Time to Plan/Organize a Battalion Attack?

[Don Glewwe]

A more-than-the-usually-meaningless rumination (-the sort of thing done while waiting for paint to dry…) that has an impact on a (June ’44 Normandy) campaign:

What would be a reasonable range of time for a (foot) Battalion to shake itself out of a (single road) march and be ready for an attack(game) to begin across a frontage that’s, say, a half-mile either side of the road?  If called out as separate (ie: the attack could go in without), how long to get something like artillery/mortar support set up and ready to go?

Off-the-cuff: What increment in something like a 2d6 (or 3d?) roll reasonably be? …10 minutes? …15? …more? …less?

Right now I have no idea/clue what to use.  I’m not looking for going-to-be-carved-in-stone exactness and/or historical veracity, just something better than a wild guess.  Thanks to any who are, perhaps, also watching paint dry and take the time to respond. ; )

[Aethelflaeda was framed]

If this was a hasty attack, unexpected, then unless part of the planning at Brigade/Div was to offer dedicated supporting artillery to that battalion’s advance, the best answer is “What’s the context of the fight” for whether any support other than the battalion’s mortars could be brought to bear in anything approaching mere hours as opposed to never. The battalion mortars might be available in minutes if sitting ready in “overwatch”.  Otherwise it will be much longer easily an hour or more.  WW2 radios were pretty bad. wire remained important but a road march probably hasn’t laid any.

 

Just remember in war even the simple, is really hard.

Mick Hayman
Margate and New Orleans

[Don Glewwe]

“The battalion mortars might be available in minutes if sitting ready in “overwatch”.  Otherwise it will be much longer easily an hour or more.  WW2 radios were pretty bad. wire remained important but a road march probably hasn’t laid any.”

That makes sense.  Any guesses as to how long the Battalion (Companies + organic support) would take to shake out of a road march, put together some sort of plan, and begin an attack?

[John D Salt]

Let’s start with a time and distance appreciation. Marching men on good level roads doing 120 30-inch (0.762m) paces to the minute cover 100 yards (91.44m) in a minute. Allowing 5 minutes’ rest per marching hour gives 5,500 yards (a little over 5km) or 3.125 statute miles per hour.

Assume rifle companies are 120 strong, and HQ and S company twice that, for a grand total of 720 in the battalion. If everyone marches in 8-man sections in file with 1-yard spacings, with 25 yard spacings between sections, each company takes up 420 yards and the whole battalion 2,645 yards, or one and a half miles (2.4km) of road space.

Assume further that the battalion is attacking two up, two back on a frontage half a mile wide centred on their approach road, and that movement cross country is two-thirds of the speed on roads. If the lead company wheels off the road at a fixed point and marches until the head of the column is a quarter of a mile (440 yards, 400m) from the road, its cross-country speed of 3,667 yards per hour (3.35 km/h) means it will achieve this in 7.2 minutes. The second company will then be able to do the same thing to the other side, so let’s say 15 minutes to shake out the leading two companies. If the third and fourth companies are to be positioned 420 yards behind the first line, they can deploy at the same time; if closer, add the time, at cross-country speed, needed to make up the difference.

Of course this assumes that “across a frontage that’s, say, a half-mile either side of the road” means a total frontage of half a mile, centred on the road — that is, a quarter if a mile each side. This is, historically, a reasonable battalion frontage. However if it means half a mile each side of the road, for a total frontage of a mile, then using the same time and distance assumption our battalion would take half an hour to shake out for a one-up attack.

All this is of course entirely artifical and idealised, but indicates what is probably a reasonable lower bound to the time needed to accomplish the necessary movement on foot, assuming no problems of terrain, weather, and enemy interference, and also, probably the biggest assumption of all, that everyone knows that’s where they are supposed to go. In an attack that has been prepared in depth, there might be all sorts of aids to let people know where they are supposed to go, such as white tape and soldiers acting as guides. Those are not at all likely in an attack off the line of march.

This is also looking solely at the question of physically placing the riflemen where they need to be. Despite the training of staff officers in solving time-and-distance problems, it is not typically the movement of troops that limits the speed of an attack. As m’colleague Paul Syms has put it, “An army advances as fast as it can think”. It may be helpful to think of the thinking as consisting of three processes; doing the recce, making the plan, and issuing the orders. Recce (including specialist kinds, like engineer recce, and what is now called “Information Preparation of the Battlespace”) will be going on the whole time, but it is likely that commanders at each level may wish to make their own personal recce before finalising their plan. Not everyone does this — German junior leaders were encouraged to do their recce on the way in, to save time. There is always a balance to be struck between through preparation and getting things done quickly; Jim Storr has presented a simple but convincing argument that quick decisions dominate good decisions. Planning, on the basis of whatever information is available, can take any amount of time. Military analysts spend a lot of time trying to extract answers from soldiers to questions like “how long does it take to plan a battalion attack?” and always get the answer that it depends how much time is available. A good staff will make a quick outline plan almost immediately, and then spend as much time as they have available on refining it, with the idea of being ready to go if anyone suddenly brings H forward by two hours, or unexpectedly puts everything off until Thursday. The Royal Regiment of Artillery, incidentally, makes it a point of pride that the infantry should never have to wait for the gunners to complete their planning.

