Napoleon.
Yes, the strategy was first used as a collective plan in 1813 and again in 1814. Others realized the dangers in having to confront him before that and often tried to avoid him as well.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Thaddeus!
As indicated by Whirlwind his command effect is pretty much in the pre-game show and in his ability to adjust his plans as events unfold.
His morale effect is limited to his location. In other words mainly to the troops directly in front of or behind him.
Think of him as the ultimate motivational speaker or inspirational leader. Once somebody starts to shoot at you or come at you with sharp pointed objects most of that fades away and self preservation becomes the dominate thing on your mind.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Thaddeus!
I don’t think anybody disputes that (about Napoleon).
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Victoria!
I’m pretty much in agreement with most of your comments if your applying it to an individual. I don’t think you could apply it to an entire army. It also does not seem to address the issue of “French superiority”, which is the subject of this conversation.
Still, it’s certainly a great synopsis. Thanks for giving me your thoughts.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Thaddeus!
Well what is your definition of a winning record? What happens when Napoleon is not on the battlefield? Do you really think that Napoleon had a lock on confidence? Do the allies not have any inspirational leaders?
Sorry, but I’m completely lost on how your comments about Blucher give every French unit superiority!
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Whirlwind!
Excellent points as always with you.
Yes, I would certainly look at some kind of bonus to some French line units. In some rules that could be a “veteran”, “well trained”, or “experienced” modifier, etc. I think the important thing to keep in mind is these are fluid modifiers and can change from day to day, French army to French army, for a number of reasons. And it’s certainly not a constant modifier for every unit that justifies the notion of some kind of permanent “French superiority”.
The Prussians of course had similar units, maybe not as many and perhaps a larger number of green/raw/poor units.
As you know how you sort this all out is not easy and is often a sort of exercise in black magic. However, I think these differences did exist. I also think that understanding these differences starts to enable some to see that “French superiority”, is simply a myth.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Whirlwind!
Can I add:
5) The Prussians fought on a second rate battlefield and deployed awkwardly without the full effect of their entire force.
6) The French army was well organized with a large portion of experienced troops.
7) The Prussians were actually in retreat mode and holding on desperately to the false idea that the British were coming.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Chris!
My comments only pertain to the subject which I understand is about “French superiority”. As you have pointed out “Motivation” is not exclusive to the French. Some rule sets would include this in leadership, morale, cohesion, etc.
Best regards,
Glenn
SpectatorHello Thaddeus!
Some rules have a separate category called “morale” while others make it part of “cohesion”. Napoleon was clearly a genius and some rules would consider him under “leadership”. Other than Napoleon himself (who was not present at every battle) the three categories are not exclusive to the French.
Best regards,
Glenn
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