[Mike Oliver]

First, the Quatre Bras incident may well have been something Wellington devised on the spot for a particular situation – I haven’t looked into it but I know that there was very little allied cavalry support available and a four-deep line might have replicated the effect of a square, if the unit was under threat from French cavalry, without actually forming square.

Second, a line of British infantry would usually refrain from firing until the enemy was within close pistol shot, whereas other nations frequently opened fire at longer range – sometimes meaning they got off two relatively ineffectual volleys during an enemy’s approach whereas the  British would fire what is usually described as “one devastating volley” that brought down large numbers of French infantry thus ending their advance. Unlike their opponents, British infantry received considerable musketry training which made them more effective. This coupled rate of fire with instructions to aim low (at the legs of the enemy) so that recoil lifted the muzzles to around chest height. French infantry tended to aim for the upper body and so a large proportion of the projectiles went over the heads of the target. This is why I feel that +1 is a not unreasonable DRM for British infantry.

However, whilst not a drill manual requirement, French infantry would endeavour to advance to contact in column. In our rules If they manage to survive a volley fired by their enemy they should receive a DRM either in their morale throw (if any) to achieve contact and/or in their melee resolution.

Remember, rules are written to regulate the manoeuvring and combat of miniature figures on a table top with a view to achieve results that are similar to those of historical combat, not to give any particular advantage or disadvantage based on the rule-writer’s preconceptions.

[Mike Oliver]

My secret is out! But thank you for the kind words. I somehow thought the conditions in the AWI might have occasioned something like that but I don’t think it throws any particular new light on the discussion about 2 vs 3 ranks. Your comments on Tarleton are in line with what I’ve read about him.

Cheers,

Mike

[Mike Oliver]

I’ve now had the chance to re-check Nafziger and, as Whirlwind states, he gives the reasons for the British two-rank formation as those I mentioned earlier. It is interesting to note that he also says that Napoleon favoured the two-rank option because of the number of wounds caused by the third rank on the two in front of them – apparently mostly caused during reloading and firing by the third rank (even though third rank firing was not permitted by regulation).

Whirlwind is correct about the British battalion strengths at Vimeiro (many were at around 1,000) but I could find no reference as to the depth of their lines and so we are left with the same conundrum. I suspect there may have been the odd battalion whose diehard colonel favoured three ranks – personal preferences seem to have been acceptable in those days – but that the vast majority adopted two-rank lines. I have no other reason than “gut feel” for this, though. Sadly, many aspects of warfare at the time were “taken for granted” and so not mentioned in records. If it was “taken for granted” that battalions formed in two lines, it is doubtful that anyone would have thought it worth mentioning in the records of battles. So we remain in ignorance.

I’m starting a new thread on a related matter: to what extent did the activities of “camp buddies” affect the outcome of battles. Generally, in camp, a small group of maybe a dozen other ranks (including a non-com) would form a self-support group that shared camp chores (uniform repair, boot maintenance, cooking, foraging, etc.) and looked out for one another in combat. If anyone’s interested, look out for the post and let me have your thoughts.

Cheers,

Mike

 

[Mike Oliver]

Your first thoughts could be correct. Wellington preferred to fight a division formed in two lines – one brigade of three our four battalions in line behind another. At Albuera, for example, this enabled 2nd division to reform after the disastrous attack of the Vistular Lancers and 2e Hussards. A skirmish screen was usually placed ahead of the first line in extended order which often appeared to the French as the first line. The way the order is framed (“The order of battle of the ARMY [my capitals] is to be 2 deep”) doesn’t sound like he is referring to individual battalions and, if the practice was, indeed, commonplace (even standard), would battalions need such instructions?

Cheers,

Mike

[Mike Oliver]

Hi Stephen:

I would always take anything I read on TMP with a pinch of salt. The site is a navigational nightmare, is not well-run and opinion rather than history seems too prevalent. However, on the British army question, I can recall reading that a general order for two ranks was issued – possibly as a result of experiences in  the American War of Independence. So, perhaps my feeling that Wellington had a hand in framing the order is mistaken.

As far as the Guards are concerned, I’m going to check out Brent Nosworthy and George Nafziger to see what they have to say on the matter – they are both trustworthy sources and don’t worship Napoleon as a military god 🙂

Regards,

Mike

[Mike Oliver]

First, let me say it is some time since I looked into this subject, so my memory may well be at fault. I believe the original British drill manual called for 3 ranks. However, there was an over-riding requirement that the frontage (of a company, I think) be of a certain length and that, if this was unachievable with three ranks, due to a shortage of men, the company was to form in two ranks. The Guards battalions were generally not in trouble over manpower and I have the recollection of reports that they did form in three ranks.

The Peninsular War thinned out the ranks of most of the battalions present (some units even falling below 400)  and so the tendency was for them to form in two ranks to preserve the frontage. I’m not sure if this is anecdotal or a fact but Wellington was aware that the effect of fire from a battalion in two ranks was sufficient and that the ability to resist enemy charges was not noticeably weakened, so 2 ranks became the rule. As a result, the troops gained confidence in the system and it continued.

The main reason for the success of the British in the Peninsular, at a tactical level, was the fact that they selected positions out of sight of the enemy (reverse slopes) and deployed a much more dense skirmish screen than the French (smaller intervals between paired skirmishers). When the French encountered the thicker British screen, they assumed it was the main line and, when this retired as they advanced, believed they had thrown the main British line back. When they came upon the silent battalions of the main line awaiting their arrival, there was a faltering. As they moved closer and their enemy “at long pistol shot” made ready, presented muskets and fired a devastating short range volley, frequently destroying the front rank of the advancing French, there was hesitation that was met with lowered bayonets, a loud “hurrah!” and several hundred red-coated men headed rapidly in their direction. This was frequently (but not always) sufficient to panic the French into a precipitate departure.

French drill manuals required the infantry to march in column to a position within musket range, deploy into three ranks and commence firing. On the main European continent, the sight of the French advance in great columns with fixed bayonets was often enough to break the enemy before firing was begun and so the habit of using cold steel at the front of a column to unsettle their foe became the preferred method, despite the drill books.

Finally, if brought to a halt by enemy fire, French infantry were expected to halt, deploy into line and participate in a musketry duel. Unfortunately for them, the British tactic of not firing until at very short range made this such a hazardous procedure and, for those that halted and stood, as the rear ranks moved out from behind their comrades at the front, they were met by a hail of volley fire from the British that they scuttled back into what cover their comrades provided. This is possibly where the myth of line superiority vs column was created.

I have said, more than once, that this is written from memory and is not offered as cold, hard fact. I shall re-visit my sources and try to obtain confirmation to let you have if I can.

Regards,

Mike Oliver

 

[Author]

Posts