Planning might be infinitely fungible, but there is a good planning principle called the one-third/two-thirds rule that says whatever the amount of time available for planning and orders, and HQ should take one-third of the time for itself, and allow two-thirds for its subordinates. This applies at every level. So, if we imagine that a battalion is supposed to get an attack laid on in 15 minutes (the time from the time and distance appreciation above), that would be five minutes for battalion planning and orders, three and a bit minutes for company, and six and a bit for platoons. I hope it is obvious that these timings are silly. It is true that during the Cold War Chieftain squadrons were expected to be able to issue squadron radio orders in three minutes, but that is merely dictating some quick orders over the air to the whole squadron at once, with no time for planning at all.

Much more reasonable would be the sort of timing I experienced in the “I Have a Cunning Plan” game I put on at COW many years ago now. This was modelled on then-current British Army planning processes at battalion level. A battalion staff of quite experienced wargamers easily managed to fill up an hour creating the planning materials for a pretty simple battalion attack. There was then an additional time needed to convey the plan to the companies in an ‘O’ group; say another ten minutes if we’re quick. Using the one-third/two-thirds rule suggests that the whole planning and orders process should then have taken three and a half hours, which sounds a lot, but I don’t think is madly out of line. Note that that is seven to fourteen times as long as our above estimate of the physical time required to walk to the start positions.

Of course there is an endless supply of other factors that could push timings up or down, and a lot depends on the broader situation and the command culture of the army in question. Plans aren’t made, and orders aren’t framed, in a vacuum; there will be some previously-issued operation order that sets the context, and may cover lots of things so that the staff needn’t worry about them. Having lots of drills makes it possible to take shortcuts sometimes. I have given section orders that took a good hour for the planning, poncho model and ‘O’ group (suggesting a battalion planning cycle of 3.375 hours). I have also been in section attacks where no orders were given at all, because we knew our contact drills and we always went right flanking. I understand that the Wehrmacht could, thanks to its drills, start a regimental attack off the line of march in 45 minutes, which is good going by anyone’s standards. Abbreviating things could also produce difficulties. “Killer Butterflies” mentions the WW1 experience that, because the plan had not been shared down to the very lowest level — soldiers were expected to do what they were told, not understand it — there were many cases where, having successfully captured an enemy trench line, the soldiers occupying it would come back for further orders, because their officer had been hit, and he was the only one who knew the plan. This was not a question of cowardice, but simply of not having been put in the picture. I expect a lot of second-rate armies continued the tradition of not telling the lower ranks what was going on until WW2, and even later. Even good armies don’t always manage it (“On the wagons… off the wagons… different set of wagons”).

And there are all the wonderful elements of Clausewitzian friction that Mick Hayman is recalling with his mild paraphrase of the Prussian’s apothegm “in war, even the simplest thing is the most difficult”. I always like the saying that “The British Army fights all its battles on hillsides in the pouring rain where two maps meet.”

Hope that has contributed some meaninglessness to the more-than-the-usually-meaningless rumination.

All the best,

John.

[Don Glewwe]

“Hope that has contributed some meaninglessness to the more-than-the-usually-meaningless rumination.”

Indeed in has! Thank you very much…that looks to have been a few gallons of drying paint. ; )

[MartinR]

This is what the 1956 British Army Tactical Wargame had to say about it, based on operational experience in WW2 and Korea. Note, this is PLANNING time. This in addition to execution, which includes moving time, and typical battle duration for a 2km advance estimated at 2 to 4 hours.

Battle Planning:

Bttn.Pre-planned Bttn counter attack w. Tank Sqdn plus Arty Regt. 2 hours

Bttn.All other Bttn attacks with basic support (Troop/Squadron/Battery) 3 hours

Bttn.Bttn attack with Tank Troop/Sqdn plus Arty Regt. 4 hours

Bde.2 Bttn Pre-planned Counter Attk w. Squadron/Regiment + Arty Regt 2 hours

Bde.2 Bn attack w. Troop/Squadron each + Arty Regt 7 hours

Bde.2 Bn attack w. Squadron each + 2 Artillery Regts 10 hours

Bde.2 Bn attack w Squadron/Regiment each + 3 Artillery Regts 12 hours

Div. 2 Brigade attack w. Tank Regt each,  all Div arty, reserve Bde 24 hours

Hasty attacks (Bn/Bde) only required 1 hour planning time, but no Div artillery available

 

"Mistakes in the initial deployment cannot be rectified" - Helmuth von Moltke

[MartinR]

There are other task timings in the various umpire guides, but critically, for battalion sized units, one Hour to deploy and one hour to reform.

