[rob shackleton]

No pics of Viv’s cart. But its a nice enough model. I have tarted mine up to fit with ABs and it works well

[rob shackleton]

By the way what is this mysterious ‘D=R*T’ – it is not a Napoleonic term I am familiar with

[rob shackleton]

Could we start again with this and could those ‘experts’ who are not really interested go off and do something else. Please God this aint TMP!

[rob shackleton]

My two penny worth.

1) Only the commander of the army can realistically order a GB to be formed.

Only he knows what the available limit of guns/ammunition are/is. A corps commander is unlikely to have time to see opportunity if he is managing his corps properly. That does not mean to say that he cannot supplement or enhance the artillery at divisional level. But that enhancement will only give advantage at a local level and that advantage will be temporary. It is likely that the sole purpose of this enhance artillery power is to enable his divisional commanders to enact their orders effectively. Such positioning of Corps artillery is ought not to be seen as a GB. It also requires professional officers of general rank to be able to oversee it’s operation. Only the Army Commander has access both to competant officers and spare artillery

2) The GB ‘has’ to have a ‘Grand Tactical’, battle winning purpose

GB cannot be formed on a ‘whim’. Some thought has to be put into where its position will be, how it might get there, who needs to move out of the way, how much space it needs, how is it best supplied, what its target is and effect on that target can it be expected to have. And importantly, once it completes its mission, how and who exploits the advantage. So a grand battery is an integral part of a plan OR all the operations above have to be realistically achievable as the battle unfolds. Once again only an Army commander can do this -only he has access to the expertise and authority to ensure the operation  is carried out effectively

3) it is not simply a killing machine what was its real purpose?

We ‘assume’ that the cumulative effect of 60 (example) guns shooting on a narrow (ish) frontage against a defined target or area is going cause a whole heap of dead and wounded. There is no evidence to back up that assumption. If we take the example of the ACW (which was ‘essentially’ a Naploleonic type battle experience and has reports all in English) we see that the effect was ‘bloody hell get your head down or lets get out of the way of this’ (Official Records of the War of the Rebellion  – Gettysburg reports for example) There appear to be no excess casualties among Union regiments as a result. For the union artillery it was a bit like p*****ng into the wind – their material was being damaged and their fire was having no ‘appreciable effect’ (important phrase that). There were quite a lot of unexpected casualties among regiments posted behind the lines unable to understand why so many cannon balls were whizzing merrily down the hill at them after seemingly doing little damage among the troops they were aimed at. This is even before we consider if the Confederate artillery was up to the task it was asked to do. For all practical purposes it was giant pyrotechnic failure. Now that being said were the Union lines shocked enough to fall victim to the attack. history shows us no, But imagine if the confederate attack had been supported by two brigades of light horse?

Imagine (even if the artillery could be classed as French on a bad day) the smoke clears and you find yourself concussed and confused facing a French infantry division fresh as daisies supported by 8 regiments of light horse was approaching in a determined manner, the chances are you would scarper. After enduring the rough and tumble of all those balls, your nerves would be shot and you would be off. And history would record the grand bombardment of the lines as a masterstroke. The failure of Bobby Lee’s GB was its poor professional performance (not a critical issue at first) and the timing and confusion of Picket’s charge and the lack of a decent cavalry force on the battlefield. (this is not a red rag for you ACW buffs)

So the purpose of a GB is to alarm and confuse an enemy, to break the nerve of any troops in front of it and crucially to be timed with a well led combined arms attack at the point of weakness. Not an issue of casualties as such – but for gaming purposes loss of casualties may well be a good way of modelling loss of effectiveness.

In these respects I don’t think GB were as common as supposed. The example of Russian organisation at Borodino as a good case why not. The artillery was in large formations for organisational purposes, it may have been used in relatively large groups of batteries- but these were local responses in moments of crisis  organised by local artillery commanders -Kutuzov not having much of a clue as to what was going on. His purpose was to avoid being defeated. He personally seems to have exercised no control on the way the battle was fought.

Good examples are the GB at Wagram and Waterloo- organised by N using experienced troops. I am not sure about Senarmont. did he just gather all his artillery in one place to engageand advance at close range on his own accord. Or was it something thought about at length lest such an occasion avail itself. I don’t believe it can be classed as a classic GB. It was more like a GB of opportunity .I would be intrigued to learn (and understand) how, in the midst of battle he on his own initiative sought out all the batteries of his Corps and got them to move to exactly the correct position (from that point on the gunners merely did their jobs). How did he ‘see’ the opportunity, were most of his batteries unengaged at the time? I imagine the divisional general’s complaining if an a battery was taken out of line on the whim of a General de Brigade. All the maps show Serarmont’s GB fully deployed at the start of the battle which suggests the hand of the master.

 

I’ll get my coat now…

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