So for your hasty battalion attack off the line of march, supported by the battalion S company, you are looking at two hours to deploy and plan the hasty attack. If generous, you might include a dedicated artillery battery, if the unit already had one.

Hasty attacks against prepared positions have a seriously reduced chance of success unless the odds are overwhelming.

A prepared battalion attack with minimal support is going to take three hours (as the unit can deploy while the planning takes place).

 

"Mistakes in the initial deployment cannot be rectified" - Helmuth von Moltke

[Don Glewwe]

Thanks much for the info!  -should be enough dried paint to allow me to come up with something workable. ; )

[Orm Embar]

In your example, one of the things to remember is that unless planned in advance, a Bttn attack would not have a pre planned fire plan. This doesn’t mean they didn’t have fire support, but that it would need to be called in by Forward observers and unit commanders on the hoof.

 

In the Normandy campaign a hasty attack by British or American commands could result on a quiet day, of a hell of a lot more artillery hitting the enemy than the attackers expected, and on busy days, the bare minimum of support given. There is an account (might be in Jary, 18 platoon) about a company attack that called for support, and got everything including battleship shells on top of the targets, because the areas AGRA had no preplanned targets at the time they called for help, essentially every support gun was available.

 

they strolled into the position they had to take, with deaf and badly disorientated defenders milling around as they had been caught cold.

[Don Glewwe]

…unless planned in advance…fire support…would need to be called in by Forward observers and unit commanders on the hoof.

…a hasty attack…could result…a lot more…[or] the bare minimum of support given..

Good points – thank you for the ideas.

[Silent Invader]

Fascinating discussion. Thank you.

[Don Glewwe]

Okay, here’s an off-the-cuff, one-cup-of-coffee idea for determining the (campaign) time used to get a (foot) Infantry Battalion (3 Companies +Supports) deployed into position for an attack across a half-mile frontage from a single-road march:

Deployment: Each Company (in road order) and equivalent support unit rolls 2d6 x5 = number of minutes used to get into position.  Results may never be less than a previous roll, but instead default to the previous roll.  This would allow the player the option to begin without a lagging unit if desired.

Any possible artillery support (beyond incorporated mortars or such) requires its own roll, but multiplies the result by 10 to determine the number of minutes required — # dice rolled = 1d6 +1d6 for every command level above Battalion.  As with the individual Companies, the player then has the option to proceed without the artillery support if the resulting time is judged excessive.

Planning: Roll 1d6 x10 = number of minutes used to plan the attack.  The player may continue to roll one die at a time until the desired number of minutes has accumulated, but the number rolled on each die must always be used/added to the total (i.e.: player cannot add just ‘some of’ a number rolled on a die).

The Rub (‘cuz there’s always a catch…): Every 10 minute increment less than 100 used to plan the attack will generate a turn (counted from the beginning of the game) in which the attacking force suffers from a ‘poor deployment’ restriction.  During those turns, any unit deploying onto the table must first roll (1d6) greater than or equal to its troop rating (3, 4, or 5) to successfully deploy – a failure means that they cannot deploy that turn, and the order chit/point used in the attempt is lost.  This would give a force with a higher rating a better chance to pull off a hasty attack?

 

Obviously, the greater result of the two steps (deployment and planning) will determine the minimum time (plans aren’t worth much if the troops aren’t in position…and vice versa).

I’m going to pour another cup of coffee…

[Aethelflaeda was framed]

I would get rid of the ability to avoid a lagging unit unless there is absolutely very good command control and communications.  Attacking piecemeal due to lack of communications and some units getting lost or  to the start line positions too early/late is a common situation even with radio equipped forces and forces on time or not lost might not know that the others are and proceed on the assumption of support/protected flanks.

 

Certainly a good fix to counter player omniscience and absolute command control on the table.  You’ll have much more enjoyable, tense games and tactical situations when that platoon/company is late, rather than on time and in the right position.

 

Nothing is more dangerous to a unit than a LT and a map.

Mick Hayman
Margate and New Orleans

[Don Glewwe]

…get rid of the ability to avoid a lagging unit…Attacking piecemeal due to lack of communications and some units getting lost or to the start line positions too early/late is a common situation…

Good point.  Perhaps (to make it not so nasty) give a chance(roll) for the player to find out that B Company isn’t ready yet (-based on Troop Rating, similar to deployment?) so that the attack can be delayed until they’re set?

[Aethelflaeda was framed]

You could add a modifier based on the quality of the HQ/training of the battalion overall and the recce capabilities of the battalion.  Still, some high initiative/ impatient  units are simply not going to wait on the slowpokes and move out anyways. Those are going to be the most fun and memorable games to play.

 

It is this sort of game that shows the importance of maintaining a ready reserve, able to commit to unforeseen circumstances.

Mick Hayman
Margate and New Orleans

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